SECOND FRONT PROBLEMS
THE so-called second-front demand raises much more serious questions than a great deal that is lightly talked and written about it would suggest. It has divers champions, ranging from Lord Beaverbrook to Mr. Harry Pollitt, who addressed a Trafalgar Square crowd estimated at 6o,000 on the subject last Sunday. That has its disturbing aspect. It is difficult enough, as was realised in 1917-18, to apportion the responsibility for the condpct of war judiciously as between Ministers and Generals. That must always be so in some degree, and the difficulties it raises are not insuper- able. But strategy by demagogy and acclamation is a totally different matter. That, if any serious attention were paid to the outcry and the cheers, could lead only to swift, certain and irre- trievable disaster. Lord Beaverbrook is not to be put in the same category as Mr. Pollitt. He has, after all, been a member of the War Cabinet, and had then, if he has not now, full knowledge of the extent of our command of those resources essential to the successful prosecution of military operations in a new field. But Lord Beaverbrook has never been conspicuous for complete in- fallibility. The gospel of isolationism he preached so assiduously for decades has a strange sound today, and it was not till the very shadow of war was on us that his principal paper ceased assuring its readers daily that the fear of war was a hollow bogey. It is possible to believe that if Lord Beaverbrook differs from the Cabinet and General Staff, the Cabinet and General Staff are not necessarily wrong.
The reasons for desiring the constitution of a second front in Europe are overwhelming. The case against irresponsible de- mands for it—which means demands by people who do not and cannot know the essential facts—is equally overwhelming. And the case against any concession by the Cabinet to mere clamour is so decisive that any Minister who yielded against his own con- sidered judgement would be Russia's worst enemy and Hitler's best friend. All that has to be said to clear the ground. Only then can serious discussion begin. It is true that the less said about a second front the better till the moment comes when that front can be made a reality. But since, in fact, a great deal is being said, resulting in divergencies of view which would lead in the end to a paralysis of purpose, it is well that the elements of the problem should be soberly examined with a view to reduc- ing differences to a minimum. That there must and will be a second front everyone is agreed. The intention has been put on official record in the identical statements issued by the British and American Governments after M. Molotov's visit to 'London and Washington in June. The actual wording of that declaration deserves notice. " A full understanding," it was affirmed, " was reached with regard to the urgent task of creating a second front in Europe in 1942." Ambiguity could no doubt be discovered here. The statement might conceivably be interpreted as meaning that an understanding had been reached that the urgent task would be discharged in 1942 if it could be, or even that the urgent task could not be carried out in 1942 at ali. gut the conviction the plain man would derive from the words is that there will be a second front in Europe before 1942 ends. With that the plain man may well be satisfied.
But that he is not satisfied is intelligible enough. None of us is satisfied. How could we be? With the spectacle of the irresistible impact of German force on Russian gallantry, with the relentless progress of the German armies towards Russia's richest corn- lands and oil-fields, all our impulses both of self-interest and of sympathy for a heroic ally impel us to desire above all things the opening of a second front tomorrow. The German army of occu- pation in France has been drawn on to supply reinforcements for the Russian front, and though the total number of divisions there may have been kept up by drafts from various quarters, the general average of efficiency has probably been lowered. To that extent the dangers of an attempted invasion of France are diminished. The importance of such an operation, moreover, is underlined by psychological as well as purely military considera- tions. The state of mind of the average Russian can well be imagined. His country is facing the very crisis of its existence. Day by day the Germans are advancing farther into the heart of Russia. Day by day, though we hear little of it here, thousands or tens of thousands of Russians, fathers, sons, brothers, from families themselves labouring to exhaustion-point behind the front, are falling victim to the tanks and guns and aeroplanes of the invader. What, in face of that, are Britain and America doing to help? They are sending invaluable material, it is true, and their seamen are risking battle and tempest to get it there. But what are the millions of British soldiers, and the growing army of Ameri- cans, safe in camps and billets in Britain, doing to relieve pressure on Russia? The question is inevitable, and if it is left unanswered the consequences may be dangerous.
So true is that that the Russian Government itself might per- haps be informing its own public opinion on this rather more than it appears to have been doing. For M. Stalin and M. Molotov understand fully the position of Britain and America. No secrets were kept from M. Molotov in London and Washington, and there is no reason to believe that he misunderstood anything that was explained to him or challenged the conclusions based on it. It was after those conversations and explanations that " a full understanding " was reached regarding the creation of a second front in 1942—not in August or September or any other specified month in 1942. Britain and America have fulfilled their undertakings to Russia to the letter in the matter of material. There is no reason to doubt that they will fulfil them with equal fidelity in the matter of the second front. It would be a service to the general cause if M. Stalin would dispel any doubts his people may entertain on that point. For M. Stalin, poignantly conscious as he is of the need for any diversion that would relieve the pressure on the Don, knows as well as Mr. Churchill or Mr. Roosevelt that a second-front offensive that failed because it was attempted prematurely would in the end be as disastrous for Russia as for the rest of the United Nations. He knows well what conditions are necessary for suc- cess—the number of troops, the degree of air-superiority or supremacy, the tonnage needed for the transport and main- tenance of an expeditionary force of a certain size. And he knows that the moment those conditions are fulfilled a move will be made.
But incontrovertible as that presentation of the situation is, it is by no means the last word. The general situation at the moment is bad, bad in Russia, anything but satisfactory in Egypt and worst of all in the sphere of U-boat warfare. The shipping- losses indeed must for a time be a determining factor. New oversea expeditions while shakings are outstripping new con- struction would be madness, since even though ocean-going vessels might not be needed in large numbers for the actual transport of troops, the bulk of their supplies would have to be brought across the Atlantic. The question is whether, when once the submarine menace has been mastered, as no doubt it will be, the second front should be created forthwith. Theoretically it should not be till the other conditions have been fulfilled. But in view of the urgency of the situation it would be folly to insist on seeing them fulfilled to the last button. Risks must be taken in a situation like the present. Blows must be struck without ideally adequate preparation. If a second front involves subordinating civilian needs almost wholly to military in the matter of trans- port, subordinated they must be. In the delicate and critical task of measuring need against risk we must trust implicitly to the experts. No civilian is qualified to press any advice on them in such a matter. But this at least may be said, that when the moment for action approaches the nation will shirk no risk that comes of striking before preparations are finally complete. Far better that than disastrous delays arising from excess of caution. For while we are waiting till the maximum number of men are fully trained, an air-force equal to any eventualities ready and ships adequate for all needs available, Germany may have pinned Russia behind the Volga or farther East and transferred a million men or more to Western Europe. Instead of fighting some 20 divisions we may have two or three times that number to face. And difficult as the shipping-problem is, every ship will give a hundred times the service to a western front that it can to a theatre reached via the Cape. But no one need doubt that these arguments are being properly considered where they should be.
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