SEA, LAND, AND AIR STRATEGY.*
IF any single officer is competent to deal with two such complex and different subjects as war operations by land and war operations by sea, Colonel Sir George Aston is the man, since be has bad much experience with both the Army and the Navy. It is true that the general underlying principles are the same on the two elements, but their application in the two cases is widely different. Any attempt to treat them together must from the nature of things not only be very difficult, but may tend to gloss over the differences, and thus encourage superficial minds to believe that they comprehend matters really beyond their competence. The layman may be so misled, but not the officer who understands thoroughly the art of conducting war either with armies or with navies. He will be aware of his limitations, and will not imagine that he is really competent to deal with an arm other than his own. Such officers, when of different professions, quickly under- stand each other and readily work together. It is well to remember that the great Napoleon failed to apply his own principles in war at sea, and that Nelson does not seem to have understood their application on land. Their limitations tend to show that a knowledge of principles without a complete mastery of practical details cannot lead to great success. Consider the immense difference between the care, mainte- nance, movement, and use in battle of a warship and a regiment of infantry. Would not an Admiral be as helpless in command of a large army as a General at the head of a great fleet? The • Sea, Land, and Air Strategy. By Sir George Aston, K.C.B., A.D.C., Colonel /loyal Marine Artillery. London : John Murray, [10a. 6d. net.1
differences are so great and fundamental that any attempt to discuss the two subjects concurrently must lead to confusion of thought.
Our author's treatment of the subject is interesting, because it shows two conflicting theories at issue—first, that of Napoleon and Nelson, who each concentrated their attention on the armed forces, well knowing that, if these are either disarmed or their action neutralized, all else will follow as the victor desires; secondly, that of a certain school who place in the forefront the need to bring pressure to bear on the unarmed civil population. It is true that the author leans heavily towards the first, but it seems to us that the arguments would have been more simple, more cogent, and more con- vincing if he had once for all exposed the fallacy of the second, and had recognized that in the conduct of war the logical sequence of thought should be the fight, or the threat to fight ; the movements to bring about the fight, or to threaten to do so ; the action required to reduce the resources of the enemy. The most superficial observer must see that a clear conception of the value attached to the weapons and of the way to use them—that is, of the tactics in the fight—is indis- pensable before the strategical movements most suited can be decided. Has not the increased range of firearms caused changes in tactics and corresponding alterations in strategy on land P Has not the assumed efficiency of the torpedo, rightly or wrongly, brought about changes in tactics and strategy at sea? Turning to the value attaching to pressure brought to bear on the unarmed civil population, does not the present war clearly show that it is quite a secondary matter ? Does not all depend, on land, on the result of the battle between the armed forces P And at sea, does not the pressure on Germany, due to the stoppage of her trade, flow entirely from the action of her armed ships being neutralized ? Does not that spring from the fact that the British Navy stands ready to fight?
The subject presented in the manner suggested would develop from a single ideal—the attack on the armed force —and would gradually grow as all the side-issues were worked in to strengthen and buttress the central conception. Acceptance of the Napoleonic and Nelsonian idea that the defeat of the armed force covers all else at once indicates the line of action to be taken and simplifies every secondary issue. The author's dictum on p. 51 that "in making our plans we must consider what we must defend, namely, the merchant ships upon which the population depend, our own vessels carrying troops, and also our territory against attacks on a large scale," changes into what we must attack or prepare to attack. It is quite true that the author says the best way to defend is to attack, but there is an immense difference between arrangements made primarily to defend merchant ships and those made primarily
to attack the armed ships that threaten them. In the first case, attention will be chiefly directed on the merchant ships to be defended, and the tendency will be to spread out the force over the whole area traversed by the trade. In the second case, the mind's eye will be firmly fixed on the attacking ships, and the tendency will be to concentrate every effort against them.
Again, in the chapters on " Objectives " and on " Sea War- fare" the author starts with the premiss that the usual object in war is to bring pressure to bear on the civil popula- tion. It is difficult to understand why this secondary point is placed in the forefront, seeing that the author does not seem to believe in it, but to agree with Napoleon and Nelson that
the primary object is to disarm the armed force or to neutralize its action. His simile between war at sea and football is
excellent, but he does not point out its true inwardness in that it illustrates the principle that the armed forces are all- important and that attack is the best form of defence. Do not the players represent the armed forces P Does not each side attack on a well-arranged plan to neutralize the action of the other, and thus provide for the defence of its own goal P Are not the spectators the civil population who do not count, except that they provide the funds to enable the game to be played? The present war offers an impressive example of the protec- tion afforded to trade by a superior navy properly used to neutralize the action of the attacking ships, when supple- mented by an effective system of insurance to spread the losses. It also shows that the trade of a Continental country can be largely stopped in certain circumstances. The exaggerated and mistaken views of Lord Loreburn and other emotional writers have been shown to have little foundation. The author seems to think the main reason for stopping the trade of a belligerent is to bring pressure to bear on the civil population. It is suggested that, since the decision depends upon the armed forces, the true reason is because the stop- page dries up the wealth by which they are maintained and supported. In connexion with this question of trade protection, the author and others repeatedly refer to control of communications. It is difficult to understand why they use a term which requires so much explanation, or why they thus divert attention from the armed force upon which the control of the communications depends. It is much simpler to say that the enemy's armed ships have been destroyed or their action neutralized than to use a phrase which is not commonly understood, and must be explained.
The author discusses the interesting question whether in the case of a threatened invasion the defending fleet should devote more attention to the covering fleet or to the transports. He properly points out that the former is ultimately the greater danger, and that the latter can be dealt with by cruisers and small ships. But his argument illustrates the defects of a work which deals with strategy without first examining tactics. He assumes without a particle of proof that the torpedo has worked a revolution. Is it quite certain, after the experience of the Russo-Japanese War and the instructive example of the' Lance ' and the German minelayer, that the gun armament of a destroyer is less effective than its torpedo armament ? Equally necessary is a correct appreciation of the tactical problem when dealing with questions connected with concen- trations, dispersions, and detachments. Our author's con- clusions seem to be very reasonable, but it is worthy of consideration whether concentration of effort rather than of purpose does not more correctly express what is required when armed forces, whether on land or sea, are acting in detachments with a common object.
The author devotes two chapters to the question of fortifi- cations, and rightly suggests that their use shall be limited to conditions under which they contribute to the strength of the mobile armed force, as the French forts are seen to do in the present war. The tendency always is in time of peace to magnify the dangers from the enemy's attack and to place undue reliance on fixed defences. This is often very pronounced in the case of harbours, as the author points out. Unfortu- nately the force of his argument is somewhat reduced by mixing up with their strategical aspect tactical questions connected with the use of fortifications. It seems to us that sufficient attention is not called to the protecting power of a great Navy vigorously handled, bent on attacking every hostile ship which puts to sea, hardened against danger by constant cruising, and firmly determined to seek out and destroy every submarine, to sweep up every mine, and to sink every mine- layer. Such an attack gives an enemy no time or opportunity to retaliate, and assures security not only to the ships in our own ports, but to the trade at sea and the country itself. The chapter on "Air Warfare" contains much useful information, and the book itself is deeply interesting at the present time, but requires to be read with discrimination.
Previous page
