EIRE'S NEUTRALITY
By PETER MATTHEWS URING the past few months the outside world has become aware of a part, at least, of the price which Eire is paying for her policy of neutrality. The shortage of flour in the months before the harvest, though it was alleviated in some measure by the arrival of certain supplies from overseas, aroused in the country districts widespread fear of famine ; the fuel and power position is already considerably graver in Eire than in Great Britain, and informed opinion is extremely concerned about the probable position next winter ; the fuel crisis reacts upon the transport position, and this, in its turn, aggravates the fuel position still further, since limitations of transport, together with a shortage of suitable labour, prevent the full exploitation of the country's vast reserves of turf.
The emergence of these very real problems has, however, served to divert attention from developments which, if they are less obvious, are ultimately of far greater importance for the future of Eire and of Anglo-Irish relations. The Eire Government, with, the full sup- port of public opinion, opted for neutrality, recognising that the country would inevitably forfeit British goodwill, upon which, whether she likes it or not, Eire must inevitably depend to an im- portant extent for the alleviation of economic problems resulting from the war. And the problems with which Eire is confronted in the economic sphere, grave though they are, also confront in greater or less degree every European country, whether belligerent or neutral. Participation in the war, by regaining British goodwill and giving Eire a better claini on available shipping, would mitigate em in some degree, but nine Irishmen out of every ten are pre- ared to forgo the possible advantages of belligerency rather than sacrifice the neutrality policy. Other things being equal, the mass f the Irish public certainly feels that the bombing of Irish cities would be too high a price to pay for a little extra coal, a little xtra oil, and a rather larger allocation of superphosphate.
War-time problems of supply will after all disappear with the war, tit there are other respects in which the present position of Eire ill inevitably mould the future destiny of the country and its eople for an indefinite period after the war has ended. The power- ul stimulus given to autarkic trends in Eire is certainly matched by similar tendencies in other small neutral States, but in Eire's case is stimulus is the more important because Irish hankerings after utarky derive not merely from strategic and economic, but also from litkal impulses. Irish economic nationalism, a development which as notably hastened by the experience of the "economic war" ith the United Kingdom, means in practice one thing, and one ing only—freedom from economic dependence upon the British sles.
Though critics of the Government point to the present crisis as 'roof that the self-sufficiency scheme has failed, Mr. de Valera's Pporters can claim that the position would be even more critical
but for the encouragement given to the growing of wheat and sugar beet. Although it is clearly fallacious to argue that the autarkic tendency in the economy of Ireland is justified, as a long- term programme, because it has mitigated in some degree the effects of war-time conditions, such relief as it has afforded will certainly be advanced in its favour after the war.
In the opinion of Eire's most competent economists and agri- cultural experts, the only means of solving the country's agricultural and social problems, and of arresting the constant drain on the country's man-power from emigration, is to exploit Eire's greatest asset, the proximity of the British market. The stimulus given to autarky, and the forfeiture of British goodwill which results from the neutrality policy, will inevitably militate against the integration of Eire's economy in a system of freer international trade. The question whether the country will continue, as hitherto, to solve its economic and social problems by a steady export of Irishmen, or whether, by modelling its economy on that of Denmark, and thereby raising the standard of living, the Government could make life in the country districts sufficiently attractive to arrest emigration, will be vitally affected by the stimulus given to autarkic trends.
The essence of Eire's problem can be defined as a conflict between geography and history. Considerations of geography and economics point to a close association with Great Britain ; on the other hand, the long struggle for an Ireland freed from British " domination " has produced the trend towards economic isolationism, and this trend will inevitably be intensified by Eire's experience of war-time conditions. It is matched by political isolationism. The great personal prestige which Mr. de Valera enjoys at the present time is due in no small measure to the fact that Eire has so far escaped the horrors of war, and few people pause to reflect that she has done so simply because Hitler has not judged it possible to invade Ireland—largely because of the presence of Anglo-American forces in the Six Counties. The maintenance of neutrality is regarded, not as a fortunate accident, but as a positive achievement, and this
attitude will influence powerfully Eire's attitude to post-war prob- lems. It will help to perpetuate in Eire the mistaken belief that neutrality a la Suisse can give immunity from attack.
Students of the problem of federation would do well to examine the position of Eire. Mr. de Valera is believed to favour the entry of Eire into a West European Federation—provided always that the issue of Partition is first solved to Eire's satisfaction. In fact, if that problem was ever "soluble "—which certain Southern Irishmen have come to doubt—the developments of the past few years have made its " solution " in the Nationalist sense even more difficult. In fact, it may well prove that the handing back of the Irish ports, so embarrassing to Great Britain's conduct of the war, was an equally bad bargain for Mr. de Valera himself. Irish neutrality, and the denial to Great Britain of the three " Treaty Ports," has compelled British opinion to look at the Partition question from the point of view of strategy. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the Partition issue—and against the rights of the Protestant minority
in the north must be set the rights of the substantial minority-within-
the-minority—it is difficult to see how Great Britain could, after the war, repeat the strategic folly of 1938 by handing over the London- derry base into the bargain. If it is true, as the Irish leaders suggest, that Partition was one of the main causes for Irish neutrality, it is also true that Irish neutrality has enormously strengthened the hands of those who oppose the ending of Partition.
It is difficult for English opinion, which paid such scant attention to the question of Anglo-Irish relations during the fifteen years after the Treaty, to appreciate the importance which Irish nationalists attach to the question of Partition. But for the survival of this problem, there would be a fundamental identity of interests between the United Kingdom and Ireland. A strong Britain would give to Eire the assurance of immunity from attack, whilst a friendly and co-operative Eire would free Great Britain from anxiety for the safety of the western approaches. The vicious circle, whereby Parti- tion was held to preclude Irish participation in the war, and Irish neutrality enhanced for Great Britain the importance of maintaining a foothold in Ireland, has obscured this fundamental identity of interests.
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