The War Sur veyed
THE CRIMEA AND THE NAVY
BY STRATEGICUS
T is one of the most striking experiences of the war that it I requires such an episode as that of the operations in the Crimea to bring home the importance of sea-power and the means by which it is exercised. The dangers latent in the Crimean situation_ are the reduction of the Russian Black Sea fleet to impotence and the turning of the position of Rostov by an invasion of Caucasia from Kerch. The first derives from the fact that Sevastopol is the main base of the Black Sea fleet and the enemy advance threatens it. Naval ships are as much dependent upon their bases as aeroplanes, as much almost as fighters, since the accessibility of the base is the limiting factor in their sphere of operation. Naval ships based on Kronstadt, for instance, are of no more value for Black Sea operations than were fighters in Egypt for the campaign in Crete. It is another point in the analogy between ships and aeroplanes that a base threatened is a useless base.
For this reason Sevastopol may be valueless already. Gibraltar would be similarly rendered useless if enemy guns were installed on the opposite side of the bay. Fortunately for us there are no enemy guns in that spot ; but it is quite possible that the enemy has already reached artillery-range of Sevastopol. If this is the case, the Black Sea fleet will be compelled to find another base ; and there appear to be only two ports that will now be available, Novorossisk and Batum. The first lies only about 8o miles from Kerch on the eastern end of the Crimean peninsula, and it is therefore within easy aeroplane-range. Indeed, it seems scarcely possible that it could be used if the Germans challenge it. They are said to be in possession of Feodosiya already ; and this port lies near the neck of the isthmus upon which Kerch stands. It is not indulging in undue pessimism to conclude that Novorossisk must even now be crossed off the list of alternative bases. Batton remains ; but this port has many disadvantages compared with Sevastopol.
Russia is, therefore, in a serious situation with regard to her Black Sea fleet. It is unnecessary to imagine that the resistance in the Crimea is at an end; but unless the Germans can be held at a considerable distance from Sevastopol the fleet will not gain. The Kerch strait is only one or two miles wide, and it is possible that the enemy may design to cross it and invade Caucasia. It is true that the Caucasian side of the strait is not well-roaded, and that there is no railway-line until one approaches Novorossisk; but the Germans have made difficulties the chief factor in their success, and the discouraging nature of the terrain can be considered no insuperable barrier. Moreover, air divi- sions could be landed easily near the railway or in some more suitable place. When the prize is so great, it is hard to imagine the Germans boggling at difficulties in the way, more especially as a landing in Caucasia would avoid the more obvious diffi- culties of attacking the line pivoting upon Rostov. If a landing could be made there, the Germans would be able to turn the Rostov line at once; and they would then be a very long step nearer to the severance of the communications between the Russians and ourselves, which is their immediate objective.
If they could land in Caucasia they would avoid the possi- bility of -naval interference; but if they can reduce the naval bases they can ignore zit. These are the-prizes for which they are fighting at the moment; and it is obvious that they are well worth the seven divisions the Germans are said to be employing. But it is important to recognise that the main reason for this heavy attack upon the Crimea is the powerful influence of the Black Sea fleet; and it is surely an extraordinary thing that the role of warships has been so completely ignored. When the Germans were advancing against Leningrad, the Baltic Fleet
operated so vigorously on their flank that although they pene- trated to within less than 15 miles of the centre cif the city they could not move along the coast nearer than Oranienbaum, 25 miles to the west. They were similarly hampered in their opera- tions against the Russian force in Estonia, which was the real distant defence of Leningrad. The Black Sea fleet has from the first compelled the enemy to make his advance against the fierce opposi- tion upon land. It is because he finds the advance against Rostov unpromising that he has at length felt himself compelled to make a
short-circuit by attempting to invade Caucasia by sea or across the Kerch strait. In either case he is now driven to attempt the destruction of Russian sea power in the Black Sea.
Marshal von Rundstedt, in one of his pre-war lectures,. emphasised the tremendous influence of British sea-power ; but somehow it escapes notice, mainly perhaps because, being the foundation of our military effort, it lies beneath the threshold of consciousness. Yet it should be realised that not a single part of our military effort could be carried out if that were to fail. There is even a tendency at the moment to recognise the work of the merchant-seaman without any corresponding recognition of the means which assures him the precarious safety he enjoys. It is found natural to record the arrival of aeroplanes and other war- material in the Russian White Sea ports without most people recognising that this is only possible because the navy has shouldered the additional dangerous task. When military opera- tions are under discussion it rarely enters anyone's mind to suggest that the navy is engaged upon them every minute of the day, and always under conditions that do not preclude the inven- tion of some new and horrifying breach of the customs of war. The soldier knows within sufficiently narrow limits what he must face when he goes into battle. The Navy was suddenly faced first with the magnetic and then the acoustic mine.
Naval men wish for no more recognition than they receive ; but if their work and its essential importance to every aspect of our military effort were better recognised, it might be easier to secure a due appreciation of the problem that appears now to dominate the whole war-situation. Everything turns now upon supplies, and the communications by means of which they can be transferred to the point where they are most needed. We cannot even reduce this to the work of the British factories, though experience in the last War shows how great industrial expansion can be. It is impossible for us to manufacture sufficient material—tanks, guns, aeroplanes and the rest—to meet our own needs if we are to hope for victory at all ; and it is plain, therefore, that we cannot meet the requirements of Russia at the same time. Our success in the war must depend upon the pro- duction of the United States. In both directions, however, we are faced with the problem of communications, the security of which is dependent upon British sea-power.
Since, howestr, we have assumed new duties of convoy over the dangerous route to the White Sea, and the much longer route to the Persian Gulf, we require not only more merchant-, ships, but also more warships. The urgency of these problems can be appreciated now that the position in Russia has become so critical. It is an illusion to think that the Government do not realise the necessity of sending as much war-material as soon and as quickly as possible. They recognise as clearly as anyone that the war is one and that the fate of Russia is inextricably bound up with our own. But, even if they were foolish enough to desire to send twice as much material from Britain as they have been endeavouring to send, they could not ignore the fact that it is extremely hard to carry out even our present commitments with our allowance of shipping-space and naval protection. If it were not for this limiting factor, it is quite possible we should find the Government pressing ahead of schedule, because of the precarious situation in Russia at present.
On the southern front von Rundstedt is undoubtedly en- deavouring to cut the land-communications by means of which the supplies from Britain and the United States reach Russia. Even if we admit that the loss of the Donetz centres is not as serious as has been thought, through the transference of a greater proportion of Russian industry to eastern Russia, the theory upon which our hope of victory is founded is that Britain and the United States should make good the loss already suffered in the production of war material. We have no knowledge of the resources of Timoshenko on the southern front. The central sector is holding wonderfully, in spite of the fresh German spurt. But it is the southern front that has wavered most for the last three Months, the southern front that has lost most ; and it is this that covers the Allied communications. Even if, as we
must hope, they are kept intact, there are long winter months when the exercise of the sea-power that will permit us to receive and transfer the necessary war material to Russia will be under a severer strain than ever before, If, again as we hope, there develop operations in the western desert, the strain will be in- creased still further. Russia depends upon the exercise of that power almost as much as we do ; and if ever we are in deprecia- tory mood justice demands that we recognise that.
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