IS GERMANY NAZI ?

By JOSEPH W. GRIGG, Jr.

HITLER'S great summer offensive is nearing its peak. He is making his supreme effort to create a military situation which would guarantee him at least against ultimate defeat. The sheer weight and ferocity of this effort have again inevitably focussed the world's attention upon the Nazi war-machine instead of upon the unstable, increasingly shaky, structure that constitutes the German Home Front. Yet the obvious rottenness of that structure, the bad morale, the grumbling, the under-nourishment, the overwork and the general war-weariness which were evident to anyone living, as I was, in Germany up to a few months ago and which will certainly increase rather than diminish as the war goes on, are bound to prove contributory factors of the first importance to the ultimate downfall of Hitler and his system. I use the word "contributory " advisedly, because as long as the German armed forces continue winning victories it would be idle to hope for an internal collapse. During the last war, when the state of the German Home Front became progressively more precarious even while the Kaiser's armies were still winning stupendous victories, the Germans coined a phrase Deutschland siegt sich tot, which literally translated means " Germany is conquering itself to death "—in other words, " Germany is killing itself by its victories." There are not a few far-sighted Germans who are wondering whether the same is not equally true today. Yet the apparent parallel between 1918 and the present time is to a large extent deceptive. There will be no Ebert or Scheidemann or Erzberger to take over the reins of a defeated Germany at the end of this war.

Hitler's Third Reich is theoretically a totalitarian National Socialist State in which every citizen is theoretically a Nazi. In

actual fact, at a purely rough estimate, probably not more than twenty-five per cent. of the German people are whole-hearted Nazis. Certainly not less than another twenty-five per cent. are bitterly opposed to Hitlerism. The remaining fifty per cent. consist of ill- assorted nondescript elements vaguely supporting National Socialism because it is prudent to do so or because they have a minor vested' interest in the system ; the self-styled " good Germans " who make the mental reservation " of course, I don't approve of everything Hitler does," but who add that as long as Germany is fighting for its life there is nothing for it but to support the regime ; those who dislike Nazism but prefer it to Communism, which they regard as the only alternative ; and the great body of political " don't cares" who exist even in a politically totalitarian State. These divisions are, as I said, purely rough estimates, yet they are highly significant, because they suggest that in a country theoretically one hundred per cent. behind Hitler only a minority—and a small minority at that—can be counted as Nazis by conviction.

Moreover, even at the crisis of the • greatest war in Germany's history, there is a section of the German population deeply and passionately opposed to the country's present leadership.

The anti-Nazi Opposition can be found everywhere in Germany. It is not limited to one part of the country or to one section of the community. It is made up of the most diverse social and political elements. That is its great weakness ; it has no cohesion and no common organisation. Let us examine for a moment what these element.; consist of. First and most obvious, there are the under- ground Communists. That a secret Communist movement still exists in Germany after nine years of National Socialism cannot be doubted. It has some degree of organisation in secret cells, par- ticularly in the industrial cities such as Hamburg, Cologne and Essen, but it is purely an underground movement and numerically probably quite smalL It cannot be regarded as in any sense a real menace to Hitlerism. Then there are the Churches—potentially an oppositional force of the greatest significance. The real show- down between the Nazis and the Churches, which appeared to be brewing a few years ago, has been postponed, more or less by tacit mutual understanding, until after the war, and the situation now

can best be described an armed truce. That is particularly true of the quarrel between the Nazis and the Evangelical Church, which has been at a complete standstill since the outbreak of war.

A new outbreak of hostilities with the Catholic Church appeared likely about a year ago, when a wave of expropriation of Church property by the Nazis was followed by the courageous public protests of the Bishop of Muenster, Count Galen, and by a meeting of the Catholic Bishops at Fulda, at which a series of strong pastoral letters condemning Nazi infringement a Church rights was drafted.

The Nazis let it be known, however, that if these pastoral letters were read they would not hesitate to arrest the entire Catholic hierarchy. At the same time a split appeared in the Catholics' own ranks when many of the younger priests refused to have any part in reading the pasforal letters, which they condemned as a stab in the back at a time when Germany's existence was at stake. As a result, the quarrel between the Catholic Church and the Nazis never reached an acute stage. The truce was resumed, with the Nazis clearly holding most of the strategically advantageous positions.

The third oppositional element is to be found chiefly among

what can only be termed rather vaguely the "intellectual" classes. ii It includes a fair proportion of the German professional classes, of the old nobility and of the theatrical profession. In other words, whereas Nazism is primarily a lower middle-class movement, the opposition to it is found mostly in the upper middle-class section of the community. Finally, when considering potential resistance to the Nazis, one must take into account the marked deterioration in general morale on the Home Front during the past twelve months; the increase in grumbling and the complete lack of any popular enthusiasm for the war—particularly against the United States. This state of mind, which really amounts to a progressive war-weariness, is evident in all parts of the German community, yet it is an attitude which is purely passive at the moment.

There are, in fact, two fundamental differences between /918 and today. The first is that throughout the last war there was a strong, well-organised, parliamentarily articulate Socialist Party opposition in Germany, which had little enthusiasm for the war and was ready to take over when the Imperial system collapsed. Today there is an equally widespread lack of enthusiasm for the war, but the Opposition is scattered, without organisation or means of expressing itself publicly and—perhaps most important of all— without arms. The second great difference is the existence today of a minutely organised, well armed and completely ruthless Nazi Party system, watching for and prepared to deal at once with any indications of discontent or open revolt on the Home Front. This Nazi Party organisation extends octopus-like into every street and every house in the country. Denunciation flourishes and is used to satisfy private spite. The Nazi Party can find out every detail about the private life of every individual German if it wishes— who his visitors are, what time he goes out in the morning and returns home at night, whether he grumbles, what is his attitude

to the war, to air-raids, to the Nazi regime. The omnipresence of this party system makes the development of any organised opposition virtually out of the question.

In addition the Nazi Party has its own private army, the Waffen SS—better trained, better equipped and better armed than the rest of the armed forces, and hand-picked to the last man. It numbers today, according to the most reliable estimates, between 250,000 and 300,000 men. Its existence as a potential weapon to crush any internal revolt was underlined by the captured German document published in the Press recently. The Waffen SS possessed up to a few months ago every type of weapon except planes. According to reports, which however have not yet been confirmed, Goering's well-known opposition to an independent SS air-force was recently overcome also. In any case, it was well known in Berlin that the SS were quietly but systematically taking over strategic corner-buildings in Berlin and other big cities, which were being converted into miniature SS " fortresses'" for use in a possible future civil war.

Hitler, in fact, has doubly insur.td himself against a collapse from the inside. The first insurance policy is the creation of a party system which makes the development of an organised opposition movement virtually impossible, the second is the construction of a powerful Party shock-army to be used to suppress any revolt which, despite his other precautions, might break out. The result is, as we have seen, that, although morale is deteriorating steadily and although a sizeable section of the German people is bitterly anti- Nazi, the growth of an organised Opposition on the Home Front is at the moment almost unthinkable. But Hitler's policy has produced a further consequence, which may prove of the greatest importance when the combined military strength of the United Nations finally crushes the Nazis. Nine years of Nazi rule, with the complete and ruthless suppression of any form of opposition, have created a situation which can only be described as a " political vacuum." In other words, when Hitler and his clique disappear from the scene, there will be no Ebert or Scheidemann to step in to replace them. There is no group of civilian Germans inside the country today which could conceivably take over from Hitler. Names such as Schacht or von Papen have been suggested, but there seems little likelihood that a Schacht or von Papen could pick up the reins of a defeated and crushed Germany. Still less is it likely that any of the anti-Nazi German statesmen now living in exile could do so. They have lived abroad too long, and their names are all but forgotten inside Germany. In any event, the name even of a figure like Dr. Bruening is too closely associated for the great majority of Germans with a period in their history which few—whether Nazi or not—would wish to see return. The prospect of this " political vacuum " in Germany at the end of the war to rid the world of Nazism is discouraging to anyone who hopes for the creation of a new democratic, non-aggressive Germany. Yet it a prospect with which the United Nations will have to reckon.

What, then, could take the place of Hitler? The best informed foreign opinion inside Germany up to the time I left that country a few months ago could see only one alternative—military dictator- ship. There was, in fact, good ground for believing that a strong, highly influential group already existed, ready to seize control swiftly if at any time and for any reason Hitler should disappear from the scene. We have seen that an internal revolt is hardly conceivable in present circumstances. But Hitler is making his supreme military effort this summer. If that fails, the strength of the German armed forces will have been dangerously drained. There is good reason to hope that when the tide of battle begins seriously to turn against the German armies their morale might go fairly quickly, and with the demoralisation of the armies the progressive deterioration of conditions on the Home Front could easily lead to a more or less general collapse of the whole Hitlerian system. In such circum- stances, a high army group might well attempt to seize control in the hope of negotiating a peace before Germany had lost every- thing, and an army putsch probably would lead to open civil war with the Waffen SS, which it is quite certain the Nazis will use to fight their corner to the bitter end. Whether a German military dictatorship would be preferable to German anarchy would then be for the United Nations to decide.