BOOKS OF THE DAY
Soviet Economy
BOOKS and booklets about U.S.S.R. are in full flood, and it would be a pity if Mr. Hubbard's book were submerged by the torrent. It may not be as eulogistic as the public would wish, or as the subject might deserve, but it fully makes up in substance for what it lacks in " gush." Its avowed subject is Soviet industry and industrial labour, and it does not include Russian agriculture, which is covered by an earlier book. But Mr. Hubbard's industrial topics inevitably lead him into every major problem of Soviet economy. The first four or five chapters are largely historical. A brief, and necessarily superficial, sketch of Russian economic development under the Tsars is followed by a more detailed discussion of the successive transfigurations of Soviet economy from the days of " war communism " to the eve of the German attack. The follow- ing fifteen or sixteen chapters analyse the system, as it functioned in the 'thirties: the structure of industry, the standard of living, the financial and fiscal policy, and the general mechanism of planned economy. There are even chapters on the Jews and the women.
Mr. Hubbard's method is analytical, and his manner argumenta- tive, but his conclusions are impeccably judicious. He records the great progress of industry under the Soviet rule, but notes that the rates of growth have not been much greater than those of the last decade of Imperial Russia, or, indeed, those of other countries in periods of rapid industrialisation. He traces the development of restrictions on workers' migrations and on their choice of employ- ment, but does not forget to point out that the restrictive laws could not be rigidly enforced, and that labour has remained as fluid as ever. By implication he destroys most of the current generalisation about the Russian standards of life. The real earn- ings of industrial labourers were probably at their highest at the close of the N.E.P., dropped very low by 1934, but were on the rise again by 1937. On the eve of the first five-year plan they were higher than before the revolution ; at the end of the plan's first year they were ptobably much lower ; and it is very doubtful whether even in 1937. they quite overtook the level of earnings in 1913, or were anywhere within the range of contemporary earnings in Britain. In arriving at this conclusion, Mr. Hubbard takes into account both the social services (not all of which are gratuitous), and the compulsory or all-but-compulsory deduc- tions from wages.
The most interesting sections of the book are those which trace the concomitant evolution of Soviet attitudes to wages, prices and distribution. In order to raise the productivity of labour the Soviet Government had to introduce steeply graduated scales of earnings. But in order to make The scales real the government had to abolish the rationing of consumption goods, to restore the uniform purchasing power of money, and to supply the recipients of high incomes with "luxury" goods and services. The policy was too recent, and in view of the war with Germany too short- lived, to raise real class barriers. But at the end of the 'thirties signs of class distinction were beginning to affect the externals of social intercourse.
The moderation of Mr. Hubbard's matter is somewhat belied by his manner, for, like most students of Soviet Russia, he is inclined to take the official advocates a shade too seriously, and more than a shade too painfully. But in one important section, and one only, he has failed to give the advocates their due. He does not appear to have considered all the economic consequences of Stalin's pre-occupation with armaments. A great deal, if not most, of Soviet investments into capital goods were, in fact, directed into war industry, and had less effect on the output-of consump- tion goods, than the same volume of savings and investment would have had in a country less intent on rearmament. If by 194o the standard of life failed to rise as highly as ordinary Russians had hoped in 193o, the true explanation will be found not in the in- efficiency of the system or the iniquity of the " plan," but in the fact that Stalin, unlike Baldwin, ordered guns instead of butter. Had the necessary figures been available, Mr. Hubbard, in his computation of real incomes, might have included a per capita share of the national .armaments. In the absence of figures, he might at least have pointed out that a shepherd should be judged, not only by his ability to make his sheep fat, but also by his ability to save them from being eaten. One other criticism. Mr. Hubbard's economic arguments, though not always watertight, are invariably expert and well-in- formed. On the other hand, his sociological arguments are, to put it mildly, ingenuous. Most of his historical generalisations about the way things are done east of the Polish frontier (or is it east of the Rhine?), about national psychology and racial characteristics, are out of place in a book as serious as his. Some readers, how- ever, may be interested to know that Mr. Hubbard's description of the racial characteristics of Russian workers are in every way identical with Ure's description of British industrial labour in the
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