TOPICS OF rim DAY.
THE VERGE OF WAR.
AS we write it seems as near certain as anything can be in, human affairs that war will actually have broken out between Turkey and Bulgaria, Servia, Monte- negro, and Greece before the next issue of the Spectator is in our readers' hands. When war begins or is imminent the public naturally want to know the answers to the following questions: (1) What has made the com- batants determined to fight ? (2) Is there any possibility of preventing war P (3) If not, who is likely to win ? (4) Is there any risk of England or of the Powers with which she acts being involved and a great European war being the result? (5) On which side should British sympathies be ? We propose to try to answer these five questions.
(1) What has made the combatants determined to fight ?
The cause of the war in the last resort is the effort of the remaining Christian and European provinces of the Turkish Empire to obtain their freedom. The peoples of Macedonia and Epirus, or rather the Christian part of the population, want by two steps—by first obtaining autonomy and then complete independence—to put themselves in the position of Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, and Greece, States which were 'once under the Turkish dominion but are now free. As for the people of Albania, though here the bulk of the population is Mohammedan but not Turkish, they also want to escape from the misgovernment and the interference of Constantinople. But the people of the European provinces of Turkey have been calling for freedom from misgovernment aggravated by massacre ever since the Treaty of Berlin recognized their abstract right to something in the nature of autonomy. Why then should a. desire which has been frustrated so long suddenly become dangerously active? The answer is to be found in one word : " opportunity." The people of the Christian provinces and their helpers among the four Balkan Powers think, whether rightly or wrongly remains to be seen, that the time has come when they can make a suc- cessful attempt to get rid of Turkish rule. If we analyse further the nature of this opportunity, it will be seen that it has arisen from three causes. First and foremost, the four Powers have been able to come to an agreement as to their action against Turkey and as to the disposal of the spoil. Till within a very few months ago the Turks felt secure, because it seemed certain that the four Powers would, owing to their internal quarrels, be unable to present a united front to their hereditary foe. At last, however, they have been able to compose their jealousies and agree what shall be done, provided they can get rid of the Turks. Next comes the fact that Turkey is at war with one of the great Powers, and that surely, if slowly, the tendency of that war is becoming adverse to Turkey. Within a very few months, whether she likes it or not, Turkey must make terms with Italy. That peace would probably have been made by the end of November has no doubt made the four States, Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro and Greece, realize that if they are not to lose the psychological momenttliFf4natitee-7Iro wait ft., attack-Turkey till she has got out of her difficulties with Italy would obviously be a capital error in militant politics. Even though Italy may not care for the help of the Balkan States, she cannot alter the fact that if a group of Powers are simultaneously at war with a. common enemy they must help each other. Another consideration which has no doubt made the war seem opportune is the internal situation in Turkey, both politidal and financial. Though the _power of the Committee has been greatly weakened it has not been altogether destroyed, and until it is destroyed the present Government at Constantinople must be unstable. Again, Turkey is beginning to feel the financial strain of the war with Italy. Lastly comes the fact that, though no doubt the great Powers are quite sincere in desiring to prevent any breach in the status quo, they are not in a position to enforce their desires. These are the considerations which have brought war, or at any rate, brought Europe to the verge of war. They are all bound up in the imperative consideration—" Now or never."
(2) Is there any possibility of preventing war ? We fear there is none. The only possibility would be for the Powers to send an ultimatum to Turkey, in effect ordering her to grant the demands of the four.States—i.e , to give autonomy to Macedonia and Albania. But this the Turks would in all probability not do, even if the Powers could bring themselves to demand it. In any case such action would go a great way beyond preventive measures. It would not be preserving the status quo, but would be, in fact, an alliance of all Europe to help enforce the demands of the four Powers. But for such a policy a general agree- ment is impossible. To put the matter simply, Austria- Hungary does not want the solution which the four States want, and therefore for the great Powers to back the demands of those States would in truth mean the over- bearing of the will of Austria-Hungary. But Germany, if she had no other reason, could not possibly join in virtually coercing her ally. On the other hand, France, Russia, and England have no intention of risking a European catastrophe by ignoring the wishes of Austria- Hungary and her German ally. In a word, the solution which we are now considering could only be reached if the Powers were in thorough agreement as to the future of the European provinces of Turkey. While they are disagreed they cannot act together except to maintain the status quo, and autonomy demanded-at the point of the bayonet is not the status quo. Another way of stopping the wax would be to tell the Four States that they shall do nothing to help their co-religionists in Macedonia, or elsewhere, and that, in effect, the Christian Powers mean to support Turkey in her right to bully her own Christians and to refuse to give them either reforms or autonomy. But clearly Russia, as the protector of the South Slays, could not possibly agree to a policy so cynical, nor, again, could we or France. Curiously enough, even Austria-Hungary would find a difficulty here, for long-suffering as is the huge Slavonic population of the Austrian Empire, it could not endure to see Austria-Hungary insisting that the cry of the Christian population of the Balkans should not be regarded. The only way in which Austria- Hungary could act would be for her to step in herself and occupy -Macedonia and such parts of Albania as would prove penetrable to her forces. But for Austria-Hungary to make war on Turkey would be a strange way of helping the Porte out of its difficulties or of preserving the peace. Even if this anomaly could be got over, direct Austrian action must threaten difficulties so great in regard to Russia and Italy as to be wholly impracticable. The Great Powers are not likely to commission Austria- Hungary to seize the goods in dispute and keep them for herself till somebody can make out a better title. That would be only too likely to end in the permanent endowment of Austria-Hungary with the remains of European Turkey. The Great Powers may be altruistic, but not quite so altruistic as all that. Again, the notion of Austria-Hungary occupying Servia. and Bul- garia and Montenegro and bombarding Athens, though leaving Turkish territory inviolate, in order to keei the four States quiet, is an impossible solution. As far as we can see, the most that the Powers can do to prevent war is to tell the four States that though they, the Great Powers, have no policy of their own, whatever 'else happens the aggressive States shall not get anything out of tho war. Unfortunately this is much easier to say than to carry into practice, and it is greatly to be feared that it will have very little effect at Sofia, Belgrade, and Athens. Granted that these States think that they have got a, real opportunity of beating the Turks, they will not be deterred by hypothetical considerations. Wilco nations are worked up to the point of making war they are not greatly moved by being told that they will get no material benefit out of the war. If such considerations moved nations when in a war fever, war would have ceased automatically long ago, for, as Mr. Norman Angell preaches, no one ever 'has .or ever will get any material benefit out of fighting. Yet they fight.
-(3) Who is likely to win in the war ?
That is a point which it is almost impossible to decide., No doubt the Turks are great men of their hands, and, as the military correspondent of the Times remarks, though they may have neglected reform in Macedonia, they have not neglected reform in the army. At the same time we must not forget that the Bulgarian army is an exceedingly fine military instrument, and that though Servia and Montenegro and Greece have not very efficient forces they count for something, nay, perhaps for a good deal, owing to their geographical positions. In all probability the Turks will, if war comes, trouble very little for the time about the Greek or Servian or Montenegrin frontiers, but will concentrate all their efforts on beating the Bulgarian army. These tactics might do very well if the Turks could certainly ensure a short sharp fight and a conclusive victory. But suppose that the Turks fail to beat the Bulgarians, and that, though the way is not opened to Constantinople, there is something like a drawn game in the Rhodope Mountains. In that case the Servian, Greek, and Monte- negrin armies would probably be able to overrun Macedonia. But if once the Turks leave Macedonia and Albania no amount of holding their own on the Bulgarian frontier will enable the Crescent to be restored in Macedonia. In making such a calculation we are assuming that the first act of the Turks would be to throw Tripoli to the wolves and to make peace on any terms with the Italians. If this is not done, Italy would, no doubt, be obliged to tell the Powers that she could no longer be bound by her self-denying ordinance to confine the land war to Tripoli. But that must mean the end of Turkey in Europe. On the whole, then, we can hardly believe that the Turks will be victorious, though we admit there is, of course, the possibility that the Turks may throw up some great military chief who will carry the Crescent once more to Sofia and Belgrade. But such a victory, even if it took place, would hardly help the Turks. Whatever else happens Europe will not permit the Danube once more to reflect Turkish standards.
(4) Is there any risk of England or of the Powers with which she acts getting involved, and a general European war being the result ?
On the whole we do not think any such catastrophe is likely to occur. All indications seem to point to the fact that if they cannot prevent war, the Great Powers, unable to agree among themselves, will make a ring and let Turkey and the four Powers fight it out, in the hope that somehow or other the question will settle itself, or if it does not, that they will later be able to find a solution. In the last resort nations only fight because they want to fight, or because some strong-willed statesman has come to the conclusion that war will suit his ambitions or those of his nation. But just at the moment we see no reason to think that any of the Great Powers or their rulers are in this mood. At the same time we cannot ignore the fact that Austria-Hungary finds herself in a most difficult position. It may be that she will be drawn into some unwise action—action, that is, of the kind which Russia, and possibly also Italy, will be unable to tolerate. In that way, though unwillingly, the rest of the Powers might no doubt be dragged in We can only say " Our hope is better."
(5) On which side should British sympathies be ? We trust and believe that they will not be anti-Turkish or anti-Mohammedan in any vindictive sense. No doubt Turkey of late has shown anything but a friendly front to this country ; she was, indeed, at one time drawn into the German orbit, the temptation being that if " the great war" came, Turkey-, under German military auspices, might be able to cross the Syrian desert and re-take Egypt. Our Government and people have, however, never been hostile to Turkey, and have made every possible allowance for her fall- ing under German influences. Again, the last thing that we want to do is to give any excuse for the declaration. that we are playing an anti-Mohammedan part. We have no quarrel with the Turks as Mohammedans, but a wise and natural desire to see them fairly treated. But though we must not look upon the war as a Christian crusade, we cannot blind ourselves to the merits of the quarrel or to the impossibility of permanently upholding the rule of the Ottoman Turk over Christians. That is an anomaly which must sooner or later come to an end, and, in our opinion, the sooner the better. We admit that from many points of view the Balkan States are very little better in regard to the use of massacre and outrage for pblitical purposes than the Turks, and that, tried by a high standard of civilization, they must be condemned. At the same time we must not forget that they have in them a progressive element, even though it be of small dimensions, and that apparently, and despite her many good qualities in other respects, Turkey has not. The Christians of the Near East are improvable. The Turks are not. On the whole, the formula which Chatham 'used in regard to the Great Rebellion seems to us best to fit the case. Speaking of that event Chatham said —we quote from memory : " There was ambition, there was sedition, there was oppression, but you shall never persuade me that it was not the cause of liberty on the one side and of tyranny on the other." In the last resort, and making every allowance for Bulgarian cynicism, Servian bloodthirstiness, Grecian perfidy, and Montenegrin savagery, no one shall ever persuade us not to desire that the Christian provinces of Turkey shall be freed from the yoke under which they have suffered so long, and which has brought with it ills so many and so great. The Balkan States have a bad record, but considering their terrible history the wonder is that that record is not far worse rather than better. After all, where would our civilization and good morals be if we had been under the dominion of the Ottoman Turks for four or five centuries ?
"Think if the arm of Charles Martel Had failed upon the Plain of Tours ! That fate whose course we know so well, That foul subjection, had been ours. Where then had been the high renown France can from sire to son deliver, Where English freedom, rolling down, One broadening, one continuous river ?"
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