RUSSIA, ENGLAND, AND PERSIA.
men to a most able and statesmanlike letter contributed by Sir Rowland Blennerhassett to the Times of Saturday last. In it he makes a plea, which we most heartily endorse, for a reconsideration of our policy in regard to Russia. He points out how of late our foreign relations in the largest sense have been dominated by the idea that Germany is our friend and Russia our inevit- able enemy, and that we must make concessions to Ger- many in order to secure her help against Russia. Yet, as he shows, all the premises upon which this policy rests are un- sound. Germany is not our friend, and cannot be, because her national aspirations run exactly contrary to ours, and these aspirations cannot possibly be satisfied without the loss of what is essential to us. Russia, on the other hand, is not our inevitable enemy because Russian aspirations do not conflict with our essential interests. Let us hasten to say that this is not due to the fact that Germany has a double dose of original sin, or Russia a double dose of virtue. It is simply a fact that Germany cannot fulfil her national aspirations without injuring us, and that Russia can, and we attribute no wickedness to one or goodness to the other because of that fact. Both Powers are thinking only of their own interests, as is the way of all Powers. Any one who will take the trouble to consider the respective aims of the Powers in question will see that we are under no illusion in this matter. Germany aims at sea-power and the command of the sea in order to shelter her vast sea-borne commerce, and to create and build up a Colonial Empire. But Germany cannot secure the command of the sea without wresting from us what we regard, and rightly regard, as the essential condition not merely of our safety but of our national existence. Germany is preparing to challenge our position as a Great Power. We are bound to say that there is no concealment about it. The German Press and German statesmen in their speeches do not leave the matter in doubt for a moment. They tell us openly that they want the position we have got, and that they mean to have it. We do not blame them, for they are only doing what they believe to be in the interests of their country; but the fact remains.
Let us ask next what are Russia's aspirations ? They are, as Sir Rowland. Pdennerhassett very well expresses it, "to obtain with as little delay as possible secure outlets to the Pacific, the Mediterranean, and the Persian Gulf," and, we may add, to maintain them when secured, and thus to build up and strengthen Russia's great land Empire. How will it hurt us if she does fully secure these aspirations ? How do they conflict with our own aims and objects ? The answer, we contend, is that they do not conflict at all. They are all consistent with the continuance and prosperity of the British Empire. We have virtually admitted this already in the Pacific. There Russia has got her ice-free port, and will soon have her railway completed to it, and yet British influence in the Far East has not suffered from that cause. If it is less now than formerly, it is because Germany is at Kiao-chow, not because Russia is at Port Arthur. In the same way, the British people are beginning to realise that it is not we who would suffer if Russia were to take Constantinople and were thus to have free access to the Levant. Other Powers might find the position one of danger and difficulty, but we should not be injured. There remains then only Persia where Russian aspirations can still be seriously con- fronted by us. Is it worth our while to forbid Russia to have access to the Persian Gulf, to secure a port there, and to dominate, if not to annex, Persia? If ports gave sea-power it might be reasonable to oppose the acquisition by Russia of a port or ports on the Persian Gulf. But parts do not give sea-power. Russia may have the best ports in the world, but unless she can fill them with. ironclads they are of little use to her in a war with a Power which holds the command of the sea. What gives sea-power is ocean-going ships and not ports, and. we shall believe in Russia's desire to take from us the corn. mand of the sea when we find Russia doubling or trebling her Fleet instead of merely taking more ports. The Gennans it may be noted, who do challenge our command of the sea: do not worry about ports, but lay down cruisers and battle. ships. We hold, then, that we can see Russia's aspirstiou in the Persian Gulf satisfied without the slightest injury being inflicted on ourselves, and we believe that the British Government might to-morrow come to an understaading on the matter. A great deal has, no doubt, been said to the impossibility of corning to an understanding with Russia, even though we tried to do so. It is urged that Russia does not really want to come to an understaading —that Russia, in . fact, does not ask for an agreement' but for a complete surrender on our part. Therefore it is declared that it is impossible to deal with Russia. We do not, of course, want to defend. Russian diplomacy, for we believe it very often to be tortuous and insincere, and we do not profess to have sympathy for the system of bureaucratic tyranny which prevails in Russia, but we cannot help thinking that in this matter our diplomatists are unreasonable. They say on general principles that there ought to be a compromise and. give-and-take on both sides. That sounds reasonable enough in the abstract, but translated into practice it means that Russia is to give up at our bidding the most cherished part of her schemes. She wants, for example, to get to the open sea, and we say we shall be happy to agree to her coming within twenty miles of it, but no further. When Russia says that she will not agree to that, we say she has no idea of give-and- take. In truth, the only way is to decide definitely whether the satisfaction of Russia's aspirations will injuie us or not. If it will not injure us, do not let us bargain, or attempt to get Russia to take less than she desires, but let us frankly yield her the whole of her demands. If her gains are not injurious to us, the more completely she is satisfied the better. But Russia's gain of a port on the Persian Gulf will not damage us, therefore we hold that she should be given as free a hand there as we can give her.
Those who are anxious and doubtful as to the policy of satisfying Russian aspirations cannot do better than picture the world as it would be if Russia had ports on the Persian Gulf as well as on the Pacific, and further had received from us the assurance that as far as we were concerned she might to-morrow acquire Constantinople. How should we be worse off than now ? In the Far East Russia, owing to the rivalry, naval and commercial, of Japan and Germany, would be extremely glad to have got over her quarrels with us, and would not desire to reopen them. In the Persian Gulf Russia would. have a port or ports and a large and flourishing trade, but those ports and that trade would be at the mercy of our Fleet. In the Near East Russia would no doubt avail herself of the withdrawal of our opposition to push her in2uence in the Balkans and in Asia Minor and Syria, and would seriously prepare for the absorption of Constantinople. But Russia could not do this without the risk of serious friction with Germany. That would, be troublesome to Germany, but it certainly would not injure us. The picture of a Russia fully satisfied as far as we were concerned on the Pacific and in the Persian Gulf, and pressing her policy as regards the Mediterranean, is certainly one which should have no terrors for Britain, whatever it may have for the rest of the world.
We have treated this question of Russia, Persia, and England in the abstract since it has not yet become actual. At any moment, however, it may become a matter of practical politics, and we may have to decide whether or not we mean to stop Russia's advance to the Persian Gulf. Personally we feel sure that if Russia moves without any- thing having first been settled, we shall write scathing despatches about Russia's perfidy, and make violent paper protests. When, however, these are ignored we shall do nothing, and. Russia will in the end. get her way in spite of our loudly expressed anger. We shall bark, that is, very loud. indeed, but we shall not bite. This refusal to bite will not be because we shall be afraid of Russia in a railitaq or naval sense, but because when we come into actual touch with the question the country will see that there is really nothing to fight about, and that it would be pre- posterous to go to war rather than allow Russia to have on the Persian Gulf. The thing will be pronounced port o foolish." Therefore we shall submit to a diplomatic defeat not any the less humiliating because self-in- Bided. But Russia will naturally enough look at the matter very differently. She will draw the lesson once more that we are her deadliest and inevitable enemy, and that the only way to move us is by threatening war. It will, that is, be Port Arthur over again. Russia will get what she wants, but in spite of us instead of through our help. But would it not be better to learn wisdom from the case of Port Arthur, and as we certainly do not mean to go to war to prevent Russia getting a port on the Persian Gulf, and as Russia is equally certain to go there some day and. some day soon, to let Russia know while she is still in doubt about the matter—Russia does not feel sure, though it is a fact, that we shall not go to war to keep her off the Persian Gulf—that we are quite willing that she should have access to the sea ? Russia will get to the Persian Gulf in any case, but under the policy we propose, as opposed to the traditional policy of the Foreign Office in dealing with Russia, Russia will get there with our good- will, and not as a triumph over us. If we thought it possible that this country would fight about the Persian Gulf, it would, we admit, be necessary to show more in detail and at greater length than we have done to-day that Russia on the Persian Gulf is not, in fact, a menace to the Empire. Knowing, however, that we shall not fight to keep Russia off the Gulf, it is really only necessary to point out that it must be better for us that Russia should reach her destinationwith our help than without it. There is no reason why we should not be friends with Russia, for we shall not fight to prevent her doing any of the things she wants to do. Therefore she may as well take her inevitable course in the guise of a friend as of an enemy. With Germany it is different. There are things which Germany wants to do which she must either abandon or fight us, and therefore there is no use in talking of a permanent understandino. with Germany We are standing in a gateway. We know that Russia will sooner or later want to go through the gate, and that we shall not deem it worth while to prevent her. That being so, it is far better policy, and far more dignified, to stand out of the way now, and before Russia comes charging down with a rude call to stand aside. We shall have to stand aside any way, as we are not idiots, but it is pleasanter and better to do it with a good grace now than with a bad grace later on.
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