SHIELDS • IN WAR.
SUFFERING can be better endured when it contributes to the growth of knowledge. The patient who is informed that his disease presents some features new to medicine finds an immediate alleviation of his agonies in the thought. Thus we may take some comfort from the general admission that the costly and painful war in which we are now engaged is likely to solve many fresh problems of military science. No such war has been fought under modern conditions between foes of fairly well-matched ability and weapons. The Greeco-Turkish and Spanish-American Wars hardly counted for the student. But our struggle with the Boers has already brought out several interesting and novel points. In this respect it will rank with the wars which introduced the Crimean rifled gun, the Prussian breechloader, and the Turkish system of field entrenchments. A new era in war- fare is now opening. That being the case, it seems-to the military student that there can be no possible harm in trying as many experiments as possible, provided that they are neither too costly nor too risky. Neither of these objections applies to the proposal which has been made in several quarters to furnish our infantry with some kind of shield for use against rifle-fire in the advance against an entrenched position. Some of our corre- spondents have touched on this matter. It is quite true that the testudo formation which "A. M. A." proposed last week is hardly practicable, because of the target it would offer to guns ; besides, as " A Lieutenant-Colonel of Infantry " points out, the weight of a shield 6 ft. by 3 ft. of any material adequate to resist the Mauser bullet would render it useless to the foot-soldier, although it might profit- ably be applied to field-guns. Our recent experience at the Tugela River shows how liable guns are to be put out of action by skirmishers, now that the effective range of rifles is beginning to approximate to the radius of visibility. Surely it is open to think that, if each of Colonel Long's guns had been provided with a bullet-proof shield, similar to that attached to naval quick-firers, they might have made a better fight against the Boer sharp-shooters. The artillerists' objection to the introduction of shields is two- fold ; it would, they say, diminish the mobility of the guns, whose teams have weight enough behind them already, while the shields would be a fatal target for opposing artillery, and would burst shells that would otherwise fly wide. But mobility is not the sole desirable quality in guns : as usual, there-has to be a compromise, and after the Tugela experience it must be felt that a shield would have been a useful exchange for some rounds of shell. As to the other objection, one may suggest that the shields might be so constructed that they could be lowered out of the way when an artillery duel was in progress. The Boer Maxim which did us so much damage at the battle of Graspan was saved from being early put out of action by its shield, which was pitted all over with bullets before a shell finally broke it in two.
The use of shields by infantry, however, is a much more revolutionary proposal, and not a few civilians and soldiers will treat it with ridicule. Yet some consideration is due to the fact that such experts in metallurgy as Major Boynton and Professor Byles have asserted that a shield adequate for protection against rifle-fire can be made light enough for use in the advance. Major Boynton thinks that the weight could be reduced to seven pounds by the use of one of the new aluminium alloys. Mr. Marsden suggests the employment of the bullet-proof material which a German tailor offered to our War Office some years ago. That inventor had at least strong con- fidence in the virtues of his own stuff. When the Duke of Wellington was at the Horse Guards he was often visited by men who professed to have invented shot-proof cuirasses. His invariable custom was to ask the inventor to put on his own cuirass, and to order up a couple of files with loaded muskets. The suggested trial never went further. But the German inventor stood fire, and his garment protected him. To issue cuirasses is obviously out of the question, but the possibility of shields for temporary use is worth investigation. It should be easy to put the protective qualities of such shields to a speedy test. If they prove to be efficient, why should not a number be sent out to Africa for trial ? The problem of war is the same now as in Cmsar's day, or as when our probably arboreal ancestor first associated with his fellows for the purpose of aggression. It is, in its essence, to bring the attacking troops into close quarters with the defenders. The object of the defence is to keep them aloof. This truism is worth enunciating, as there seems to be a good deal of misconception on the subject among the critics of our present operations. It is true that, human nature being imperfect, the defender does not always wait for the attack to be pushed home, and often gives in before he is incapacitated for resistance. Hence arises the value of turning movements. But if the defender happens to prefer death to defeat, like the Turks at Plevna and the Dervishes at Omdurman, then the battle resolves itself into a question of whether the attack can be driven home before it is exterminated. Against modern firearms the old mad rush is out of the question, and battles have to be won by a succession of short rushes alternated with periods of rest under such cover as can be found, until a sufficient force is lodged within the proper distance for that final charge which must always decide the result. The use of fire within deadly range, or of the bayonet, is a question of detail ; the object of every general is to accumulate within striking distance a force sufficient to demoralise or crush his foe. That is the difficulty with the Boers ; we have to push our men forward in the face of such a heavy and searching fire that they cannot get within striking distance. Here it is that shields might prove effective, as shelters for the rests between the rushes. It is not our business to define the exact nature of the shield which might be used, or to say how it should be utilised. That is a task for the War Office. But we do think that when warfare is confessedly in a stage of rapid evolution, there can be no possible harm in trying an experiment that is recommended by several experts and has many features of promising novelty.
It is objected to the use of shields in attack that it might diminish the men's courage, and would certainly impair their mobility. As to the first, we need only remind the reader that that has been said of every improvement in weapons. We have never heard that Cmsar's troops lost their valour because they were encouraged to regard their entrenching tools as no less essential than their swords ; nor that the men who work behind the twelve-inch armour of a battleship are less plucky than the crew of an undefended torpedo-boat. The skirmishers of every army are encouraged to use all the cover they can find, and they are hardly likely to lose heart in the ultimate rush because some of the shelter behind which they have crept up in happens to be artificial. We do not think so meanly of our troops as to suppose that their valour depends on their equipment. Yet it need not be taken for granted that Tommy would despise shields, since he is ready enough to risk his life without them. When Skobeleff's division learnt in the Turkish campaign that their lives depended on their spades as well as their muskets, they ceased to grumble at the weight of the tools which they had been apt to fling away until experience taught their value. The second objection is more serious. Everything that adds to the soldier's load diminishes his radius of action, and transport troubles are our worst in Africa. If it is understood, however, that shields are only for use in frontal attacks, this might be surmounted. A single waggon would carry shields enough to equip a battalion, and if twenty lives were saved by them the effect would be to add so much to the power of the attack. No one suggests that men should march with shields on their backs. The moral effect on the enemy of anything that tends to make their foe less vulnerable must also be reckoned with. In connection with shields, there has been suggested the use of armoured motors. An armoured train's utility is impaired by its dependence on the rails. But why should not an armoured traction engine be used to take guns into close action, where horses would be shot ? Why should not armoured motor cars of higher speed and dirigibility be devised for taking troops over part at least of the fire zone,—to the base of a kopje that has to be stormed, for instance ? No doubt such questions are in the minds of many soldiers, to whom civilians may safely leave them to be worked out. We need not grudge the cost of this war if it teaches our Army to develop the same ten- dency to try experiments and improvise means of meeting every difficulty that has long been a chief boast of our Fleet.
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