AIR-POWER AND COMMUNICATIONS
By STRATtGICUS
ABOUT Kletskaya and Tsimlyanskaya the Russians have been fighting with amazing stubbornness for a fortnight. Until Monday night they had been holding their own for several days
about Kushchevskaya and Salsk, but have now withdrawn from Salsk towards Byelaya Glina, which lies southward between the nvo. On Tuesday the Germans claimed to have taken the town of Voroshilovsk. These facts sum up the position of Hitler's drive to the south-east ; and if we can interpret them correctly we shall be able to form a just idea of its success and limitations. It is clear that they require interpretation, for Kletskaya and Tsimlyan- skaya roughly define a north and south line across the bend of the Don, and we know that the Russians have pinned the Germans down to the immediate neighbourhood of the river about Tsimlyan- skaya, whereas Kushchevskaya is 5o miles south of the Don and Byelaya Glina about 85.
The reason of the different fates of the advances in the two areas is not far to seek. If the north and south line through Tsimlyanskaya is continued towards the Caucasus it will leave to the west almost all the communications which Caucasia possesses. East of it there are hardly any railways or roads, and few useful tracks. West of it there is a comparatively well-developed system of railways and a number of good roads. It is, therefore, easy to understand why von Bock has been able to make such considerable headway in the west, and has been pinned down in the east. The flow of reinforcements depends upon the existence of good com- munications, and the material which forms the metal finish of his phalanx cannot so readily be brought up or kept supplied without them. The stubborn Russian infantry appear to be able to put up a stolid resistance against almost anything. In this war they have at least weapons to use against the enemy ; in the last at times they had none.
So obvious is the difference between the advance in the two zones that the Germans have been fighting hard for about a week to get the eastern in motion again. One of the main purposes of the drive from Rostov which has fanned out towards Salsk, Kush- chevskaya and the Azov littoral, is to compel the force about Tsimlyanskaya to withdraw under the threat to its flank ; and it has been developed to such a pitch that apparently it must have divided the western from the eastern Caucasian armies. But it has so far achieved so little success that now the Germans are attempting to advance eastward between the Don and the Sal. The tributary is divided from the great river by no more than 24 miles at Tsimlyanskaya, and the space is bare of communications except a few tracks that run athwart the line of advance. It can readily be recognised how much depends upon the Russian power to check this thrust While the resistance about Tsimlyanskaya and Klets- kaya, in the bend of the Don, is maintained there is a chance of a radical change in the whole position. If the Russians' magnifi- cent stand about the bridgehead south of the Don should be crushed the Caucasian forces may be separated, and the advance towards the Volga be pressed from the south-west as well as from the north-
west and west. •
The position between the Don and the Sal does not appear to be so threatening as that in the western Caucasus. On Tuesday the Germans claimed to have captured Voroshilovsk, whereas the Russians only that day announced their withdrawal in the Salsk area. When it is remembered that this town is over no miles south of Salsk, and over rsci south-east of Kushchevskaya, it seems certain that the German claim can only mean that some mobile detachment has penetrated between the two armies. If true at all, it is nevertheless serious, since it means that the Stalingrad railway has been cut north of the Baku line,- and the communications which supply the central and northern armies with most of their oil and manganese, as well as with much corn, must now be drawn across the Caspian to the Volga and the Ural river.
Indeed, it seems that in whichever way one turns the com- munications monopolise the attention. They are the arteries which feed the attack at the same time that they limit the defence. This is, of course, no new problem of war ; but, as has been frequently pointed out, the present war depends upon them more than ever before. Its numbers and the tremendous quantities of so many materials, the speed and mobility which are the foundation of the force no less than of the surprise of attack, the vast human wastage that must clog the machine if not removed—all these tend to make communications the grave preoccupation of every staff. Von Raven- stein said of Panzer warfare in the desert that it is a tactician's paradise, but a nightmare for the quartermaster ; and it is dear that his head must lie uneasy in any sort of country. So obvious is the advantage of the denial of communications to one side, even if they are not available to the other, that it is very difficult to understand why more attention has not been given to the possibility of interrupting them.
Where long continuous lines exist as watersheds between armies the ordinary means of interruption are not applicable ; but in the air-arm we are provided with a weapon that should be able to make communications secure or completely interrupt them. Why has this not been done? It is perhaps the most remarkable fact of the war that all the theory about aircraft points in one direction and all the experience in another. About no weapon or tactics have dreams been so expansive ; but it is difficult to think that anyone has care- fully followed the course of the war without some impatience as to the restricted area of realisation. In the Polish campaign it seems that the Douhet plan was successfully applied to an extent never since experienced—or is this because the results are not available in a completely trustworthy form? Since then the results, carefully considered, suggest that the air-arm is more capricious than reliable.
There is a reservation here that accuracy requires one to make. The generalisation just given is truer if the period up to two months ago is considered, but not so true since then. Take, for instance, the single case of the Libyaa and Egyptian pot ts. Even at the present moment Rommel is receiving supplies and reinforcements from across the Mediterranean, and yet all the ports have received num- bers of visits. How many tons of high explosive and incendiary bombs have been showered on Tripoli, Benghazi and the rest some ingenious person may one day compute, and then the world will be astonished. Theoretically, these ports should be completely out of action. They are not, unfortunately. The Mediterranean com- munications are still being used by the enemy in spite of all we can do by sea and air. In this sector of the war front, where it is imperative to prevent Rommel receiving reinforcements and fresh supplies, air-attack has never ceased, but it has never been com- pletely successful.
Whether it be due to a lack of versatility in our tactics or an uninspired and unscientific reconnaissance, it is impossible foi us to say ; but it should surely be possible for detached and thorough analysis to suggest some means of making the use of aircraft more economical. Such criticism, of course, does not apply only to the Royal Air Force, which is certainly as good as any in the world.
The German is much inferior in this respect on the whole ; and one has only to think of Buna and the Aleutians to see that the limiting factor is universally distributed. There is clearly a certain enmity between extent and concentration of . bombing-practice, and the recent huge raids have shown so great a difference in degree as to suggest a specific difference. This is true not only of strategic bombing but also of the use of aircraft in dose support on the battlefield. As it is certain that the strain upon material is immense and increasing, it is of great advantage to destroy as completely as possible one industrial plant after another.
But this must apply to aircraft also. The losses, though not great in percentage, must begin to reach a considerable total in aggregate, and it is already recognised that the American production is ex- pansible beyond the availability of material. We are, therefore, thrown back upon the more economical use of aircraft, and the problem does not appear to be one simply of precision bombing— though in that direction we may still have far to go—but even more of careful and detached study of the objectives of raids and the most perfect means of achieving them. It should theoretic- ally be possible to isolate any given battlefield ; and in the Russian crisis it has been shown how important this is, and how little has been done to accomplish it. The German tank-columns wend their way to centres of far too great an importance to be lost permanently, just as they seem to move with increasing weight in the Egyptian desert, in spite of the constant reports of damage done to supply columns. Used as flying artillery, aircraft should be able to break up any concentration ; and yet it is pretty certain that it will be found that up to the present ordinary field artillery has proved the best reply to the tank, as I suggested two years ago.
In Caucasia the battleground is within reach of reinforcement from our Middle East bases by air. Americans are appearing there in increasing numbers. They claim to have made a special study of precision-bombing. It can hardly be doubted that their inter- vention would have telling effect if they could slow down the stream of German ground and mobile units that is steadily pressing towards the Caucasian foothills. But such intervention to be of any value must depend upon a prior discovery of the means to bring efficiency very much nearer to the standard which theory suggests. Such a discovery would prove to be one of the major factors in the war.
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