THE CONSERVATIVE ORGANS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT.
THE St. James's Gazette is greatly exercised by "the dis- couragements of Conservatism." It assures its readers that," while the Radical-Liberal Party is extremely active all over the country in strengthening and extending its organisa- tion, the Conservative Party has fallen into a dull and effort- less condition equally remarkable." And this "apathy and discouragement" increase "from week to week." Our con- temporary suggests three causes of this "nerveless condition into which the Opposition of all shades has fallen." The first is the death of Lord Beaconsfield, the second is the conduct of the Standard newspaper, and the third and chief is the "disheartened, ineffective generalship of the Conservative leaders." The modesty of our contemporary has omitted a fourth cause, which, we believe, has quite as much to do with the state of things which he deplores as any of the causes which he has enumerated. That fourth cause is our contemporary himself. It would take a strong party to withstand the depressing and demoralising influence of such advocacy as his. We all remember the flourish of trumpets which heralded the advent of our contemporary in the character of a great "anti-Radical organ." And the end of it all, by the confession of the St. James's Gazette, is the increased vitality of Radicalism, and the "apathy and dis- couragement" of the Conservative Party. But what else but "apathy and discouragement" could follow the unfulfilled prophecies, disproved assertions, and monotonous vitupera- tion of political opponents with which our contemporary has been feeding the minds of the great political party whose livery he wears ? The dullest of Tories must have perceived by this time how egregiously he has been be- fooled by the great "anti-Radical organ.' The multitude of things which he was told were going to happen have not hap- pened at all, and the things which he was constantly assured would never happen, have come to pass. He was told, for example, that the Turks would never surrender Dulcigno, and he found, to his chagrin, that the Turks did surrender Dulcigno. To console him, he was assured that though the official Turks retired from Dulcigno, the Albanian Mussulmans would never allow the Montenegrins to retain peaceful possession' of the new territory. But no sooner had he begun to enjoy the satisfaction engendered by that assurance than he discovered that so well disposed were the Albanian Mussulmans, that three Montenegrin policemen sufficed to keep order in the ceded territory. To soothe his disappointment, he was informed in oracular tones that, at all events, Mr. Gladstone had nothing to do with the surrender of Dulcigno. This assertion of the "anti-Radical organ" the Sultan himself most ungratefully refuted, for he frankly owned that it was Mr. Gladstone's threat to confiscate the revenues of Smyrna which induced him to con- sent to the surrender of Dulcigno. Here our contemporary stood gallantly at bay. He professed to know the Sultan's motives better than the Sultan himself. Dulcigno was surrendered at the request of Count Hatzfeldt, in return for an engagement on the part of Prince Bismarck that the Sultan need fear nothing more from the concert of Europe, and that no demand should be made upon him to cede any territory to Greece. This, too, the Tory Party believed, on the authority of their "anti- Radical" guide, and now they learn from recently published official documents that it was Prince Bismarck, of all men, who took the lead in proposing armed interven- tion on behalf of Greece, in case the Porte refused to yield to moral pressure. To expect the Tory Party to be cheerful and hopeful after this disheartening experience is surely to make an unreasonable demand on human nature. It appears to us that the honest and independent criticism of the Standard is more likely to serve the cause of its party in the long-run than the fanatical and undiscriminating zeal of the "anti-Radical organ." The general attitude of the Standard is, of course, hostile to the Liberal Party ; but its hostility is guided by reason and expressed with moderation. It does not paint the Tory Party all white and the Liberal Party all black, nor does it find the motive of all Liberal measures and tactics in the "overweening vanity" of Mr. Gladstone. And therefore the Standard has acquired considerable influence outside its own party. Liberals think it worth their while to read it, and to consider with attention and respect the arguments and
criticisms which it addresses to them ; for they know that it represents the opinions of an important and intelligent section of the community,—that moderate and progressive Con- servatism which we associate with the names of Canning and Peel, and which differs more widely from the revolutionary- Toryism of Lord Beaconsfield than it does from the Liberalism of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville.
Representing this reasoning and reasonable Conservatism, the Standard says that "the dominant conviction in the coun- try "is that Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues "have not yet had a fair chance of showing the constituencies what they can ac- complish in the work of Imperial administration. Their hands have been tied and their movements have been fettered by Ire- land." In the matter of Foreign Policy, however—and under the head of "Foreign Policy," the Standard includes the affairs of South Africa—it thinks that the verdict of the country would, on the whole, be against the Government. The Standard does not argue the question, and we are at a loss to con- jecture the grounds on which it founds its conclusion. The facts appear to us to point to a directly opposite inference. Let us look at them. The issue placed before the country at the General Election was the maintenance or reversal of Lord Beaconsfield's foreign policy,—not a reversal of formal engage- ments, to which the honour of the country was committed, but of the policy which had resulted in those engagements. The country voted with an overwhelming decisiveness in favour of Mr. Gladstone's policy, as against Lord Beaconsfield's. There is not the slightest reason to believe that the country has changed its mind, and the question therefore is whether Mr. Gladstone's Government has fulfilled Mr. Gladstone's pledges. The Standard condemns the withdrawal from Candahar. But neither the permanent nor the prolonged occupation of Candahar formed any part even of Lord Bea- consfield's avowed policy ; still less, then, could it ever have been imagined as entering into the plans of Mr. Gladstone's Government. What the Liberal leaders advocated was the abandonment of the nebulous "scientific frontier," and the withdrawal of our forces behind our old frontier. And that is the policy which Lord Hartington is carrying out as rapidly as circumstances will permit. We have no doubt at all that the- dominant feeling of the country just now is one of intense satisfaction that there are no British troops in the province of Candahar to embroil us in the struggle of rival competitors for the throne of Afghanistan. We can regard the issue of that struggle with serene indifference, from the secure position. which we now occupy. If this were not the prevailing feeling of the constituencies they would certainly have taken care to- make known their dissatisfaction. The Standard mistakes the silence of entire approval for the sullenness of discontent.
With respect to the rectification of the Greek frontier, we- believe that the country gives the Government credit for having fulfilled its pledges, so far as circumstances would per- mit; which is indeed, a great deal farther than even moderate. Tory critics had at one time believed possible. The foreign policy of Lord Beaconsfield's Government was based on secret arrangements and clandestine engagements. The inevitable result was to breed mutual jealousies, distrusts, and intrigues among the Powers of Europe, a conspicuous example of which is afforded by the policy of France in Tunis. Mr. Gladstone, on the other hand, advocated a return to the policy of the Euro- pean concert,—the policy, that is, of mutual confidence, respect, and co-operation. Which of the two policies has justified itself by its fruits ? The policy of Lord Beaconsfield's Govern- ment was tried for the best part of two years with the result
that the Treaty of Berlin remained entirely unfulfilled in every clause which did not directly concern the interests of
Russia,—in every clause, that is, of which the fulfilment de- pended on the influence of England. The result was—let Tory critics say what they will—that at the close of Lord Beaconsfield's Government the influence of England on the Continent of Europe was reduced to the humble task of saying ditto to the decrees of the Cabinets of Berlin and Vienna. Those Cabinets did not feel particularly interested in the settlement of the Greek and Montenegrin questions, and those questions accordingly remained as unsettled as they were on the morrow of the ratification of the Treaty of Berlin.
Even the Sultan and his Pashas laughed at the despatches of Lord Salisbury and the scoldings of Sir Henry Layard, and openly ridiculed the gasconading movements of the British Fleet into Turkish waters and "bock again," like the burglar in the story, the moment the Turk showed his face over the wall. Mr. Gladstone's Government was not six months in office when Lord Granville restored the European concert and,
taking the lead of it, coerced the Porte into submission on the Montenegrin question, without the shedding of a drop of blood. The result of this exhibition of mingled tact and firm- ness was to make Prince Bismarck a warm convert to the expedi- ency of applying the policy which had proved so successful in settling the Montenegrin question to the solution of the Greek question also. "Fearing war to be inevitable" between the Porte and Greece—we are quoting the official documents- " he had suggested to the Austrian Government that an agreement should be come to for localising the conflict, by
warning the Porte that, in defending their own against the Greeks, they must refrain from occupying Athens or annexing the kingdom of Greece ;' and further, that 'the conflict should be restricted to operations by land, and that the Piraeus and other Greek ports should be protected against any attack on the part of the Turkish Fleet by the presence of the ships of the concerted Powers.'" Prince Bismarck com- municated this proposal to the British Government, which, as it happened, had already resolved on a similar plan, the dif- ference being that Mr. Goschen and Lord Granville thought the intimation of such an intention would deter the Porte from war ; while Prince Bismarck "contemplated a certain action involving actual naval protection to the Greeks, in case of war breaking out." This was on the eve of Mr. Goschen's departure for Constantinople, and he took Berlin on the way, in order to explain to Prince Bismarck, on the part of Lord Granville, how the two proposals might be combined for the purpose of "avoiding a conflict." What happened in the interviews between Mr. Goschen and Prince Bismarck is related by Mr. Goschen in a despatch from Constantinople, dated February 22nd, 1881, and it is so remarkable that we shall give it in Mr. Goschen's own words. War between Greece and the Turkish Government was then considered imminent, and the question for the Ambassadors at the Porte was how to prevent the march of the Turks "straight to Athens." Prince Bismarck, as we have seen, proposed the protection of the Greek coast by the guns of the Allied Fleets. But in his interview with Mr. Goschen he went beyond this proposal. Here is Mr. Goschen's own account of the matter :—
"I wish to put it very distinctly on record that the prevention of such a march formed part of the programme of Prince Bismarck. I ao not know how far the instructions to Count Hatzfeldt go; but it is certain that his Highness discussed the measures which could be taken if the Turks refused to listen to reason, and the other than moral support which might ultimately be given to Greece. He him- self scargested the transport of some 30,000 Greek troops in the yes- eels of the Powers to the Dardanelles, as a possible means. It was, aa I understood, part of the plan, that if the assent of Turkey could not be obtained to what the Powers thought reasonable, pressure was to be applied, by its being distinctly intimated to the Porte that the Greeks might probably be assisted navally. Prince Bismarck thought the ulterior measures need not be brought forward for discussion at present. Thus nothing is said on this head now [i.e., by the Ambas- sadors to the Porte] ; but it appears to me somewhat dangerous to let matters proceed too far without some hints being given. On the one band, the Ambassadors are influenced by the idea that nothing mill or can be done if the Turks refuse any line. On the other, the Turks may come to some dangerous sudden resolution, from which they would be deterred if they knew the consequences. I have felt bound to address your lordship on the subject. Count Hatzfeldt has on no oaoasion thrown any doubt on the accuracy of my recollections on my part of the interviews to which I have called his attention, and Lord Odo Russell, who was present throughout, is in a position to state what were his impressions as to the understanding arrived at."
These Parliamentary papers do not state whether the Porte received any warning of the consequences of a war with Greece ; but as no war took place and the Porte yielded at last a much larger territory than the maximum beyond which it protested at one time that it would not go, it may be inferred that some hint was given to it of the understanding between Prince Bismarck and the British Cabinet. That the cession to Greece was not larger seems to have been due to the timidity and selfishness of Austria, the Tunisian schemes of France, and the dislocation of Russian policy by the assassina- tion of the Czar. That it was so large is due to the firmness and conspicuous ability of Mr. Goschen, backed by the cor- dial support of Lord Granville. Mr. Goschen was the moving and guiding spirit of the negotiations at Constantinople ; and we know from other authority than these Despatches that his colleagues there gladly yield to him the palm of the suc- cessful issue. But to what a pitiable plight these revelations reduce the confident assertions and predictions as to the policy of Prince Bismarck indulged in by the prophet of "anti- Radical " politics!
It is not neceqsary to say much on the Transvaal and Tunis questions. They are both legacies from the -late Govern- ment. Our own opinion is that the moment negotiations were opened with the Boers, through the intervention of the Presi- dent of the Orange Free State, Sir George Colley should have been peremptorily ordered to stand strictly on the de- fensive; and the omission of this precaution we consider a grave error of judgment on the part of Lord Kimberley. The refusal to wipe out the disaster of Majuba Hill in blood before proceeding with the negotiations for peace was a display of courageous magnanimity which the country heartily approves, and which has extorted the admiration of the Continental and American Press. The affairs of Tunis have afforded Lord Gran- ville an admirable opportunity for the exercise of that strong grasp under the velvet glove of which he is such a consummate master. His task was rendered singularly difficult and delicate of management by the indiscretion of his predecessor. In short, the success of the Government in extricating the country from the disasters and entanglements, which the "peace with honour" had bequeathed to them in foreign and colonial affairs, has outstripped the most sanguine expecta- tions of the constituencies, as the Tories would find if the question were put to the test in a general election, which is the only fair ordeal of the feeling of the country. Bye- elections too often turn on local and irrelevant issues.
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