TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES.
IT seems to be admitted on all hands that the Government of the United States has not as yet made any formal concession on the subject of the Indirect Claims, but that it has appended to its argument in their favour a telegraphic assurance that it is quite willing, not to withdraw them, which it professes its inability to do, nor even to concur in an instruction to the Arbitrators practically to disregard them ; but to engage to make no claim in relation to them, even if the Arbitrators should in their own discretion decide that anything is due under that head. Both Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville have assured us that " there are known to us grounds for a hope that a settlement of the entire matter may be arrived at which we are well assured would be satisfactory to both countries," and the general character of the information from the United States points to the kind of solution which we have described. Now, of course, the whole nation will scan with the greatest anxiety the precise arrangement arrived at, and we ven- ture to think that no solution will be satisfactory to this coun- try under which (1) the claim for indirect damages is not form- ally repudiated by this country as not included in the Treaty of Washington, and not in any way submitted by us to the Arbi- trators ; and under which (2) the United States and England do not explicitly agree that nothing under this head shall be demanded or paid. So long as these two points are suffi- ciently assured, we do not think it matters whether the Americans do or do not profess to withdraw formally the illegitimate part of their Case, or whether the Arbi- trators at Geneva do or do not pronounce their own private opinions,—the authority of which, whether it be in our favour or otherwise, would be wholly denied by us,—on the admissi- bility of these indirect claims. We shall abandon no position of our own, nay, we shall abandon no right to defend other and weaker neutrals on any future occasion from the burden of such monstrous claims, provided we make it quite clear that whatever the United States may have argued, and whatever the Arbitrators may say, we have not in any way admitted their authority on this point ; and that the decision of the Arbitrators on the direct claims is accepted by the United States as a full and final discharge of all their claims under the Treaty. We apprehend that Mr. Glad- stone and Lord Granville would be quite right in assum- ing that any agreement founded on these assumptions would be perfectly satisfactory to Great Britain, and that on the point of the non-consent of the Senate of the United States to this apparent narrowing of the first American demand, it would be childish in us to refuse to run that infinitesimal risk of a reopening of the question in future, if the Government of the United States is itself willing to risk it. After all, it is the public opinion of the United States, not any pressure of ours, which has conquered their Government ; and to suppose that a con- cession made in deference to the public opinion of the United States is likely to lead to technical difficulties in future, is to weigh mere shadows of fears against the clearest and most substantial international advantages. The only thing we now fear is lest, satisfied by the engagement of the United States not to push damages on account of the Indirect Claims, we should go on with the Arbitration without a formal declara- tion of our intention not to recognise any authority in the Arbitrators as regards those claims. The mis- chief of this would be that certainly the rights of other neutrals might be compromised, and possibly our own ; the Arbi- trators might decide that something is due from us on this head under the Treaty, though the United States fail to press for any such decision ; and it would be impos- sible to say that we had barred this right by any action of ours, unless, before the Arbitration begins, we formally declare that we will not recognise, nor argue upon, nor in any way, explicitly or implicitly admit, any such claim. An award given under an Arbitration of which we had not thus carefully limited the scope, even though the Ameri- cans declined to claim it,—which it is not at all certain they could do,—would stand as a precedent for such awards in future ; and we, instead of being the guardians of the true international principle, should have at most saved ourselves, and perhaps not so much as that, from liability. We are perfectly sure that any waiver of our positive duty of disclaiming altogether the authority of the Arbitrators in rela- tion to these demands would be universally condemned by the country, and we trust that the Government will anxiously gnarl against so fatal a blunder. There is too much reason to fear- that we may be overpersuaded into not lodging the proper protest, on the plea that if we do, we shall shake the authority of the Treaty itself, and open up questions which may result in the retirement of the United States. It would be a fatal weakness.
However, our Government, we think, deserves considerable credit for having brought the Government of the United States• to the rational and temperate attitude of mind which renders a, settlement possible. Indeed, Lord Granville has reaped, some- what late in the day, the advantages of the very defect whicla made it so nearly hopeless that any understanding should be arrived at. He was too easy-going when the Treaty was made. He was much too easy-going last December- when the American Case was first put in. And many a- men in his place would have tried to atone for these- faults by becoming much too peremptory when the astonish- ment and disgust of the British nation at the American, demands were first expressed. Lord Granville, however, was shrewd enough to be himself still. He found himself in the very situation in which his happy complaisance and negligent good sense were likely to work with good effect, and though: we were all justly irritated with him for his loose bargain of last summer, and his intolerable delay at Christmas, he resisted' the temptation which a weaker man would have felt to give- expression to the national temper as distinguished from the national resolve, and in consequence he has now brought us,. we do not say to harbour, but within fair sight of harbour,. with but a few sunken rocks to pass; and these few careful steer- ing will probably enable him to pass in safety. It is a great thing not to throw away advantages of character at the critical! moment when they become really useful, simply because at an earlier stage of the transaction they have led you into error.. Before Lord Granville woke up to the great difficulty in whicht he was placing the country, his easy complaisance had been a great danger ; but directly he did so wake up, it became a. great power, and as such he has used it. It is impossible to. deny that we owe to his determination to exhaust all the resources of "friendly communications" the hopeful situation. in which, if we may trust Lord Granville himself, the negotia- tions with America now are.
At the same time, we must remember that even though,. after all this fright and agitation, Lord Granville succeeds in piloting us into " the haven where we would be," there will be nothing in this Treaty to be proud of, though there will be something to be grateful for. It is impossible to deny that the failure to press the Canadian claims on the United States for the Fenian invasions, as set-offs against the American claims on us for the depredations of the Alabama and her consorts, was. utterly indefensible in principle, and that the consequent neces- sity under which we find ourselves of openly bribing Canada into acquiescence by guaranteeing a new loan is a real humiliation for us before the world. There really was hardly any argument by which the reference of the one class of claims to arbitration could be supported, by which the reference of the other class to arbitra- tion could not also be supported; and we have, therefore, virtu- ally admitted that we were under so strong a necessity of concili- ating the United States as to be willing to pay Canada for not pressing her rights,—i.e., in some rough form to buy up her claims on the United States, and then drop them,—whea we agreed to give Canada a guarantee for 12,500,000 as hush- money for her disappointment. We are far from saying that circumstances may not have justified even this very strong measure ; but assuredly it is one which makes our success, if we do succeed, in carrying our point about the Indirect Claims look poor enough beside the success of the United States in persuading us to waive indefinitely claims of the very same character as those which they had been urging so. bitterly and so long. We have fair hopes for the Treaty now, and we must be thankful for that. But whether it goes. on or not, it is not one that Great Britain can ever feel proud of, with that unpleasant pecuniary sop to Canada,—demanded an& conceded with almost cynical frankness as the only mode of inducing her not to reject it,—staring us in the face whenever we recall it.
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