BOOKS.

THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR.*

ETRICT impartiality is a quality which at times receives a higher meed of praise than it deserves. The so-called impar- tiality of those whom Canning satirized as the friends of every country but their own is far from being a virtue. It is a vice, which not nnfrequently has its origin in love of notoriety, self-righteousness, or overweening vanity. Im- partiality may also at times arise from sheer indecision of character. In some cases a man who avows that he has no opinion on some subject of first-rate importance stands self- condemned either of moral cowardice or of inexcusable apathy. There is, however, a form of impartiality which is entitled to universal respect. There are men who are both capable and desirous of forming deliberate opinions, but who none the less wish to weigh with the utmost conscientiousness and to the fullest extent the arguments on both sides of a con- troversy before arriving at any conclusion. This frame of mind tends in some degree to hypercriticism. It leads the seeker after truth to reject all but absolutely first-rate evidence, and eventually to introduce numerous qualifications into the delivery of his final judgment. Nevertheless, the deliberate verdict of men of this class merits very special attention. The processes of ratiocination which they adopt before stating their views are in themselves a guarantee that they are not influenced by bias or prejudice of any kind. Their final conclusions are, there- fore, all the more valuable. Professor Stowell appears to be animated by impartiality of this latter type. He has compiled a very detailed and perfectly accurate precis of the diplomatic correspondence which preceded the war. He does not shirk the issues which are involved. His book really covers the same ground as that already trodden by the talented author of "J'Accuse I" but the extreme moderation with which he expresses his opinions, the degree to which he admits extenuating circumstances in dealing with political crimes and misdemeanours, and the lenity of his final judgments stand in strong contrast to the fiery anathemas which the author of that remarkable work, after framing a scathing indictment of his own countrymen, launches against those whom he holds responsible for the catastrophe with which the world has now been visited. Englishmen, strong in the righteousness of their cause, and firmly convinced that in this case they and their Allies are the champions of civilization, may perhaps feel surprised at the leniency of some of the judgments pronounced, but they will none the less rejoice that an authority who approaches the whole subject in the calm judicial spirit displayed by Professor Stowell has in no ease given a decision favourable to, and has in almost all cases been distinctly condemnatory of, the proceedings of the common foe.

In a very interesting chapter which deals with the deep underlying causes of the war, Professor Stowell says that in reality it constitutes a contest between two great rival systems of thought—nationalism and internationalism. It is, indeed, a fact that whilst the remaining nations of the world have been laboriously struggling upwards towards the attainment of that broader conception of human society involved in the principle of internationalism, and thus strengthening that "peace power" which must of necessity be based on a respect for international law, Germany's "mystic conception of the divine position of the State," as Professor Stowell euphemisti- cally calls autocracy in excelsis, has prevented her from co- operating in the general movement. She has taken her stand on nationalism of the most narrow and exclusive type, the basis of which is that the interests of the rest of the human race are to be sacrificed to those of Germany. She has resolved to hack her own way through to a place in the sun, and practically to exclude others from participating in the genial warmth of the solar rays. Intent on this object, she has for a long time past steadily set her face against all proposals tending towards placing the peace of the world on a more assured basis than heretofore. Thus, at the Hague, the German representative stoutly opposed the principle of obliga- tory arbitration, and the German Government has persistently • The Diplomacy of the War of 1514. By Ellery C. Stowell, Ansistant Pro- hisser of International Law, Columbia University. Cambridge: at the River-

side l'reas. net.]

refused to consider any arrangements for limiting the armaments of the Powers of Europe. The tendency of German jurists has been to consider the observance of treaty obligations, not as a sacred duty, but rather as one to be decided by the ligh t of policy and the self-interest of the moment. Professor Stowell considers " the German view on this point to be an anachronism, and, taking into consideration all the aspects of the subject, the greatest error of mankind." He is, however, so far indul- gent to Germany as to sympathize in some degree with her desire for expansion, and to recognize that, inasmuch as most of the habitable globe has been already more or less appro- priated by other Powers, it is extremely difficult for her to expand. He expresses disapproval of the dislike entertained by other Powers at the growing ascendancy of the Germans at Constantinople. At the same time, he himself supplies an excellent reason why that dislike should have been enter- tained. If, he says, "England and France could have been sure that, once Germany had expanded over these regions [i.e., Asia Minor], she would subscribe to their own philosophy of the status quo, and not take advantage of this increase of strength to make it a fulcrum for a further advance, they could doubtless have reached some agreement with her." Unfortunately, no confidence whatever could he felt that there was any limit to the aggressive intentions of Germany. To this consideration may be added the argument, which would certainly have carried great weight amongst influential sections of the English public, that all the evidence forthcoming pointed to the conclusion that German expansion was so designed as to be of exclusive benefit to German commercial and political interests, and that German influence was in no way exerted, as in the case of English influence in India and Egypt, to benefit either civilization in its moral aspects, or the true interests of the inhabitants of the countries in which it was paramount. In spite, however, of his indulgence, Pro- fessor Stowell's final judgment on the general aims of German policy is sufficiently decisive. " Before we yield up our cherished ideals," he says, "we will strive, by force of arms if necessary, to meet the force which that marvellously perfected national State has thrown against the foundation of our international order. We will help to overthrow the projects of such a Government, and recognize none that will not live within the same community of common international ideas."

Professor Stowell examines at length the question where the responsibility for the war really rests. He experiences a great, perhaps a somewhat excessive, difficulty in " deter- mining with any degree of accuracy which party is the aggressor in any conflict." He takes the charitable view of holding that Germany did not really wish for war, which is probably true if she could have gained a complete diplomatic triumph over the rest of Europe without fisiting. But, inasmuch as this was obviously impossible, Professor Stowell thinks that Germany, by refusing to enter into a Conference with a view to settling the acute point of difference between Russia and Austria, incurred the largest share of blame. He brushes aside the flimsy excuses offered by the German Government for their treatment of Belgium. There is, in fact, not a tittle of evidence to support the German contention that, if they bad not entered Belgian territory, the French would have done so. The real reason for the action of Germany in this connexion was explained in a significant remark which Herr von Jagow let fall, on August 3rd, in conversation with Baron Beyens, the Belgian Minister at Berlin, when the latter alluded to the fact that " the French frontier is of such an extent as to make a passage through Belgium avoidable." Herr von Jagow naively replied : " But that frontier is too well fortified." Moreover, no excuses based on after-thoughts can obliterate time impression made by the German Chancellor's very explicit statement to the Reichstag on August 4th. "Necessity," he said, "knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and have possibly already entered on Belgian soil. Gentlemen, that is a breach of international law." Mr. Roosevelt has said : "It will never be possible in any war to commit a clearer breach of international morality than that committed in the invasion of Belgium." Professor Stowell's view, though expressed in somewhat lose decisive language, is substantially the same as that of Mr. Roosevelt.

Professor Stowell strongly condemns the proceedings of Austria, notably because " she concealed her intentions and tried to lull to rest the suspicions of the Powers, while she prepared an ultimatum to Serbia, which she knew could not

possibly be accepted." He does not altogether acquit Russia of blame. He thinks her military preparations were "pre- cipitate," but ho adds that " never did country have greater provocation." He admits that Russia displayed a "most unusually conciliatory disposition" in the face of Austria's arbitrary and high-handed proceedings. As regards France, he thinks that the French Government "does not seem to have been as active in working for peace as England and Italy," a circumstance which he explains by maintaining that the French Ministers were from the outset clearly of opinion that the only hope of peace lay in the Entente Powers making a firm stand against the .A.ustro-German demands.

Professor Stowell, of course, acquits England of all respon- sibility for the war. Indeed, be goes so far as to say : "It is very possible that the French and English statesmen might have bit upon some plan to prevent the outbreak of the war, but my thorough examination of the documents and my study of European politics have not made it possible for me to dis- cover wherein that possibility lay." All Englishmen will read with pride and pleasure the glowing tribute which Professor Stowell pays to Sir Edward Grey's diplomacy. "On the whole," he says, " I believe, unsuccessful as the event proved, Sir Edward Grey's diplomacy, as pourtrayed in the British White Papers, will stand forth as one of England's glories and as a pattern for generations to come." In point of fact, what German statesmen hoped and expected from the first was that England would adopt the dastardly policy of throwing over her Allies, and declaring in effect that she would in no circumstances take part in the contest. At that exorbitant price, peace might perhaps have for a time been preserved. The rage against England is largely due to the fact that the Germans wholly misunderstood the character both of the English Ministers and of the English nation.

The whole of the facts connected with the negotiations which preceded the war are so well known to the public, and have been so thoroughly discussed from every point of view, that it is unnecessary here to do more than draw attention to one or two salient features.

In the last chapter of his book, Professor Stowell propounds a number of questions, to some of which he gives answers, whilst others he considers must, in view of the scantiness of the available information, remain unanswered. In the former category is the question, "Did the German Government know the contents of the Austrian Note to Serbia before it was pre- sented." Professor Stowell's reply is as follows: " I our con- vinced that the German Government spoke the truth and that the Note was not previously communicated. From an examination it would seem probable that this ignorance was prearranged." But in the "Questions without Answers" Professor Stowell includes this query : " Did Von Tisohirschky, the German Ambassador at Vienna, telegraph the contents of the Austrian Note to the Kaiser before it was presented to Serbia P" Now, Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambas- sador at Vienna, states categorically that, "although be was unable to verify it, he had private information that the German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum before it was despatched, and telegraphed it to the German Emperor." Dealing with this statement, Professor Stowell remarks: "If there should prove to be any truth in this allegation,• it would have an important bearing upon the responsibility of the Kaiser, and show that Germany was afflicted with a secret or irresponsible diplomacy similar to that which was the curse of the old regime in France."

Professor Stowell is possibly not very fully informed as regards the methods adopted by German diplomacy ; neither perhaps does he realize the fact that that diplomacy comes into Court with a damning record for tortuous proceedings, dating from the days of Frederic the Groat, such as is

unparalleled in the history of any other country. It is notorious that the "secret and irresponsible diplomacy," at which

Professor Stowell merely hints, actually exists. At Cairo, the

agent employed was Baron Oppenhoim. It is generally believed that Baron von KiihImann occupied a similar position

in London. It cannot be doubted that there were other agents

in every capital of the world. Inasmuch as their principal function was to communicate direct to the Kaiser over the had of their chiefs, it can. readily be understood that this pernicious system often led to much friction. The fact of its existence, however, renders it not merely highly probable, but almost certain, that Sir Maurice de Bunsen's information was

perfectly correct. It would be quite in accordance with German methods that the Austrian Note should have been received at Berlin, but that Herr von Jagow should have been designedly kept in ignorance of its contents in order that, in dealing with the foreign diplomatists, he should be able to say that the German Foreign Office had not been consulted before it was delivered to Serbia.

Professor Stowell discusses at length the vexed question whether Sir Edward Grey should or should not have yielded to French and Russian pressure to the extent of declaring, at an early stage of the negotiations, the intention of England to support the Dual Alliance. He was at first. inclined to think that such a declaration should have been made, but eventually came to the conclusion that the course which Sir Edward Grey pursued was unquestionably right. Apart from any considerations based on the necessity of securing the general support of the public in England, any opinion on this subject must to a great extent depend upon what view is held este the sincerity of the German statesmen when they declared their wish to avoid war. Sir Edward Grey believed that they were sincere, and, if he was right, the policy which be pursued was unquestionably the best. On the other hand, as Mr. Oliver pertinently remarks, speaking of this episode in his Oradea/ by Battle, " there are some practical dis- advantages in being a gentleman." encase%