THE WAR IN THE AIR.*
THERE is probably no feature of the Great War which lends itself to description better than the work of the flying men on whom both sides depended for the greater part of their reconnaissance and information. Wellington used to say that the best general was the one who could guess most accurately what the enemy were doing on the other side of the hill. The coming of the aeroplane will make it unnecessary to depend on guesswork in future ; all the general has to do is to send a man to look. Such, at least, was the idea which led us to send as many as thirty-seven aeroplanes across the Channel on the memorable 14th of August, 1914. The work done by this handful of scouts was of priceless value ; it was they, for instance, who brought the news that at least three German army corps were attacking at Le Cateau, and so enabled General Smith-Dorrien to take his momentous decision. The fighting abilities of the aeroplane were only recognized later, and the long duel in the air may be described in the main as an effort on each side to put out the eyes of the enemy. The bombing capacities of this new arm were never really exploited on an adequate scale, though if the Armistice had not been concluded when it was we might have given an instructive object-lesson to Berlin in this matter.
Major Turner, who was one of the comparatively small number of pre-war aviators (No. 70 in the British list), and did good service throughout the war as an instructor in the Royal Naval Air Service, has written a very interesting account of The Struggle in the Air, 1914-1918. It does not profess to compete with a regular history of the Royal Air Force and its predecessors, such as Sir Walter Raleigh is understood to be compiling from official records, but is simply " an endeavour to present, but without technicalities, the development, step by step, of aircraft, of the art of flying, and of the various func- tions of aircraft in war." A leading feature of the book is the large number of extracts from official accounts of individual exploits, mostly taken from the honours list in the Gazette or the publications of the Air Board. Baldly as most of these stories are told, they make extremely thrilling reading, and for their sake alone this volume would be an admirable birthday present for any adventurous-minded boy. We may quote, as a typical example, the narrative of the action for which Major Brabazon Rees was awarded the Victoria Gross :— " Whilst on flying duties, Major Rees sighted what he thought to be a bombing party of our own machines retang home. He went up to escort them, but on getting nearer discovered they were enemy machines, about ten in all. Major Rees was immediately attacked by one of the machines, and after a short encounter it disappeared behind the enemy lines, damaged. Five others then attacked him at long range, but these he dis- persed on coming to close quarters, after seriously damaging two of the machines. Seeing two others going westwards, he gave chase to them, but on coming nearer he was wounded in the thigh, causing him to lose temporary control of his machine. He soon righted it, and immediately closed with the enemy, firing at a close-contact range of only a few yards, until all his ammunition was used up. He then returned home, landing his machine safely in our lines."
Another of these concise little anecdotes relates the inoident for which the famous Canadian airman, Colonel (then Captain) Bishop, gained his V.C. :— " Captain Bishop, who had been sent out to work independently, flew first of all to an enemy aerodrome ; finding no machine about, he flew on to another aerodrome, about three miles south-east, which was at least twelve miles the other side
• The Struggle in the Air, 1114418. By Major Chariot 0. fulmar. London : Edward Arnold. [155. net.]
of the line. Seven machines, some with their engines running, were on the ground. He attacked these from about 60 feet,
and a mechanic, who was starting one of machines, was seen to fall. One of the machines got off the ground, but at a height of 60 feet Captain Bishop fired 16 rounds into it at a very close range, and it crashed to the ground. A second machine got off the ground, into which he fired SO rounds at 150 yards range, and it fell into a tree. Two more machines then. rose from the aerodrome. One of these he engaged at the height of 1,000 feet, emptying the rest of his drum of ammunition. This machine crashed 300 yards from the aerodrome, after which Captain Bishop emptied a whole drum into the fourth hostile machine, and then flew back to his station. Four hostile scouts were about 1,000 feet above him for about a mile of his return journey, but they would not attack. His machine was very badly shot about by machine-gun fire from the ground."
Probably the annals of warfare afford no better illustration of Scott's " crowded hour of glorious life " than is to be found in the numerous similar narratives contained in Major Turner's book. He does not, however, confine himself solely to incidents of aerial fighting. In his later chapters he deals with many other interesting subjects, such as the work of artillery observers, whether in aeroplanes or balloons—the latter, by the way, being in need of a peculiar brand of cold-drawn courage, as they were constantly attacked both by aviators with incendiary bullets and by long-range shell-fire, without any possibility of defending themselves—of aerial photographers, bombers, and so forth. One of his most interesting chapters describes the " apron " defence of London against Gothas. These aprons consisted of a large number of loose wires hanging vertically from a horizontal cable which was kept aloft by a number of kite-balloons. There were about three balloons to every thousand yards of the fence, and the apron extended from a height of eight or nine thousand feet for some three
thousand feet downwards. Major Turner tells us that an accident which occurred to one of our own planes during experiments
with these aprons led the Germans to the conclusion that the latter were mobile :-
"This is known from captured orders instructing raiders to be especially cautious of the aprons, and not only to give them a wide berth overhead, but also to act on the assumption that they might be found wandering about at any part of the country."
Apparently only a single Gotha actually collided with an apron —in January, 1918—but the knowledge of the existence of this ingenious defence certainly contributed to make the
bombing of London an unpopular task amongst the hostile airmen.
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