THE RUSSIANS IN ARMENIA.
IT isquite clear, in spite of some manifest exaggerations in the accounts, most of which, it should be remembered, are derived from pro-Turkish sources, that the Russians have sustained some severe defeats in Asia, and it is not difficult to perceive the reason. The Grand Duke Michael set to himself in the beginning of the campaign three objects to be pursued simultaneously, the seizure of Batoum, the most prized har, bour in the Black Sea, the reduction of Kars, which was essential to the prestige of the Army as well as to its safety in a further advance, and the occupation of Erzeroum, as a capital from which to dominate Armenia. The pursuit of three objects at one time, and perhaps some difficulties as to his commissariat, compelled the Grand Duke and his Staff to divide the Russian forces until on each route they had lost the advantage of superior numbers, and whenever a serious obstacle presented itself had to trust entirely to the courage, devotion, and energy of their men. They could not anywhere overwhelm their adversaries. They had to carry everything after the fashion of Suwaroff or Lord Gough, throwing regi- ments like shells at the enemy's positions, or halt with nothing accomplished. The Russian Generals were compelled to carry the heights above I3atoum, the redoubts protecting Kars, and the passes on the way to Erzeroum, or do nothing, and must carry them without the resource of endless numbers. This exactly suited the modern form of the Turkish genius for war. The Pashas had only to remain in position on heights, as at Batoum and at Delibaba, or as in Kars, behind masonry, and if they were only stubborn enough and had men enough, they must defeat the enemy's attack. No troops can carry heights in the face of modern weapons of precision, and men resolute enough to use them, without serious losses, and the capacity to bear loss becomes in such cases the measure of success. No manoeuvring was needful on the side of the defence, no particular brain among the staff, no completeness of drill and organisation among the men. All that was required was courage and endurance and good weapons, and of all the Turks had ample store, In all three cases the Russians made their attacks with a persistent, con- tinuous, and desperate valour, such as Englishmen displayed before Bhurtpore, and in all they have been defeated, for the present by their inability to sustain their losses. It was as if an English Division had had to carry Speicheren. We all know what in such a case would have happened. The English would have fought up as bravely as the Germans, and have maintained every foot acquired with at least equal tenacity ; but their numbers would have been insufficient to sustain the necessary losses, and the French would have remained masters of the hill. This is what has happened in Armenia. At Batoum, before Kars, in the gorges by Delibaba, the Russians have attacked, and attacked, and attacked in vain, beaten back always by a rain of missiles, until the loss of men has alarmed the Generals, and perhaps demoralised the soldiers, who will bear any loss if only they succeed, but are put, out of heart by massacre without result. To carry out such a plan as that we are attributing to the Grand Duke's Staff—a plan eminently fitted in many respects to the genius of Russian soldiers—he should have been able to throw away 10,000 men in an attack without missing them ; and his force, large as it was in the aggregate, was at no one point sufficient for such a policy. We cannot discern, among all the conflicting accounts, proof that his Generals at any one point anywhere commanded more than 20,000 men; while the Turks, since they received their reinforce- ments, have probably as many, counting men who, though inferior as soldiers, and indeed useless for great operations, are as useful as regulars for a stubborn defence. The Rohillas who de- fended Bhurtpore were not regulars in any sense of the word, and would have been scattered on the plain by a fifth of their own numbers, yet defended by their position, they beat back British troops. The Russians are now reported to be in re- treat from two at least of their objects, and possibly from the third, and with the mountains behind them all in commotion —as they will be at the news—must await reinforcements de- spatched by the Caspian, a very long affair. They may, of MUM, concentrate all their resources upon the siege of Kars ; but the garrison will also be reinforced, and if the Turks can but procure food, may protract the struggle through the autumn. With food and arms, the Turks have the patience for a defence of years, Turks after a success grow negligent, while Russians grow dogged, and a new General—for we look on General Loris Melikoff as surd to be superseded—may entirely change the aspect of affairs in Armenia, but it is also pos- sible that these checks received at first may make the campaign in Asia a very tedious one. The Russians, time being granted, can call up men without end, but then so also can their adversaries, and the latter's men, though inferior, are good enough to hold such positions. The news of victory, exaggerated as it will be, will bring the Turkish commander any number of " reserves "—Circassians, Kurds, and the warlike vagabonds, half-brigands, half-soldiers, always ready for action in Mahommedan society. Their success in resisting one advance will give them spirit for any amount of stubborn defensive fighting, and restore that con- fidence in their commanders which is as essential to defensive as offensive warfare, and which had been temporarily de- stroyed. The system of supplying the camps and fortresses with food will become regular, and while a State exists at all money sufficient for munitions can always be extorted, More- over, the defenders will have the advantage—very great as regards both intelligence and supplies—of the obedience of the population. The people of Armenia, including some Mussul- man tribes, were willing at first to accept the Russians as rulers, brought supplies readily, and were disposed to give any information, but a check in the field soon kills out all this "popularity." The feeling of the people does not change, but their readiness to manifest it does, and in their next advance the Russians will be moving through a country in which they hold only their camps. All these things militate against speedy success, and unless a new General appears, or the Emperor decides that the war in Asia must be pressed with hot energy and at any sacrifice, the cam- paign on that side may languish through the autumn. We do not say that it will. We do not pretend to the knowledge which would justify any dogmatism at all, but that is the way in which an Asiatic campaign so begun between such foes would ordinarily go. Energy in St. Petersburg may make up for everything, and this may be shown, but it is at least as probable that every effort will be concentrated on the cam- paign in Europe, where the Russians, though succeed- ing, are still moving with a slowness which is un- avoidable, but allows their adversaries many advantages. The accounts are of the most contradictory character, some of those from Shumla being positive inventions, but one broad consideration may be accepted with- out hesitation. The Russians, whether they have seized Tirnova or not, will not advance to the Balkans in force until they have placed their means of crossing the Danube be- yond the possibility of interruption, They must, to be safe, be able to move wagons with munitions, stores, and supplies of bread for a great army, in a continuous and unbroken stream across the river. Nobody who has not seen it would believe the cartage even a small army requires in a country without railways, and the Russians have to supply at least five times the force Englishmen think of as an " army." They cannot and will not in this matter trust anything to chance, and must either take one of the river fortresses—just the position Turks defend most obstinately—or make an entrenched new position of their own at the head of their bridge. Neither work has yet been accomplished, and until it is accomplished, the whole army carried across, and the magazines fully organised and supplied, the tendency at head-quarters will be to devote all mental energy, money, and picked officers to the European work. It will be all the more decided, because the reverses in Asia will warn the Russian Staff that the superiority of their men to the Turks once in position is not a decided quantity; that they still need for victory either superior numbers, or superior organisation, or superior strategy,—that is, in practice, care, forethought, and above all, time. They conceal their designs admirably, baffling the English Press in particular as it has never been baffled before, and making journalists feel a wicked longing that the New York Herald, with its contempt for every consideration but publicity, would appear on the scene; but as yet we see no evidence that they are prepared for any tremendow rush, any "march into space," any one of those feats .of combined intellect and recklessness which, more than defeats, cow an invaded Asiatic people.. They will, if we may judge from all appearances, club Turkey to death, not pistol her ; and clubbing is slow work, demand- ing a vast expenditure of physical strength and energy. That is all the better as regards Europe, where Austria and England are recovering from a fright, and possibly as regards the ulti- mate result, for the Romanoffs must now achieve a great suc- cess or go down ; but it strains the patience of those who had hoped that Russia, as against Turkey, would show some of the cleaving-power which a higher civilisation ought to bestow, and sometimes does bestow, on invading armies,
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