ENGLISH THOUGHT IN THE LAST CENTURY.*

[FIRST NOTIC]I.]

As we omitted, owing to some accident, to review Mr. Leslie Stephen's History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century at the time of its first appearance, we may be permitted to bestow the attention the book deserves on this second edition. It. consists of two volumes, containing in all about 900 pages, and is mainly occupied with the religious thought of England during the century of "the Deist contro- versy," though the author's plan is not exclusive, like that of Dr. John Hunt, Mr. Stephen has muck more literature than Mr. Hunt, along with great vivacity, and he allows himself a range of discursive comment which is at least ample. His general manner reminds you of an expression which Milton once applied to his Presbyterian enemies,—" hose light-armed refuters." His point of view is that of a playfully truculent Agnostic, who has had the great advantage, for the purposes of this controversy, of having been trained (as the reader will infer) in a school of cultivated religious belief. Hence his treatment of Christian apologists and other religious writers is intelligent and intended to be kindly, though (to use an old illustration) the hand that is lifted for a salute too often descends in a blow. The general impression left upon the reader's mind is that weight and intensity are wanting ; and that what might have been a broad and comprehensive book is a little damaged by that sort of attempt to include too much which ends in something like scrappiness. The lack of warmth, which makes Mr. Stephen less than satisfactory as a critic in his longer studies, makes itself still more felt in his rapid sketches of writers in groups. But we know of no book of the kind which contains so.much information or so much keen and lively criticism of the same order.

The first volume opens with a chapter entitled, "The Philo- sophical Basis," and hero the author at once lets us know what he is aiming at, and gives a lucid account of "the main currents of English philosophical speculation," in which the leading names are those of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Reid, and Hartley, though Descartes and Spinoza are not left out. This introduc- tion is, perhaps, the best part of the book, granting the point of view. But many of Mr. Stephen's readers would have liked some account, however brief, of distinctly English thought from about the time of the Commonwealth. This would have been outside his chronological limits, but so are Descartes and Spiuoza. it would not be very difficult to main- tain that English Rationalism would have run much the same course, if they had never written ; it was largely the result of social and political excitements, and had a character of its Own.

From the " Philosophical Basis," as he calls it, Mr. Stephen passes to "Constructive and Critical Deism," giving brisk sketches of the skirmishing on all sides. Then Butler, Clarke, Hume, Warburton, Law, Paley, Priestley, and Beattie are passed in review, special pains being taken, as might be expected, with Butler, Home, and Clarke. The second volume is devoted to the history in the eighteenth century of "Moral Philosophy " proper, " Political Economy," and what Mr. Stephen calls the "Religious Reaction" (with such leading names as Law, Wesley), &c. ; and the " Literary Reaction, the latter treated very discursively.

In all this, Mr. Stephen shows great reading and power of minute observation ; but his eye is much keener for differences than for fundamental resemblances, and perhaps it would have conduced to unity of effect if sonic of the smaller names had been omitted ; for examine, Mrs. Inchbald, Mrs. Rad- cliffe, and Horace Walpole. Much of that portion of the work entitled " Characteristics " is below the level of the greater part of the remainder. The thinking here is of the " obvious" order, and the writing sometimes poor. Take this about Parson Adams :—" Parson Adams, when neces- sity compels, takes to the cudgels with a vigour which might have excited the envy of Christopher North. He scorns the

unborn Malthus, and is outrageously impecunious in his habits." It will not be contended that this is "good form," even for an article in a magazine ; but some laxity of manner is naturally connected with this incessant multiplication of small dicta con- cerning men and things. A little less of this, and a little more in the way of attempting to exhibit speculative changes in con- nection with social and political changes, would have been an improvement. There is much more deliberate moral and thee- * History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century. By Leslie Stephen. 2 vols. Second Edition. London : Smith, Elder, and Co.

logical discussion or advocacy in the novels and poetry of the century than is suggested by Mr. Stephen's studies, and to have brought this out would have greatly strengthened " Character- istics."

There must always in works like this be room for difference of taste and choice, and Mr. Stephen has done SO much and introduced so many names, that we will only venture to suggest that Zachary Mayne may have been better worth notice than some other of the minor metaphysicians who are mentioned ;. and that, coining to the novelists, Robert Bage (the friend of Hutton, of Birmingham) wrote novels of a type singularly well? adapted to Mr. Stephen's purpose in the division- headed "Characteristics." To read Bage is dreary work, but enough is said about him in Sir Walter Scott's Lives of the Novelists- to provoke curiosity, and convey some idea, of his quality as a " representative " writer."

The general result may, from Mr. Stephen's point of view, be stated in small compass. The history of English thought in the eighteenth century ends by leaving Hume master of the situation, so far as theology and metaphysics are concerned. All attempts to construct a consistent scheme of natural theology broke down. Clarice's Ontology and Paley's Common- sense were alike unsatisfactory (in the Natural Theology of the latter, Mr. Stephen discerns some apprehension on Paley's part of coming disaster from a possible doctrine of evolution). Besides this, it is (Mr. Stephen thinks) clear that no basis has been made out for ethics upon the assumption of human free- will : to simple Determinism it must come at last. As for any specific form of religion, it is obvious that we must make out a Divine Being, before we can get at a revelation from him ; and even granting the natural theology of (say) Clarke, nobody has yet succeeded in showing how to bridge the gulf between demon- stration and historical or any other kind of probable evidence. Now, it would be clearly impossible here to fight a pitched battle with Mr. Stephen all along the line. He criticises the metaphysical and moral controversies of the eighteenth century in the light of the most recent conceptions, and in the philo- sophical dialect of to-day ; and, of course, this was in one way inevitable. The critic of to-day must think the thought of to- day and use its language ; and yet the outcome of this inevitable. process is in some respects hardly fair. It would, of course, be impracticable to take every separate thinker of the eighteenth century, and make him talk as he would have talked if he had. been arguing with us on similar lines at the present hour ; but so much depends upon atmosphere and latent assumptions, that we cannot feel as if we had got the very argument in its "habit as it lived," when it is ever so correctly abstracted for us by a hostile critic whose mind " lives "in quite another 'habit." The late Mr. Lewes's presentation of Schelling or Hegel, for example, strikes you like the " opening " of an advocate who has not mastered his brief, in a case which he does not like. That is a strong illustration, but many of Mr. Stephen's readers will think that where he takes most pains, he sometimes does his author most injustice; for instance, in his handling—might we say mangling P—of Locke's doctrine of a tacit social com- pact. Locke certainly does not use the word "tacit," in order to evade any difficulty or to express any doubt ; nor would he be gratified by such phrases as these,—" The God of Locke, less severely abstract" (than the God of Spinoza), "is capable of taking a side in human affairs," and. "is retained to supply- the necessary sanction to the social compact." As for Theology and Ethics, it is easy to see what men like Butler, Clarke, and Paley would say, after they had mastered the new dialect, and. reconciled themselves to the controversial etiquette of "scientifi- cally trained. thinkers." Butler would say, "I dare say it is the fault of my own way of putting things, and perhaps I was making an impossible experiment ; but at all events, you and I have been got into such a maze over the question of Conscience and Free-will, that we must really begin once more, and try it over again." Paley would say, "In the name of common- sense, why should I give up my argument from Design, if I admit your Evolution P It is true that in a posthumous work' of his, your Mr. Mill wrote as if he thought the Design argu- ment would be in danger, if Evolution should be proven ; but what if he did P All I have to do is to re-write the last eleven paragraphs of my twenty-third chapter." Clarke and Reid and Wollaston would say," Your Hume and the rest have simply made a vain circuit, and you must now either use language without meaning, or set up some new Ontology."

It would be far from true to affirm that Mr. Leslie Stephen

has chosen his field or his weapons unfairly, but there is much in the eighteenth century which makes it a favourable fighting. ground for an Agnostic of the nineteenth. The religious ideas now stand out in a wider and nobler light, and in spite of those confusions of which Mr. Stephen flippantly, though not un- justly, complains in his essays on "Free-thinking and Plain- speakittg," the Agnostic side gets for gladiatorial purposes the full advantage of that higher and wider light. Butler, the typical Christian protagonist of his time, just and powerful thinker as he is on all purely moral questions, can say things about Christiauity which sound like maxims out of a theological Poor Richard's Almanac. For example, in a missionary sermon, he gravely remarks that since the slaves in the plantations are made in this world "as miserable as they well can be" for our profit, we might, at least, take care that they are instructed in the way of. salvation for the next world. And this is not a solitary case, nor is it sarcasm. Too frequently, among Christian advocates of the time, we find a bargain-driving logic, and a trick of pinning poor human nature down to the lowest terms, which reminds one of the spirit in which the penny-a-liner recorded the suicide—" No cause can be assigned for the rash act, the sum of 7$. 6d. having been found on the person of the unfortunate deceased." Agnostic critics (among them Mr. Stephen) are apt to be angry at the difference which exists between the new religious advocacy and the old,—as if it were a case of stealing a march upon the new forms of denial ; but it is much more than this. It goes to the root of these questions, so that what sometimes looks like a more trick of phrasing—and. when used at second-hand becomes so—is really, in its origin, meaning, and last justification, an argument from the heights and depths of our moral and spiritual necessities ; a transformation of light-force and heat-force, which insists on being "conserved," and can be driven into no other shape.

Mr. Stephen refers not unhandsomely to Dr. John Hunt's well-known work, and. it will often be found a useful check upon his own. Mr. Stephen has in various essays made his own position plain enough. He is an Agnostic and a Determinist, with no reserves, and without the slightest desire to make things pleasant. It might be rude to say that he persistently scolds down any element of hope which from his point of view cannot. give a scientific account of itself, but it would not be far wrong. He is a very direct and single- minded writer, but, after all, his thoughts want body ; his logic is thin and his tone chilly. Some of his readers will doubtless say that this is just as it ought to be, and those to whom his chief topics are new, or nearly so, will be so impressed by the information he has crowded iuto his two volumes, and by the general lucidity of his manner, that they -will not miss any- thing ; but others will feel that when everything had been thrown overboard to save the ship, she ought to have made more way. Never, certainly, did a thinker go about his work in so absolutely disencumbered a fashion :—" The ultimate vic- tory of truth is a consoling, we may hope that it is a sound, doctrine. If the race gradually accommodates itself to its environments, it should fellow that the belief of the race gravi- tates towards that form in which the mind becomes an accurate reflection of the external universe." These are among the most comfortable words we can remember in the whole 900 close pages. Of course, the italics are ours. But is it worth while to go through so much to learn so little ? Mr. Stephen follows up this pinch of the open air by some doleful sentences, intended apparently to prevent our getting much exhilarated over the -too genial and encouraging words which went before. The whole passage reminds one of Charles Lamb's maliciously humorous depreciation of parental pride, on the ground that children often turn out ill and defeat the fond hopes of their parents, "taking to vicious courses, which end in poverty, dis- grace, the gallows, 6"c."

In dealing with Wollaston, to whom Mr. Hunt does much more justice than Mr. Stephen does, the author becomes the Matthew Bramble of philosophical criticism. The general effect of Wollaston's estimate of human life as it stands is not what Mr. Stephen.conveys, and it is a curious thing that that writer should be so unkindly reported by Mr. Stephen (see hid- aentally the forcible remarks of Gray, the poet, against Boling- broke and in. defence of Wollaston). Poor Wollaston spends -the greater part of his skill and space in making out what he holds to be provable, sometimes demonstrable "truths" in religion and morals. Ho also holds that (though the moral quality of an act may be expressed in various terms, including the hedonistic) it is a short and decisive way of determining the moral quality of an act, to inquire whether it is or is not in har- mony with these proved "truths." One might have expected this to meet with some mercy from a critic who must believe that right conduct is conduct duly adjusted to " the environ- ment" of the actor. But by quoting with irony the saddest passages in the book and omitting others, Mr. Stephen produces an effect which should make the "Hermit of Charterhouse Square" turn in his grave. There is no final difference between the philosophical methods of the late Mr. Lewes and those of Mr. Stephen ; yet Mr. Lewes could write that this is, on the whole, a happy world, and that on any large view the suffering that exists is thrown into utter obscurity. So much may spec- tators of the same scene disagree about it.

It is useless to attempt to disguise the consequences to which such a review as this of the history of philosophical and theolo- gical thought reduces us. One particular century is selected, but

the sceptical or agnostic argument applies to all centuries, and, the question may be stated in ITV CC, upon a review of any decade

or two of human speculation. If Ontology is impossible, the universe becomes "an incoherent fleeting uullivorse and. de- lirious chase of Pan" (for the full quotation, see Dr. Garth Wilkinson's dashing attack on Hume, in his introduction to Swedenborg On the Infinite). The new conceptions are, indeed, only held together by a new sham Ontology, from which all elements of personality, will, and affection have been withdrawn, so far as the shabbiest devices of language can pump them out. Everything is in flux, and we have only to turn the two-edged blade of Home's analysis upon such ideas as "the race" and "time environment of the race," to feel bow miserably we have been trifled with by the whole of his school. It is quite true that, take what scheme of the universe we may, we conic at the last upon one or more verbal paradoxes ; but we can be driven to accept that which contains the minimum number of these, while it absorbs all other difficulties, and reconciles itself with a provision for the deepest needs of the human heart. When we have parted (so far as we can part) with our belief in such a solution and such a provision, we feel much more than what Mr. Stephen calls "time romantic regret." We feel that we have cheated ourselves,—that there is something to be accounted for, which must be dealt with in the first place of all, and that no solution can be even sane which treats spiritual necessities as mere incidents of given stages of development.

Of course, to those who have made up their minds that there is an objective reality corresponding to the highest spiritual hope possible to the human mind, these discussions are apt to prove wearisome. But, equally of course, they are 'useful from many points of view. The heart and conscience are not satis- fied by any amount of intellectual demonstration, nor will the best-reasoned opinion lay us low at the Divine footstool. As Jonathan Edwards says, the Devil has "great abilities," and is not only well acquainted with hell from having been "the oldest inhabitant," and from having " experienced its torments for fifty-seven centuries" (the businesslike old divine's figures would now have to be extended) ; but he is a "sound and learned theologian." Still, a merely intellectual conviction is something for a mere man to hold on by, when for a time he can do no better than just hold on. But, after all, we find the old dividing-lines prevail in these debates. There are two classes of thinkers, those who incline to the a priori method, and those who incline to the a post eriori. Of course these are hybrids, and sometimes the thinker who most rigidly affects scientific methods is partly a mystic as well. Spinoza is an example. It looks a little unfortunate that while the a posteriori or " positive " thinkers find it so easy to under- stand one another, and to make common cause, those speculators who take the ." high a priori road" are slow to see that they all mean the same thing. There are very numerous examples of the a priori argument for the existence of a Cod, and they are all nearly identical, though the terms and the order of the propositions differ. Perhaps, it would not be a useless contribution to philosophical literature, if some one were to restate in their order the chief theories of what is called "intuitive morality" and the chief ontological systems of theology, and exhibit the pervad- ing agreement between them. That there is no such pervading agreement is an illusion which is, naturally enough, but rather recklessly, " worked " by thinkers of another order, who reduce the universe to "possibilities of sensation," and fancy they can keep "admiration, hope, and lore" alive and active by exhibit- ing the chance that something called "the race" may some

day, and through various processes of trampling-down, absorb- ing, and crushing, get adjusted to something called its " environ- ment ;" though by the theory there is no final reality, either in man or out of him, behind the possibilities of sensation.

Mr. Stephen has naturally and necessarily taken some account of the part which -the development of science in the

eighteenth century played in modifying theological and. other opinion, but this topic does not come to the front as often as

might have been expected. It is not much more than amusing to find our Princess Caroline (of Anspach) inviting Sir Isaac Newton .and. Dr. Clarke to Court to expound the Newtonian

philosophy, but it is deeply suggestive when we see how the "new views" of the universe affected minds like Butler's, and even minds like James Thomson's, while they glanced off from

Young's. In chapter 3, Part I., of the Analogy, Butler in-

dulges in visions of a future state commensurate with the " im- mensity " ot the physical universe, and puts the case of a future

"kingdom of God," in which the visible triumph of " virtue " should have the effect of reclaiming from" vice" those who were still "capable of amendment." And this is only one illustration. Mr. Stephen's criticism of Butler's treatment of the subject of Necessity and the Divine Government is not satisfactory. In chapter 5, section xxiii., Mr. Stephen tells us that the chief argu- ment of the first part of the Analogy includes the state-

ment that "it is .approximately true of divine punishments" that they are sufferings inflicted upon the criminal on account of his crimes. Then, proceeding to the second part, Mr. Stephen summarises Butler thus :—" We are - now invited to attend to a different, and, it would seem, contradictory series of facts. Divine punishments sometimes strike the virtuous person on account of his virtue. They often mho; the vicious person on account of his vice; they constantly and systemati- cally strike the innocent person instead of the guilty ; and the penalty is not even roughly proportioned to the offence. Why, because they resemble punishments in one respect, should we call thorn punishments at all ?" Why ? Because Butler has before, rightly or wrongly, laid it down that. "the true notion

or conception of the Author of Nature is that of a master or governor, prior to the consideration of his moral attributes." But the fact is, Butler does not say in the " First Part" that

"divine punishments approximately" follow desert, He admits, as an objection requiring to be dealt with, "that good actions, and such as are beneficial to society, are often punished, as in the case of persecution, and in other cases, and that ill and mischievous actions are often rewarded." And, more expressly still,—

" It is not pretended but that in the natural course of things hap- piness and misery appear to be distributed by other rules than only the personal merit and demerit of characters. They may sometimes be distributed by way of mere discipline. There may be the wisest and best reasons why tho work( should be governed by general laws, from whence such promiscuous distribution perhaps must follow, and also why our happiness and misery should be put in each other's power in the degree which they are. And these things, as in general they contribute to the rewarding virtue and punishing vice, as such, HO they often contribute also, not to the inversion of this, which 18 impossible, but to the rendering persons prosperous, though wicked ; afflicted, though righteous ; and, which is worse, to the rewarding acme actions, though vicious, and panicking other actions, though virtuous. But all this cannot drown the voice of Nature in the conduct of Previdonce, plainly declaring itself for virtue, by way of distinc- tion from rice and in preference to it."

No critic can come near to doing justice to Butler's design who does not at every paragraph hear in mind his own words

of caution :—" The design of this Treatise is not to vindicate the character of God, but to show the obligations of men; it is not to justiffi his providence, but to show what belongs to us to do.

ThAse are two subjects, and ought not to be confounded, though they may at length-run up into each other." And again :—

" In this Treatise I have argued upon the principles of others, not my own ; and have omitted what 1 think true, and of the utmost im- portance, because by others thought unintelligible, or not true. Thus I Intro argued ripen the principles of the Fatalists, which I do not believe, and have omitted a thing of the utmost importance, which I do bolieve,—the moral fitness and unfitness of actions, prior to all will whatever, which I apprehend as certainly to determine the divine conduct as speculative truth and falsehood necessarily determine the divine jndgment. Indeed, the principle of liberty and that of moral fitness so force themselves upon the mind, that moralists, the ancients as well as moderns, have formed their language upon it. And pre- batty it may appear in mine, though I have endeavoured to a L'Oia tit."

The writer of this article thinks that the apology in the words now italicised. was necessary as to both Parts. But the author's intention is clearly stated. The apparent confusion which Mr. Stephen finds in the Bishop's treatment of the ques- tion of free-will was inevitable, under the terms of the task ho had set himself; but the confusion is only apparent.

In spite of the real pleasure which this book sometimes gives us, and in spite of Mr. Stephen's evident love of truth, why is it that, apart from the profounder points of difference, we both read on and have to conclude with a peculiar sense of uneasi- ness? We have no hesitation in saying that the reason is what has already been hinted. at. No plea of modesty of design on the part of the author, and no sense on our part of his desire to do justice all round, reconciles the mind to the airy treat- ment of those topics, or of the efforts, -however abortive, of those who have discussed them. Mr. Stephen may think the word " airy " does hiui wrong, and perhaps it does ; but he has much more wit than humour. As to that large, sunny humour, which is never an intruder, he has none ; while the numerous " points " that are made give more uneasiness than pleasure. Some relief arises from the fact that, unless our scent is astray, Mr. Stephen has "a sneaking kindness" for the myetics goner, ally ; and this is natural, for there never yet was nihilism that. a few turns of the logical screw would not wind up into some form of transcendentalism. At all events, the study of William Law contains touches of exceptional tenderness, though how Mr. Stephen can say that "the impulse given by Law spent itself in the dreamland. of mysticism," is beyond. us.