Altogether, as the date of the Geneva meetings approaches, this
country is shown to be in an impregnable position diplomatically. Ministers have since last week's Cabinet meeting been discreet almost to excess in their reticence, and some room has been left for apprehension that they were weakening in their attitude. There is no evidence of that. A desire to keep in the' closest possible touch with France, and respect M. Laval's desire to leave the ground free for his conciliation efforts till the last moment, explains even the decision, deplorable on any other ground, to maintain the embargo on the export of munitions to Abyssinia. But in the end it is inevitable that France should have to choose between Italy and the League, and even between Italy and Great Britain, since for this purpose Great Britain and the League are one. It is not Mr. Baldwin or Mr. Eden who forces that choice on M. Laval, but Signor Mussolini. If when all else fails France stands, as she must, by the League the victory for peace will have been won, for infatuated as the Duce may appear it is beyond belief that he will challenge the declared opposition of Britain, France, the Little Entente and other European countries like Spain. This is a grave moment, but gretit gains are as possible as great losses. If Mr. Eden is wise he will read aloud at the Council table the opening words of Article XVI of the Covenant (which are quoted in the note succeeding this), and invite every member of the Council to follow him in reaffirming them. They could not refuse. If they assented there would be no Abyssinian war.
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