TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE SITUATION IN FRANCE.
IT has been a wonderful week in France, for into it have been crowded a whole series of stirring events, —the final sittings of the Court of Cessation; the trial of ' M. Deroulide, and the reception of Major Marchand. But though we must write before the week has closed, and; therefore, before we know the decision of the Court of Cessation on the Dreyfus case, and whether any political results have come' from the " acclaiming " of Major Mar- chand, it is impossible to doubt that the situation is' one of gravity, if not of actual peril, for the Republic. On the whole,'we think " the better opinion " is that the Nationalists, and -the conspirators among and behind them, will not suc- ceed in upsetting the present regime ; but at the same time it is difficult to see exactly how things are to calm down and resume their normal course. If the Parliamentary Republic possessed a bodyof loyal and able leaders—men not merely anxious to up- hold the present state of things, but capable of swift and strong action—there need, of course, be no ground for alarm. But can Who said that such men are. to be found in Paris ? . If there were, the apparently inevitable decision in favour of revision in the Dreyfus case might be made the starting-point for new confidence in the Republic. Skilful and resolute men of the Gambetta type, if they existed, might, without humiliating the Army; oblige it, or rather the " ostrich plumes the Generals—to resume their proper place in the State as loyal servants rather than as restless and irre- sponsible rulers of an imperium in imperio. . But there are apparently no such men left in France. M. Loubet is, we have little doubt, an honest; man, who wants to do his duty, and who has a certain amount of firmness, or even strength, but is he capable of putting himself at the head of the nation, and of first showing them; and then compelling them, to choose the path of safety ? It cannot be said with any confidence that he is. .He may be holding himself in for the crisis, but apparently heis-ignored by French public opinion,—regarded rather.as a chief clerk than as the head of the State. It is the same with the Ministry. They. have little or no hold upon the-nation, and few • people stop to inquire what they are doing, or . what they would do under certain eventualities. Still more is this the case with the -Chamber. Though legally all-powerful, the Chamber -recedes more and more into the background, and its actions are hardly. canvassed. The, mob and the Army remain the only vital things left in France, and the Army is paralysed by the want of leaders in whom any confidence can be felt. Whatever other . results may- come from revision, one thing is certain. The Generals are for the time " used up,".-for even those who were not members of the General Staff have to a great extent shared in the discredit that has fallen on the War Office. But when the Army is in this condition it is not likely to at by itself. - There remains, then, only the mob from whom action is likely to come, and by the mob we .mean- not merely the rough population of Paris, but all the effervescent elements in the capital. How are the mob, using the word in this sense, likely to act ? It might be supposed that the revelations in, the Dreyfus carte, the evident miscarriage of justice at the first trial, and the monstrous devices used by the General Staff to hide their original blunder would hive disgusted all men with the Nationalist cause, and would have produced a reaction in favour of the Republic. Probably this is what would have happened in England under similar circumstances, but the minds of Frenchmen work differently from ours. Disgust at the fiasco of the Dreyfus case seems in many instances to make men accept the assertions of the Nationalists that -the Parliamentary Republic is the source of all evil, in spite of the fact that the Nationalists have supported throughout the opponents of justice, to Dreyfus. They argue that a Re- public which could have produced the Dreyfus affair must be rotten. They are sick, that is, of the 'turmoil and the scandal, and are inclined to agree-with any one who attacks the status quo. Thus the exposure of the General Staff dyes not help, but rather injures, the Republic. But though there are so many Frenchmen who are utterly -weary of Parliamentarianism, and who would like to change the Con- statutionand adopt.some form of Ctesarism, it does not, of course, follow that the Republic will be overthrown. A fort may be very weak and very badly defended, and yet • the attack may not be sufficiently strong to reduce it. The Camarists, to begin with, want an instrument to carry opt • their • purposes, and that instrument. is • very ,difficult to find. None of the present Pretenders exercise sufficient influence over the French people to make it .possible for the IratiOnalisti who follow M. Deroulede .
use them. Besides, as far. as one can judge; the new : experiment which- the. disaffected want to • try -is net ;any form of -Monarchy, but a Ctesarist Republic. - But. if the Pretenders - are- discredited, and . so impossible, so .a!re the Generals. Yet a General is the natural, almost the necessary, instrument with which to make a coup. rl'itht, for. a coup &bat ,is sure to fail if the Army. is. hostile. The Army in France does not mutiny in a revolutien, but merely obeys a General who gives an order. But those • who desire to overthrow the Parliamentary , Republic think that, in spite of the fiat that the Pretenders and the Generals are discredited, they have an instrument in Major Marchand. Major Marchand has done a fine piece of work in Africa, and for various reasons lie is for the moment the darling, Of the mob. No one, however prejudiced, can "say that he'is in the slightest degree smirched by the doings at the War Office. He-is not an " imbecile .Wearer of ostrich have but sighting soldier who, while the General Staff have been putting on false beards, making assignations in cemeteries, and writing anonymous letters, has been winning glory for France. In spite, then, of the fact that he is only a Major, it is quffe. possible that an attempt may be made to . use him for the • work which - General Roget refused to. "undertake. Of course, to Englishmen all this sounds mere mid- . summer madness. Fancy turning a Major -of Marines into a Dictator '—is their feeling. Yet .for all .that there .is plenty of seriousness . behind the intrigue to use Major Marchand-as a saviour of society. .
It remains to ask whether the attempt would be successful -if it were made. We do not think it would. In the first place, though the Generals may hate the Republic, we do not think that they could_endure to see a Major of-Marines playing the part for which Marchand has been cast by the conspirators. If Marchand had ever held a General's command, say, like General Gallieni, or if he. were of high birth, it might be different, but as things are the Major's superior ,officers would not side with a mob intent on placing Marchand in power. Again, it is doubtful if Major Marchand-would himself consent to become the instrument of M. 'Deroulede and the Nationalists. People seldom plunge neck high at once into conspiracy, and the Major has not yet had time to feel his way quietly, even if he has the "desire to do so. We do not, then, believe in the making of a revolutionary omelette laWardritd: 'We May; of ' course,gbe proVed quite Wrong' by the course of the next few hours, but we think it far more likely that a state of stalemate will for the time be produced in France. The Republic—i.e.,' the President, the Ministry, and the Chambers—will not dare to punish either the General Staff or-the conspirators. The Army has no officer whom it trusts, and so, though sore and restless, will not, or rather cannot, move; and the-Nationalist .party will be. held in check by their inability to find a saviour of. society who,is fit to become their instrument. But even if this condition of stalemate is produCed it :cannot last for fore ever. ',France is.. not like England, " and : soon tires of things " just muddling on." , Unless". the . Parliamentary .Republic can shoW real life and vigour again it will . not . survive. Sooner or later, every form _of gcoiernment falls in France which has Jost grip and elasticity. . It comes :back Ito this, then, that even if the next few weeks are got'. over in. , the -Parliamentary Republic *will not survive. unless- . Loubet is able to put new life into the institutions over which he presides. It is, of course, possible that he may be equal to the task, and that he will have the, skill and,courake .to keep the ship's head to the waves: If he doeS we Audi be heartily glad, for with all its faults the Republic is, On. the whole, the best government France has had . in the past; or is likely to have in the futUre. It has had sathclals, but they have not been- worse than those of other regiples, and, at any. rate, it has .Secured a fair amount of perSinial" liberty. to persons not accused of military. treason:. People have forgotten the Third. &inn* and its crinieS, but in truth it was a hopelessly corrupt and'corrapting form of govern meat. No doubt it wa.s14. less of its.dirty linen in public than does the 'Repnblic,. but the store Of Piled garmepta was even greater. .
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