The spirit of give and take

FOREIGN FOCUS • CRABRO

'Foreign focus' is a new regular feature by an expert on foreign affairs.

Some time next month about one million of the most primitive people in the world are theoretically to be given the opportunity to decide their own future. 'Theoretically', for two reasons: first, because in practice the choice is to be made for them by individuals selected for the purpose by their present rulers; and second, because unless the present rulers are satisfied beyond doubt that the selected stooges will give the desired answer, even this pretence of a consultation will probably be withdrawn.

It is surprising that there should be any room for doubt on this second issue. For

six years, as an excellent report in last

Sunday's Observer made clear, the territory in question has been softened up by a systematic process of repression, torture and massacre. The conscience of the world has not been aroused: it has other things to worry about. But there is an embarrassment.

For it so happens that in this instance, unlike Vietnam, or Greece, or Biafra, or Czechoslovakia, or Rhodesia, the United Nations has itself assumed responsibility for seeing fair play.

For hundreds of years the Dutch ruled what was then called Dutch New Guinea. There was little or no European settlement, and when Indonesia was carved out of the Dutch East Indies in 194-6 the Dutch government quite properly decided that the Papuans, being ethnically and in every other way wholly distinct from the rest of the former colonial dependency, should be re- tained under direct rule.

By the end of the 1950s the Dutch were anxious to advance this one remaining colonial possession in the Far East towards independence. In 1960 elections were held for a constituent assembly. All six political parties represented were in favour of ultimate independence, and all six were flatly opposed to annexation by Indonesia. But the Indonesian government, with internal unrest to deal with, and the need for an external diversion, announced its intention to take what it described as West Irian by force. It pointed out that West Irian had been part of the Indonesian empire in the sixth century—and memories were too short for invidious comparisons to be made between the merits of Indonesian civilisation then and now. As a first step diplomatic relations with Holland were broken off, and commando raids on the colony were initiated.

Meanwhile the Dutch had invited the new constituent assembly to set a target date for independence. In view of Indo- nesia's attitude, they also invited the United Nations to send a mission to establish impartially the desires of the Papuans. The Indonesians responded by warning that the visit of a UN mission 'without our prior consent' would be 'illegal'. So naturally the UN stayed at home. Then the Dutch offered to hand over New Guinea into UN trustee- ship, and to endow the new trust territory With $30 million of aid, as well as encourag- ing its own administrators to stay on to help the UN. The Indonesians turned down this proposal out of hand.

At that time the State Department was engaged on a crusade to save Dr Soekarno's Indonesia from communism. So it nomin- ated a former US Ambassador, Mr Els- worth Bunker, as an 'independent' mediator between Holland and Indonesia.

From the start it was obvious that Mr Bunker's remit was to find as elegant a formula as possible for the surrender of the Papuans to the tender mercies of Indo- nesia. While negotiations continued near Washington under Mr Bunker's chairman- ship, the Indonesians kept up their harrying raids. U Thant rejected Dutch requests to ask the Indonesians to desist on the grounds that this would show bias. When the Dutch looked for support to the British govern- ment. at that time engaged in the 'confron- tation' struggle with Indonesia in Borneo, and also in negotiations for entry into the Common Market, it was made quite clear to the Hague that Anglo-American relations came first.

So in the summer of 1962 Mr Bunker produced his proposals. West New Guinea was to be transferred to United Nations administration for nine months, and thence to Indonesia. Thereafter, before the end of 1969, the Papuans twere to be given an opportunity to choose between continued attachment to Indonesia and independence.

Notwithstanding the fact that President Soekarno had already rejected 'talk of self- determination' in advance, this settlement was solemnly approved by the United Nations, and the Treaty enacting it was registered in accordance with Article 102

of the UN Charter. U Thant enthused over

'the spirit of give and take' shown by both the parties to the dispute, and proudly announced that his organisation had 'settled peacefully a long-standing problem, with benefit to all concerned'. The State Department could breathe again: President Soekarno was saved from communism.

The rights of the Papuans under the new regime were spelled out in the twenty-nine articles of the treaty for which the United Nations had assumed responsibility. The 'eligibility of all adults, male and female ...

to participate in the act of self- determination' when the time came was 'to be carried out in accordance with inter-

national practice'. The UN and Indonesia were together to guarantee 'fully the rights,

including the rights of free speech, freedom of movement and of assembly, of the in- habitants of the area'.

These solemn undertakings have been honoured in the manner that one might expect. Freedom of movement has taken the form of mass deportations to Java, although in fairness it should be added that the Indonesian authorities have apparently offered to pay a one-way passage out of those who object to conditions in the territory. The United Nations special representative, Mr Ortiz-Sans, installed to supervise the 'act of self-determination', has been told that the Papuans enjoy the same freedoms of speech and assembly as the rest of Indonesia's inhabitants, and that is all they are going to get. The Indonesian interpretation of the 'international practice' of adult suffrage turns out to be the simple one of collecting the views of carefully selected tribal chiefs.

The United Nations Secretariat is said to be disturbed about the course of events in New Guinea. It even has the brass nerve to blame the Dutch for not taking a hand. But it need not worry too much, for the members of the Organisation are most unlikely to start asking awkward questions, whateNer happens—or does not happen— next month.

Among the Afro - Asians, of course, attitudes towards oppression depend on the colour of the skin of the oppressor. For the Americans, who were essentially respon- sible for the transfer of the unfortunate Papuans from Dutch to Indonesian rule, Dr Sockarno turned out in the end to be a poor bet. But his successors adequately demonstrated their commitment to western values by the mass slaughter of all 'Com- munists' (i.e. Chinese) with which they celebrated their accession to power. To allow the Papuans to secede from Indonesia now they undoubtedly would if they were given half a chance—might precipitate the disintegration of that precarious nation of 110 million people. This would destroy a vital barrier to Chinese expansionism southwards. What is the fate of a million stone-age jungle-dwellers when thrown into the scale of such cosmic considerations as these?

One person who might ponder this saga with ad% antage is Mr lan Smith. It has been suggested that an Anglo-Rhodesian settle- ment might also be 'registered' with the United Nations. Well, why not? There could be provision for a similar 'act of self-determination' after seven years on the issue of majority rule, and by the looks of it Mr. Smith or his successors would have a good deal less difficulty than the Indonesians arc having in finding a quorum of tribal chieftains to pronounce. Yet another 'long- standing problem' would thus be 'settled peacefully, with benefit to all concerned'.