TOPICS OF THE DAY.

THE RESCUE OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE.

" We should enter into negotiations with a free Government in Germany with a different attitude of mind, a different temper, a different spirit, with less suspicion, with more confidence, than we should with a sort whom we knew to be dominated by the aggressive and arrogant spirit of Prussian militarism. The Allied Governments would, in my judgment, be acting wisely if they drew that distinction in their general attitude towards a discussion of the terms of peace."

THE words which we have placed at the head of this article were, in our opinion, much the most important in Mr. Lloyd George's speech at Glasgow on Friday week. When we wrote an article in the Spectator on June 9th urging the importance of letting the German people know that we would grant more lenient terms to them than to their militaristic masters we hardly expected that the British Prime Minister would so soon be flying a signal to that effect. Although Mr. Lloyd George's suggestion was thrown out tentatively, we undertake to say that the plan will grow and that we shall hear a great deal more of it.

There arc several reasons why it is not difficult to prophesy in this case. The infection of revolutionary ideas is in the air, and history shows that revolutionary ideas spread like epidemics. In 1848 revolution appeared in nearly every capital of Europe. The people in some of those capitals had had no thought of rising, or of making new and sterner demands upon their Government, till they were suddenly fired by examples beyond their borders. Even now, though no long time has elapsed since the Russian Revolution, the bacillus is at work in other undemocratic countries. There is no mistaking the general bearing of the incomplete stories which come through from Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, and even from Spain. It is the prospect of democracy everywhere replacing the rule of autocrats, or of narrow bureaucracies, that has specially warmed the heart of Americans. If the meaning of the war, as Americans saw it from the first moment, had to be expressed in a single sentence, it would be fair to say that it is a war of Democracy rersus Autocracy. In his speech three weeks ago President Wilson said expressly that his sympathy with democracy all the world over included the German people as against their rulers. Ho represented the war as a work of rescue, and in his vision the German people were as much in need of rescue as any other. In a sense, of course, they are in much greater need than any other people, though we must not confuse their needs with their deserts, and wo agree that they hardly deserve to be rescued after having lent themselves in so base and servile a manner to the purposes of the Prussian hatchers of war. But we must be practical, and not try to gratify whimsical sentiments when there is a chance of bringing the peace which the Allies intend to impose a little nearer. The point is that revolution is in men's blood, and that it is powerfully affecting nations which have previously kept their pinched minds above all the whole- some waves of democracy. It should be noted that Herr Scheidemann, being convinced at Stockholm that there is no chance of a Kaiser-peace being engineered by means of .the trick yservices of the German Majority Socialists, has returned home to announce that the democratization of Germany is the only hope for bringing peace visibly nearer. What he contemplates may not be a full-blown revolution, and almost certainly is not, but it is in the line of revolutionary ideas. We ought to use this spirit, this infection, or whatever it may be called, which is everywhere apparent in countries not equipped with popular government.

Pleased though we are with Mr. Lloyd George's hint to the German people that we could treat more easily with them than with the Kaiser and his evil political retinue, we could wish that his proposal had been much more definite. We should prefer an absolute assertion to a hint. But of course Britain could not refuse definitely to deal with any member of the House of Hohenzollern without coming to an agreement on the subject with all her Allies. It may be that there has not been time hitherto to draw up a united

plan, though we think that, as a matter of fact, there probably has been plenty of time. The desirable thing now, however,

is to waste no more time, but to consult with our Allies as to

whether they would be willing to announce their intention of concluding no peace with the Kaiser, or any-o11.in ...lei-ions or present advisers. Peace (so the declaration would run) would be made with the German people, and the German people alone. Representatives of Germany would be chosen by- a German Assembly elected for the express purpose.

For some such announcement by the Allies we already have a strong nucleus of support. Mr. Lloyd George, though

he would not, or could not, go so far in his speech, evidently believes that the war could be shortened by making peace with the German people instead of with the Kaiser and his crew. President Wilson also probably shares this belief, for a

conviction that the German people sooner or later would like to break away from the rulers who have fooled and misled them was implicit in every sentence of his recent speech. France and Italy would be sure to adopt any policy that seemed to them practical and sensible, and we fancy that this policy might seem to them to be both. As for Russia, we cannot imagine a better proof and guarantee that English- men do not want to support autocracies than a declaration here that we would deal with none but the German people, and would deal with them comparatively leniently. It would be no weakness in us to make such a declaration, because if the militarists who rule Germany were deprived of the opportunity of making a peace according to their own notions

we should obviously be very much nearer to procuring the complete and final downfall of militarism—and that is the principal object of the war. What we liked in particular in

Mr. Lloyd George's speech was that he threw out his suggestion without the faintest trace of appearing to say that we would accept less than we have always demanded from Germany in the essential matters of restitution and security. No intellectually honest German who read the speech could be in the least doubt as to its meaning. He would know that the Allies will necessarily exact stern terms, and that they cannot possibly abate them in substance because the very acts of reparation and giving pledges for the future safety of the world will impose humiliation and suffering on Germany. At the same time he would recognize that as some of the required pledges would be given in advance, as it were, by the process of letting popular right take precedence over the Kaiser's right, the people would get better terms for Germany than the Kaiser can ever hope to get. We should very much like to know, by the way, exactly how much of- Mr. Lloyd

George's remarks on this subject have been allowed to appear in the German newspapers. If there has been any attempt

to keep his hint from the German people, the maggot will work all the more furiously in their brains when it does arrive there, as ultimately it must.

There are several precedents for the policy which Mr. Lloyd George has suggested. In 1814 the Allies entered into a much • more indulgent peace with the Bourbon King, Louis XVIII., whom Talleyrand was the means of bringing to the throne, than they would ever have granted to Napoleon or to a Government actuated by Napoleonic motives. A common saying of the enemies of Louis XVIII. was that he came into

Paris " in the baggage-train of the Allies." That is a very

tell-tale phrase. It shows how leniently and considerately some Frenchmen thought their new King had got himself treated by the Allies. Again, when the German Army lay in front of Paris in the Franco-German War, Bismarck absolutely refused to make peace with Gambetta. He required that the

French should elect an Assembly for the purpose. There is no reason whatever why the Allies should not say as definitely as Bismarck did that we will make peace only with popular representatives specially elected. No doubt the Kaiser is already bending his best efforts every day to proving to the German people that their interests and his Home must stand or fall together. He probably reminds them in effect—too much explicitness would be an unpleasant confession and a tactical mistake—that by identifying themselves with all the violations of humane law and custom they have yoked their fortunes indissolubly to those of their Government. It is being conveyed to them, we imagine, that they can expect no more mercy than their Government can command, and that, as they would be sheep without a shepherd if they tried to speak for themselves, they had better trust, after all, to the Govern- ment which they have so long and so humbly obeyed. In fine, the Kaiser and his officials want to convince the people that they are, and must remain, political serfs and bondman. It would not be the least of the advantages of the policy of• " Peace with the people " that it would tend to put some backbone into the German people. There would be a beginning very soon indeed of the education in realities of the German people, without whioh education there can be no true change of heart and no true inner transformation—things upon which the future of Germany depends. 1t umy objected that to say that we will approach peace through only one is wantonly to close all other

possible, avenues. But it should be remembered that those who now rule Germany have never yet published to the world anything resembling a statement of the terms on which they would be willing to make peace. If the Allies were to issue the declaration which we are 'advocating, there would be a tremendous incentive to popular discussion in Germany of acceptable terms of peace. " Suppose we did do this thing that the Allies demand, what sort of terms should we get, what sort of terms could we agree to ? " Directly debates were begun on those lines progress towards the drafting of Germany's peace terms would be much more rapid than it is now, or ever has been. Moreover, there is no thought in what we propose of dictating to the Germans any permanent form of government. The popular Assembly would simply be chosen ad hoc for making peace. If the people wished afterwards to celebrate the happy days of peace by placing themselves in bondage again, that would be their own affair. To dictate forms of government to Germany would be utterly repugnant to the principles for which the Allies are lighting. It occurs to us that the time may come sooner or later when it may be actually agreeable to the Kaiser to say in effect : " I leave my beloved people to conclude the peace which they desire, and for which they have fought so gloriously. Never shall it be said that I interfered with their fondest wishes ! I therefore waive my functions temporarily. My self-denying ordinance does not prejudice, my Imperial• office; which I shall- -resume , Afterwards." Even, so fantastic & solution as this of his personal difficulties may come gratefully to the Kaiser. But would he ever be allowed to resume his Imperial office exactly as before, if he were allowed to resume it at all ? We doubt it. The growing bitterness of Prussians, Bavarians, Saxons, and Wfirttembergers would hardly be likely to resolve itself in a complete restoration of the Kaiserdom created in the famous gallery at Versailles. Meanwhile it is our best policy, and indeed our plain duty, to act in the manner that will give the greatest possible encouragement in Germany to the idea that the right of an Autocrat may be overridden, and that even though the supersession of his powers be temporary, they may- still be superseded. That will be a very wholesome thing for Germany, and very good business for the Allies.