THE Firm ARMY IN MARCH, 1918.*
Tax stubborn defence offered by the Fifth Army in March, 1918, to General Ludendorff's gigantic offensive was one of the most memorable episodes of the war. It is still imperfectly understood, and a full and dispassionate narrative of the Fifth Army's doings would be of great interest. We are disappointed at finding that Mr. Shaw Sparrow's new book on the subject does not fulfil this purpose. Mr. Shaw Sparrow has devoted much attention to the subject. He has collected much new detail and ho has obtained a number of instructive maps. But he is an advocate rather
• The Fifth Army is Mardi. 1918. By W. Shaw Sparrow. With an Intro- duction by General Sir Hubert Gough. London : Lane. [21s. net.] than a historian, and he is too much obsessed with the unfairness of the popular verdict on the Fifth Army and its commander to be a good advocate. It is a commonplace in the courts that a counsel must not take too keen a personal interest in his client if he wishes to present the case effectively, nor must he on any account lose his sense of proportion. In stating a literary case the same rule applies, and we fear that Mr. Shaw Sparrow has defied it. He is so passionately convinced of the injustice done to his clients that he is continually interrupting his argument in other to denounce the other side. Mr. Lloyd George, Lord Haig, Lord Byng, General Monash, General Main, and other eminent personages suffer at the hands of this well-meaning but ill-advised advocate, whose critical digressions become in the end so incessant and so prejudiced as to weary even a sympathetic reader. Sir Hubert Gough contributes a dignified preface, in which he expresses the hope that the book will show that " the task imposed on the Fifth Army was fulfilled in spite of its immense difficulties," and that it will elucidate the nature of those difficul- ties. We share the hope, but we fear that Mr. Shaw Sparrow's method of treating the case will leave many readers unconvinced.
It is a pity that Mr. Shaw Sparrow confuses the issue, for there should be no mystery about it. The dominant fact of the situation in the early weeks of 1918 was that Germany had the initiative and a superiority of numbers in the West. Lord Haig's armies had been severely tried by the long Flanders offensive of 1917 and by the Cambrai battles, and had had to send some of their best divisions to support the Italians after Caporetto. It was known that General Ludendorff was preparing a great.offensive for March or April, which would almost certainly be directed against our front. Furthermore, the British Armies were required at this time to take over a long section of the French front, to the south of St. Quentin and across the Oise. Lord Haig in these circumstances asked for reinforcements. The Cabinet in the exercise of its discretion declined to send them, maintaining that the British Armies were strong enough to resist any possible attack in the West. It is not disputed that fresh troops were available. The Prime Minister, after the German offensive had taken place, took credit to himself for hurrying many thousands of men across the Channel. Large numbers were also brought to France from the Near East and replaced there by Indian divisions. But Lord Haig was not reinforced in time, because the Cabinet regarded our Western front as impregnable and immovable. The Cabinet compelled Lord Haig to take risks which he thought were excessive. It was thus solely responsible for the retreat from St. Quentin to the outskirts of Amiens, and the Prime Minister's attempt to transfer the responsibility to other shoulders was as unjustified as it was disagreeable. Mr. Shaw Sparrow's comments on the attitude of the Government are severe but well deserved. But they would have been far more effective if he had not subjected soldiers and politicians alike to indiscriminate and unkindly criticism.
From a purely military point of view the Fifth Army's performance, far from being discreditable, was a gratifying and memorable achievement. Mr. Shaw Sparrow rightly points out that a retreat is often a necessary operation of war, requiring more skill and better discipline than an advance. Moore's retreat from Corunna, Wellington's repeated retreats into Portugal, Lord French's retreat from Mons, are well known examples which are rightly admired. The Fifth Army was in no sense disgraced by having to retreat from St. Quentin. Opinions will differ, until all the evidence is available, as to certain episodes in the retreat. But the fact remains that the Fifth Army and the Third Army, acting together, foiled General Ludendorff's plan and wore out his immense and well-equipped striking force before it could attain its object of capturing Amiens and separating the British and French armies. In achieving this purpose the Fifth Army unfortunately suffered heavy losses, but the price was not paid in vain. It is conceivable that if the Fifth Army had been stronger and had had more time to prepare its lines of defence, especially in the southern sectors taken over from the French, it might have stopped the German offensive at the Somme. But as the Fifth Army had only 14 infantry divisions and 3 cavalry divisions against 43 German infantry divisions, and as its rear defences were incomplete, it was compelled to retire, fighting as it went, for many miles west- ward. As Lord Haig has shown, he could best afford to yield ground in this part of his line. He did not propose or expect to confront the irresistible force of General Von -Hutier by an immovable object, as in the old scholastic problem. He intended that the Fifth Army should fall back slowly, inflicting heavy casualties on• the enemy, until the Germans had lost their impetus. His intention was fulfilled, although his plans were not executed to the letter, especially in regard to the defence of the Peronne bridgehead on the Somme. Mr. Shaw Sparrow deals in an interesting way with some details. He shows, for example, that the morning mists of March 21st, 1918, and later days were by no means so disadvantageous to us as was thought at the time. The enemy took some of our outposts by surprise, but their general advance and their artillery action were impeded by the fog which concealed the battlefield. Again, the author emphasizes the part played by the enemy's airmen who flew low over our lines and did much damage by their machine-gun fire, while our airmen in turn were doing the same to the German reserve:. Mr. Shaw Sparrow strongly contests the widespread belief that the Third Army would not have had to fall back if the Fifth Army had not been forced to give ground. It is true, as he says, that the Third Army, attacked by overwhelming numbers, had also to retreat, and that it was much assisted on its southern wing by the famous 9th Division of the Fifth Army. We wish that the author ()mid have made this plain without subjecting Lord Byng to harsh criticism. The Third Army was made stronger because it could not afford to retreat so far west as the Fifth Army ; the loss of Arras and Vimy would have been a very grave disaster. It does not beseem a layman to complain, as the author does, that Lord Byng placed too many troops in one part of his line—the Flesquieres salient ; the commander of the Third Army, who did the work assigned to him with conspicuous success, must surely have disposed his troops rightly. The author brings out the fact that the scratch force got together to dig and defend an improvised line east of Amiens—commonly and erroneously called " Carey's force "- was organized at General Gough's instance by General Grant, his chief Engineer officer, soon after the retreat began ; General Carey was at home on leave and took over the command of this force when he returned some time afterwards. If Mr. Shaw Sparrow had cut down his arguments and given more space to such details as this, and to the personal experiences of officers and men in the great battle, he might have made a really valuable book.
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