MILITARY ITALY.*
HAS the probable effect upon nations of the great modern military systems been sufficiently considered P An army of the old type by successful or disastrous wars extended or con- tracted the frontier of its country, brought under sway or lost control over other races and nationalities, and thus indirectly changed the fortunes, manners, customs, even language, of its people. But the stern schooling undergone by the armed nations of to-day may—wars and territorial changes apart— directly influence their whole life and spirit. Such thoughts are suggested by the present position of the latest convert to the gospel of conscription. Italy, dismembered for centuries, yet apparently as much marked for unity by natural frontier lines as Spain, suddenly became, in 1866, a political ex- pression. The .problem for Italian statesmen was no less than to fuse into a single kingdom seven small States, pos- sessing no recent traditions in common, educated -under different military, administrative, and social systems, even containing some marked race distinctions. It seems impossible not to agree with the author of the book before us that in the consolidation of Italy, and the creation of a genuine national 'spirit, the army is now playing an important part. In the words of Baron Haymerle—" Compulsory military service could alone lead rapidly to the desired ends, bringing each day into contact races absolutely unknown to each other, and inculcating the idea of a great national family stretching from north to south." Part of the problem, at least, has been solved, and the Italian Army of to-day constitutes an undeniable factor in Euro- pean politics ; while the Navy includes the most powerful iron- clads in the world—so powerful as to be alternately held up as models and, warnings by rival schools of English critics.
The broad principles of the organisation of the great conscript armies differ bat slightly : -all are founded on the scheme originally devised by Stein and Scharnhorst in the years of Prussia's humiliation. Readers of Military Italy will see how far and with what modifications the system perfected in modern Gerinany has been applied, and will find ample material for speculating on the military future of the young kingdom. Universal service was established in 1871; but the present Army Regulations, drawn up by General 3fezzacappo, were pro- mulgated in 1877. As a numerical result, the effectives were on April 1st, 1882,—in the Active Army, 704,207 men ; in the Mobile Militia, 330,767; in the Territorial Militia, 893,998- This gives a total' of more than 1,900,000, out of a popula- tion of 29,000,000. But these large figures naturally need' some important qualifications. The army actually present with the colours at this date numbered 216,596 men, whose average training amounted only to twenty months ; while the larger por- tion of the Reserves, unless called up for wax, spend five years on furlough, pass into the Mobile Militia for another term of five years, and are then relegated to the Territorial Militia for seven years, apparently receiving no further drill whatever. It is not easy to believe that a training of less than three years, however thorough, will last a lifetime; and the Italian con- script may easily slip back into the simple peasant. In point of training. the Territorial Militia must be incomparably inferior to our own Volunteers. The men and the organisation exist, however, and " some of the clauses of the laws of 1882 give good hope that matters will rapidly improve." The author seems to think that the national aptitude for soldiering is considerable ; but the standard of general education must be
lamentably low. "Of 160,315 men nearly 49 per cent. could neither read nor write." "Piedmont, Lombardy, and Venetia supply the best-instructed contingents, while the worst come from Naples and Sicily." Yet Italy ranks far above
• Militarg Italy. By Charles Martel. London: Macmillan and Co. 1 rel.
Russia in this respect. In Germany the corresponding per- centage is less than four. Some of the comparative figures brought forward by the author are very interesting. Taking the five great armies of Europe, the French soldier is the most ex- pensive, the Russian next, the Austrian the cheapest. In total of peace effectives, Russia easily leads with 663,000 men, France standing next with 200,000 less ; but as a question of the pro- portion of population which can be put into the field in a great war, Germany is first with 3.34 per cent., Austria next with 3, and Russia last with 1-86.
The Alpine troops form a speciality of the Italian Army. Possessing -a strictly territorial organisation, and with service companies always kept at war strength, they are believed to be able to put 30,000 men into line on the outbreak of war. Born mountaineers, knowing every feature of the Alpine passes, trained to hardship, and excellent shots, they constitute a factor of which France will do well to take account. One of the great questions for Italy, as for us in India, is the defence of the north-west frontier. The Alpine passes have been often traversed by invading armies ; and there is an English school which goes so far as to assert that the line of the Suleiman Range is indefensible. But no mountain chain has ever yet been defended as it might be to-day; and, remembering that an insignificant hill fort nearly foiled the French army in 1800—would have done so but for the presence of Napoleon—it seems possible that a sur- prise in mountain warfare as great as that of Plevna may yet be in store for us. The Italians, weak in interior fortresses, are un- questionably right in deciding upon an earnest defence of their Alpine frontier, and most wise in entrusting that defence to highly trained mountaineers born and bred on the spot. After discussing the question of mobilisation, the author concludes :— " At the present date (1883) 323,000 men in first line can be concentrated on any threatened land frontier of Italy within fourteen days of the order to mobilise." Considering the present state of communications—only one-tenth of the total length of railway lines possesses a double track, while the supply of horses is both inferior and inadequate—this estimate appears unwarrant- ably sanguine ; but the Austrians have not as yet developed any remarkable powers of rapid mobilisation, while the defence of the Alpine passes may be expected to win time for the Italians against the French, so that a less rapid concentration may suffice.
With many of the author's military opinions,—as, for example, that the French defeat at Waterloo was the " result " of "the manoeuvre by interior lines "—it is impossible to agree ; but the book is, nevertheless, a mine of valuable information on the present resources of Italy. Military students will certainly regret the absence of explanatory maps. There is, in fact, but one, while the scale is small and too much is attempted to be- shown. The elaborate discussion of the defences of Rome is. perfectly unintelligible in the absence of a map indicating the topographical features and the sites of the several forts. It is not certain that even the Intelligence Department could supply full- information as to the latter, and the ordinary reader is helpless.
The book concludes with the following significant quotation from Colonel Sironi regarding Malta :—" It paralyses the in- fluence of our peninsula, of Sardinia, and of Corsica, menacing them all, as well as the African coast." There is, doubtless, some justification for this view; yet to maintain the great island fortress as England now maintains it would entail a serious strain on the resources of Italy, while it would probably become a principal objective in the event of a Franco-Italian war. Held by France, Malta would become for Italy a very real menace.
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