TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE FUTURE OF CONSTANTINOPLE.
WE sincerely trust that our Russian allies will not be perturbed by rumours as to the attitude of the British people towards the future of Constantinople. Sir Edward Grey may have had, or perhaps we ought to say no doubt had, good reasons for the reserve with which he answered the question put to him in the House uf Commons on this point. It may be that we and the rest of the Allies have agreed that none of them shall indulge in any public forecasts whatever as to the final settlement after the war, that this self-denying ordinance is to extend to all matters, and that no exception is to be made in regard even to events which we all know are certain whatever else is uncertain. In any case, we need not feel ourselves bound by the example of Sir Edward Grey. Being absolutely convinced that there was nothing behind his words but a diplomatic punctilio, we assert without the slightest fear of contra- diction that the British people not only will raise no objection to Constantinople, the Bosphorus, and the Dardanelles becoming part and parcel of the Russian Empire, but that they feel neither jealousy nor anxiety at the prospect of such possession. The British people have forgotten all their old fears and doubts about the guardian- ship of the Straits, and will now look with pride and pleasure upon their possession by allies whom we have come to trust and to honour alike for their gallantry in the field and their good faith in the council chamber.
When we say this it must not be supposed, however, that we are suggesting that Russia is to be welcomed to Con- stantinople merely out of sentiment or good feeling. These play their part, but we are quite sure that the wiser minds in Britain now realize that it is very much to the interests of this country that in future the gates to the Black Sea should be in the hands of a powerful State like Russia, not in weak hands like those of Turkey. Weak Powers in a wicked world are always liable to be seduced, as was Turkey, by a mixture of force and fraud, bullying and bribery. Instead of Turkey fulfilling the dream of the old diplo- matists and maintaining neutrality in the Straits, she betrayed them to Germany. With Russia at the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles we shall know where we are, and not be exposed to such embarrassments as those of last October, when successful intriguing so suddenly and so completely closed the Black Sea and its wheat supplies to British commerce. Consider the position for a moment. After the present war Russia will be not merely as now the predominant partner in the Black Sea, but its mistress. There will be only one Black Sea Power besides Russia—i.e., Roumania, for Bulgaria will have her outlet on the Aegean. This means that if wears ever at war with Russia—and we are not so foolish as not to consider such a possibility, though it is one, we trust, of a very dim and distant future—the Black Sea and its ports will in any case be closed to us. We shall in these circumstances have no reason for wanting to force the Straits and to get into what would be for us unprofitable waters. Unless we can trade with Russia, we had much better keep our war vessels out of the Black Sea. If, however, we are at war with some other Power, and Russia remains neutral, then we shall indeed be thankful that the Straits are held by a Power strong enough and independent enough to maintain a real neutrality, and to keep open this essential high- road for the corn of Southern Russia. Finally, if we are, as now, the allies of Russia, and are most anxious to send supplies to her ports and to take grain in exchange, then it is even more to our advantage that the key to the Straits shall be in Russia's pocket. From whatever point of view we look upon it, it is to our interests to have Russia at Constantinople as guardian of the Straits, under due provisions, which will of course be made, and to which Russia will raise no objection, to prevent her from yielding to the temptation of levying toll upon foreign shipping or putting re- etrictions upon through traffic between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.
We admit that even if there were not these obvious reasons why we should desire to see Russia at Con- litantinople. we should out of loyalty to our ally have
been perfectly willing that a city whose possession she naturally desires so greatly should become hers now that the Turks can no longer be trusted as porters of the gate. At the same time, it is worth while to point out to the Russians, who, cut off as they are at the present moment from free intercourse with the rest of the Allies, can well be pardoned for being somewhat anxious, that our material interests, as well as our desire to please and satisfy an ally, will lead us not merely to acquiesce but to rejoice in the hoisting of the Russian flag at Stamboul and the resumption of Christian worship under the dome of St. Sophia. Con- cerned as we are for the good treatment of Mohammedans, for the protection of their Holy Places, and for their right to worship God after their own manner, we should look with the gravest anxiety upon any attempt to deprive the adherents of the Islamic faith of any mosque built by members of their religion. Since, however, St. Sophia was not only built by Christians, but was used for Christian worship up till the middle of the fifteenth century—that is, has had nearly a thousand years of Christian worship, and has only heard for some four hundred and fifty years the Moslem call to prayer—the followers of the Prophet can feel no grievance that the great church of Justinian
shall revert to the religions uses of those who built it. -
Though we are sure that we have accurately expressed the feeling of the vast majority of our countrymen in regard to the future of Constantinople, we are well aware that a certain number of people will shake their heads over our plain speaking, and say that the problem is not quite so easy as we have made it out, and so on. Their line will be : "No doubt the British people now see no objection to having the Russians at Constantinople and would welcome them there. We must, however, think a little of the rest of Europe, and especially of the Mediterranean Powers and the Balkan States. To begin with, Italy has a great stake in the Levant, and can we feel quite sure that she will not assert that the Dardanelles and Bosphorus ought to be in neutral hands and not in those of one of the Great Powers ? Again, must not Greece and Bulgaria and Roumania have their feelings considered ? Especially might not Roumania feel that if Russia held the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles she might at any time have her commerce completely cut off ? In any case, the problem is very large, and had better he left over till after the war, &c., &c." Our general answer to these objections of timidity or ignorance or both is that they are based upon hypo- thetical fears. Somebody has got to have Constanti- nople. But as we have said above, it is better for every one that the key of the Black Sea should be in strong rather than in weak hands. There is, however, a still better reason for ignoring the objections which we have just sketched. The Powers we have named cannot expect to have things both ways. There are many very good and very potent reasons why they should keep out of the war altogether, and we have not the slightest desire to argue with theta on this point, or to suggest that they have com- mitted any fault by securing for themselves and their people the blessings of unbroken peace. But it is clear that this refusal to embroil themselves in a contest which was not theirs cannot per se give them a right to dictate the future settlement of the Turkish Empire—granted always that the Allies are successful in their operations against Turkey. It must not be supposed, however, that we are making any indirect threat or menace against the neutral Powers, or hinting that they will have to pay a penalty if they continue their policy of keeping out of the fight. No each idea is in our mind, or, we believe, in the minds of any responsible persons connected with the Allies. The neutral Powers have, as always, every claim to justice and reasonable consideration at the hands of the Allies, and will, whatever happens, receive such treatment. But between the claim, or rather the indefeasible right, to fair treatment, which will be in any case fully satisfied, and the claim to dictate the specific terms of a settlement, and even to forbid Russia to hold Constan- tinople though her allies are perfectly willing, nay, anxious, that she should do so, there is a wide difference. The neutral Powers cannot expect to exercise a Merum veto over the settlement. There is, however, no occasion to make more of this, for we are quite sure that the able diplomatists who direct the councils of Italy., Greece, Bulgaria, and Roumania already realize these points to the
Lull. Italy has always been the special friend of Russia, and no friction is to be looked for there. The other Powers, even though they may have dreamed of Con- stantinople as their own, would prefer an occupation by Russia to an occupation by a local rival. The notion that they claim the right to protest against a Russian occupation of Constantinople is a delusion of the amateur diplomatist, and does not emanate from any responsible source.
Before we leave the subject of the future of Constan- tinople we should like to draw special attention to a very interesting article by Mr. Ellis Barker which has the place of honour in this month's Nineteenth Century. In that paper Mr. Barker has collected a very largo number of striking quotations from diplomatic and other documents dealing with the history of the Straits during the Napoleonic Wars. What is specially noteworthy is the origin of British suspicions and jealousies in regard to the possession of Constantinople by the Russians. Mr. Barker shows that these suspicions were largely due to Napoleon, who not only lost no opportunity of suggesting to Russia that we were the obstacle to her dream of inheriting the Empire of Byzantium, but also inspired us with the fear of a Russian advance. After quoting Napoleon's saying, "The more fantastic an attempt to attack India would be, the more it will frighten the English," Mr. Barker adds the wise comment : "There is some reason in his observation. England is more easily frightened by bogies than by realities, and one of the bogies which has frightened her most frequently during many decades is the bogy of Constantinople which Napoleon set up a century ago." In reality it was Napoleon himself who dreaded the advent of the Russians to the Mediterranean. He is even credited with the expression that he could not permit Russia to be at Constantinople, "for that is the empire of the world." Yet, as we have so often pointed out in these columns, and as Mr. Ellis Barker also insists, the possession of Con- stantinople has never yet in history conferred power upon the holder. Though on paper the position seems 80 tremendously strong, it has never been an Imperial city except in name. Its foundation marked the decline of Rome, and after the Turks obtained possession of it their power rapidly declined. Russia, however, need not fear the omen. Constantinople will only become to her an appanage such as Cairo or Delhi is to us. There is no risk of her transferring her seat of Government to the shores of the Bosphorus. Nor, again, is there any fear of her using her position to restrict international trade. Instead, financial and commercial reasons will combine to make her encourage free ingress to and egress from the Black Sea.
Previous page
