FRANCE AND MOROCCO.
TM: reconquest by Europa of the southern coast of the Mediterranean advances apace. Whatever the immediate destiny of Egypt, whether she is to continue a British de- pendency or to be handed over to some kind of Mixed Commis- sion, or to become a nominally independent and neutral State, we may be sure that "Europe," or some country of Europe, will continue to rule in Cairo, that European ideas will be predominant, and that the Pashas will feel that power—in their sense, the luxury of ruling by volition—has passed away for ever. Italian influence is already supreme in Tripoli, and will whenever a wave of ambition passes over Italy become direct. France is governing Tunis, nominally through a Bey, but really as if it were a province of her own, the Chamber actually passing Bills operative within Tunisian territory instead of agreeing to more treaties. Algeria has long been a French province with a slowly increasing European popula- tion; and now, unless we misread all signs of French action, the independence of Morocco is about to pass away. M. Ferry's organs are prompt to deny that France has any intentions in Morocco, and every effort is made to soothe the suspicions of statesmen in Madrid. But the same assurances were given to the world when Tunis was occupied "to chastise the Krou- mirs ;" and the statesmen of Rome were pacified in precisely the same way. It is useless to rely on the words of the French Foreign Office while M. Ferry rules : they are not even data for thought ; the one course for the observer to pursue is to watch all incidents and see whether M. Ferry's policy and his opportunities taken together do or do not point to a fresh conquest. About the policy there is no serious dispute. M. Ferry, restrained in Europe by fear of Germany and by the memory of a great defeat, is reinvigorating the spirit of his people and encouraging the new Army by making forcible acquisitions wherever he has a chance of success without arousing the hostility of a first class Power. He is a brave and determined man ; and so eager is he in this work, that he encounters, and has hitherto triumphed over, very serious risks, and, moreover, employs when needful forces of a by no means insignificant kind. To acquire Tunis he used an army of forty thousand men—suffi- cient in the old days for a European war—and faced remon- strances from Italy so grave that at one moment Paris and Rome were within a few hours of war. To conquer Tonquin he sent a strong fleet and twenty-five thousand men over a sea route of ten thousand miles to Asia' created a flotilla of river gunboats and defied menaces from Pekin which twice at least seemed to make war inevitable. Indeed, he believed in the possibility of war himself, and had planned out his line of operations. What reason, then, is there for doubting that if he can obtain Morocco without a great war or overwhelming expense, or long-continued call upon the Army, he will add that kingdom to the list of French de- pendencies. Morocco is worth far more than Tunis. Its posses- sion would open a road into the very heart of that West
• Africa in which French manufacturers believe they can find an endless market. It is full of minerals and forests, and naturally fertile ; and it is one of the weakest of States. Misgovernment in Morocco has long since reached the point at which it destroys the vital energy of a country, and even its natural resources in population. The Emperor could not defeat even a Spanish army, never fifty thousand strong ; and since then his regime, if not worse, has at least become more unpopular. His throne is honeycombed with treason ; and there is not a Jew, a slave, or a desert clansman in Morocco—and these three descriptions include a third of the thin and scattered population—who would not welcome its overthrow.
In a kingdom thus situated, an opportunity such as he loves has been placed in M. Ferry's hands. He does not want to annex kingdoms publicly ; and does not do it even in Tunis. Tonquin, or Madagascar. He prefers, as we did when we first entered India, to keep up a semblance of native rule, and so gain time to secure native administrative agents. He would like, not to annex Morocco, but to stretch the frontier of Algeria to the river lefuleya, thus acquiring a splendid pro- vince, and to seat upon the throne a vassal Emperor who would reign to the north as a French prefect, and to the south take the whole trouble of watching the black tribes off
French hands. Such an Emperor has now offered him- self. The only man in Morocco who rivals the Sultan in influence is the Shereef of Wazan, a Europeanised Moslem, who, partly from his pedigree as a descendant of the Prophet, and partly from tradition, exercises the chief religious sway over the Mahommedans, especially the desert tribes, and this Shereef has declared himself a friend of France. For reasons which pro- bably no European—unless it be Sir John D. Hay—thoroughly understands, this man has quarrelled finally with the Court, has accepted French nationality, the last thing a Shereef would do unless he were resolved on some large design, and has summoned all who obey or reverence him to resist the Emperor Abdurrahman. He has, in fact, rebelled openly, and must reach the Throne or perish. He can reach the Throne with French assistance ; and if anybody be- lieves that M. Ferry will refuse to use such an instrument as
that, bringing such a gift in his hand, he must form a very different idea of the French Premier from that which has grown up through these recent transactions in our own minds. There is not a more unscrupulous statesman in Europe, or a more daring, or one more determined on his end,—which is to convince the world and France that her power in the world is. neither dead nor dying.
But Europe ? Well, of course, Europe may intervene ; and in that case there will be no limit to M. Ferry's moderation and self-denial. But let us look at that a little. Germany, which is Europe for many purposes, would not inter- fere. Prince Bismarck would be delighted to see France extend herself in Africa, and occupy herself, and give a new hostage to fortune, and incur the permanent hostility and suspicion of the Spanish people, who with all their tendency to South America—which still relieves Spanish society of the hungry and energetic—look upon Morocco as their reversion. Such a hostility is a better guarantee to Germany of Spanish friendship than any alliance with a King. Prince Bismarck will not prohibit, we may be sure ; he will rather encourage France, and will leave Spain to fight her battle alone. We doubt her fighting it.. The Spanish Army, though most excellent, and composed of men whose fighting qualities are unfairly depreciated in England, where we have forgotten Baylen, and scarcely heard of Tetuan, is not organised for an invasion of France across the Pyrenees ; and without an invasion Spain cannot forbid any action to France. She could not cross the Straits in force in the teeth of the French Navy. M. Ferry would 'not waste a soldier in Spain, but would occupy the passes, and with the French Fleet stop all Spanish commerce, reduce her Treasury to bankruptcy, tear away her islands, and make the sea- port towns, now rapidly increasing in wealth, uninhabitable. It is difficult to be positive with such an unknown factor in the problem as King Alfonso ; but we question greatly, whether Spain will run such a risk, and do not question that as M. Ferry ran the risk with Italy, in spite of her huge iron- dads, so he will run it with Spain, which does not possess those weapons. His single fear will be England ; and is it cer- tain that England will intervene, unless her free entrance to the Mediterranean is threatened, which could be avoided by an extension of Spanish territory? Her people will not be very ready to engage in a great war for strategic reasons, and there are no others. Morocco itself will not increase the strength of France, but diminish it, and there is nothing in the independence of Morocco to inspire Englishmen either with sympathy or regret.. The Moors have possessed the country for centuries, and have eaten it up even more completely than the Turks have eaten up Asia Minor. The impression of doe- trinaire Radicals that all conquest is in itself wrong is not deep in this country, though it is loud; and it is weakened even where it exists by a strong dislike of these African States, with their slavery, their poverty, and their seclusion. If they can guard themselves, well and good,—that will be proof that their hour has not arrived ; but England certainly will not guard them for their own history or merits. If she guards them at all, it will be to keep the Straits free ; and her moral position for that work, with herself seated at Gibraltar brandishing the keys, is not the most perfect in the world. We may be mistaken, or M. Ferry may see obstacles not perceptible to a journalist ; but if there is a throne tottering in the world, it is that of the last. independent Arab Sovereign outside Arabia itself.
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