DANGERS AND OPPORTUNITIES

By STRATEGICUS

CHINA has kept a defiant flag flying for five years, and Russia has so far maintained her threat to the German power by driving her hardest bargain in the sale of her richest commodity— space. Napoleon, after his final bolt was shot, frequently reflected

on the problem of Russia in words that have their element of truth today: "On ne peut s'empe'cher de fremir a l'idee d'une telle masse, qu'on ne saurait attaquer ni par les cotes, ni sur les derrieres ; qui deborde impunement sur vous, inondant tout si elle triomphe, ou se retirant au milieu des glaces, au sein de la desolation, de la mort, devenues ses reserves, si elle est defaite ; le tout avec la facilite de reparaitre aussitot si la cas le requiert." Hitler's second attempt to solve the intractable problem has now reached a critical stage, in which we inevitably experience the need to balance the successes against the obvious risks.

In the month which has elapsed Since the offensive opened the German armies have advanced over 200 miles towards the south-

east. They have exploited their break-through on the Volchansk- Kupyansk sector to an extent which would have seemed incredible if it were not the fact. The attack was expected. The Russians had no lack of men or materiel. Their command is bold and ex- perienced. Yet the Germans are now fighting not far from the eastern bend of the Don, they have overrun Rostov and Novocher- kassk and are across the Don on a front of some extent: and all this without contriving to capture any appreciable body of prisoners. It has not been an easy advance. They have been compelled to fight hard in attempting to thrust towards the east and harder still in their drive to the south. Not only at the pivot of their eastern mahoeuvre, at Voronezh, but also in the bend of the Donetz, and even more before Rostov and at the bridgehead of Tsimlyanskaya, they have been compelled to pay heavily for their successes.

It is impossible for us to cast up a satisfactory balance-sheet, .since we cannot fail to realise that the account is not closed. It is certain, beyond any vestige of doubt, that the Germans have lost very heavily ; and we know that their resources are not unlimited. The progress of attrition in every part of their war-potential, from the standard of life to the extent of their material production, has gone on steadily. The continuing drain on their man-power must condition the outlook ; but it is impossible for us to make even a guess at the exact degree in which it is a limiting condition, since ultimately we deal not with material but with animate factors. The unpleasant fact is that the German successes continue ; and when we remember the price which they have paid we should draw from that the recognition that the German morale is remark- ably high, or at least that workable counterfeit of it that is called discipline. It is impossible to study the accounts of the battle of Rostov without appreciating the fact that if any army could achieve the impossible it may be the German.

This, indeed, argues no depreciation of the Russian fighting quality. On the contrary, it is because we recognise the determined stand which the troops of our ally made there that we are amazed by the lengths to which Hitler can persuade or drive his soldiers. This contains a lesson that should be astringent. It is not the abundance of materiel that will secure victory for the Allies, though some strange strain in us tends to cheat us into thinking we can depend upon it for a vicarious success. It is. not even superior numbers. It is only by a superior resolution and superior thought that we shall come through successfully at the end. But while we recognise but fail to practise this prescription we shall see Hitler's legions march on, and the war extend into the future. Hitler has so far succeeded by challenging all the obvious risks ; and he has been quite right, because it is our tendency to shun them, and we have come to expect everyone else to avoid them.

It is clear that he is at present taking serious risks and he must have formed some appreciation of them. He has attempted to Minimise them by taking further risks. He has cut direct com- munication between the Zhukov group of armies and those of Timo- shenko. He has deprived the southern armies of the main communi- cations upon which they depended for supply, concentration and reinforcement. He has deprived all the Russian armies, except the Caucasian, of ready access to the main oil-supplies and the material that the Allies are sending by the southern route. He has not cut off these sources of his strength, since, until Baku is cap- tured, the Volga and the Chapayev pipe-line are open. Rostov is no longer available, and at best the oil-supply must be very gravely weakened. The Ural region has industrial centres, mineral deposits and even oil ; but the Trans-Caucasian resources will in future be available only in small quantities via the Caspian.

These blows represent a severe restriction on the Russian power to fight a successful counter-offensive, unless such action can be

taken in the near future while existing stocks remain unconsumed.

The attempt to advance southward from Rostov may suggest a bid to secure complete liberty of action in the Black Sea by creating the conditions under which the Caucasus may be invaded from the Crimea. This threat is comparable to that against Alexandria ; but it is obvious that, whereas the fleet at Alexandria could still use Haifa, the capture of Batum would have much the same effect as the capture of Kronstadt. This is, at the moment, merely a dis- tant threat ; and the advance to the Don bend is a more immediate

menace to Stalingrad and the Volga communications. Unless he can get to Baku or Batum, Hitler will secure no positive advantage from the great oil and mineral wealth .of Trans-Caucasia, and it seems therefore that he must be working once again to a time-table.

The time factor is clearly in the ascendant. Hitler has offered tremendous hostages to fortune in his great advance. His strength has been dissipated ; and it is a sheer illusion that he is everywhere attacking with superior force. It seems incredible that Timoshenko will not seize the opportunity for a counter-offensive at the appro- priate. moment, and we have seen in Egypt that almost everything depends upon the timing. The counter-attack on Voronezh and the attack upon Briansk are at present probably doing no more than prevent the sending of further reinforcements to the south. But it is in this broad area, where the communications are better than any- where else on the Russian side of the front, that the best chances lie. The Germans are presumably relying upon the excellence of-the defensive which defied the Russians during the winter ; and ex- perience has shown that when they have had time to organise their positions they are very difficult to eject.

At present they have merely extended their responsibilities far to the east, and have had no time to protect the long flank along the Don towards the bend. They have not had time to profit by the limitations they have effected in the oil-supply. But, while time is one of the main conditioning factors of a successful counter-offensive, it must wait upon the checking of the southward advance from the Don. In this area the Caucasian army, which has not been seriously drawn upon and which contains some excellent troops, should be able to halt the German drive. Farther east and to the north there should be available the armies Budenny and Vorishilov have been training. It seems so clear that the Russians have great reserves still untapped that the most astonishing fact is that a counter-blow has not been launched already.

Apart from timing, the other main conditions which must govern the launching of a counter-offensive are its character and the place where it is applied. Up to the present the counter-attacks have appeared to bear a tentative character. Even at Orel, where the Germans admit their positions were penetrated, the attack was not pressed home ; and there is little hope of securing a lien on the advance towards the east by such attacks. At Briansk, also, there seems to be little weight about the attack. If these operations should limit the flow of reserves to the east that is as much as they can be expected to do. Yet it is obviously on this sector of the front that the Russians are best able to concentrate men and resources ; and it is here, if anywhere, that the drive to the east might best be checked.

It seems evident, then, that the best place for a counter-offensive is somewhere in the long line the German advance has dragged across the Don basin. The Russian reserves are presumably nearer these positions than anywhere else. In this area, also, it is probably easiest for the Allies to give most help from the air. Yet time, place, and character are matters for the Russian command, who have shown themselves masters in seizing upon the psychological moment for the delivery of a counter-offensive. The one doubt about the situation is simply the question of delay. The Germans are striking against this very power to deliver a counter-offensive. They hope, at the very least, to be able to rob Russia of that power ; and, in the present advance, they are steadily weakening it. Much will depend upon the next few weeks. If the exploitation towards the south can be checked and the advance upon Stalingrad held, the Germans will have suffered a real check. Up to the present, in spite of their impressive successes, they have failed to secure the success at which they aimed—the crushing or dis- organisation of the Russian armies. They have done no more than weaken them. Everything which we certainly know suggests that the opportunities they offer to counter-attack are greater than the dangers they at present threaten.