TOPICS OF THE DAY.
11-(r, RETREAT OF EUROPE FROM CHINA IT seems clear from the German Emperor's admissions, from M. Deleases speech in the French Chamber, and from the ill-concealed disappointment of all traders in China, that Europe has agreed to order a retreat from the Far East. She is sick of her enterprise, which was com- menced in a moment of emotion, and not only abandons it, but expresses in half-a-dozen languages the relief of her peoples that it is not to be continued. This is rather an important fact in modern history, for it carries with it certain results. One is that in the next dealings with China each nation will act by itself, avowedly for its own interests, and as far as possible by some road in which it can remain lonely. There is not room obviously on the main road for so many carriages abreast, and the con- sequent chances of collision are a little too serious for their owners' equanimity Another result is that China has discovered a new method of defence, or rather has accepted the new one pointed out by General Gordon forty years ago. When she fights she is beaten, but when she retreats she is safe. The invading force was by no means a weak one. The Allied Governments spent alto- gether fifty millions sterling, and their army included fifty thousand men provided with the newest weapons, with ample commissariat, and with generals of high, and as the operations proved, just, reputation. They marched through Northern China, they relieved the Legations, they plundered the capital, and then they stood gazing into air, very nearly helpless. The Court had retreated to Sian, and though the European generals could plunder villages and kill peasants, they could not reach either the Government or the armies of China. A march into the far interior through that awful mass of mankind, and over the regular and brigand " armies " which would have defended every point of vantage was beyond them, while to remain indefinitely would have involved enormous expense and very serious political dangers. If the Empress-Regent had had the sense and the nerve to offer a full apology, to execute three Princes, and to pay at once twenty millions, we do not see•what the Powers could have done except retire and boast of their moderation. As it is, they have ob- tained a promise of a large sum of money, but no other object of the great expedition. They have not punished the guilty, they have not acquired commercial advantages, they have not obtained any new security for the future. On the contrary, they have taught the Chinese the true method of baffling them and other enemies in an emergency, and have thus rendered any future resort to force much more difficult. The Mandarins will see clearly that if they had retreated before Lord Elgin in 1860, or before the Japanese in 1894, they would have lost nothing except a certain number of obscure lives which they can spare with perfect equanimity. They have not lost any- thing of the unity of China, or any authority over their own people, while they have read a lesson to the foreigner which he will be slow to forget. Whether they will feel the loss of money we do not know, but as it is to be paid out of new revenue, and the Court was comfortable with the old, we should say not. The total result is therefore a new experience for Europe, and not a pleasant one. China is a vast cheese, but not easy to eat ; the mites make themselves so disagreeable.
There is a second result which is even more important. The States of Europe cannot act together for any length of time even when they try. So far as appears, the attempt at first, while the lives of the Ambassadors were in peril, was made in all sincerity, but the moment that danger was over the Powers fell apart. Their jealousies and fears of each other were too real, and extended too deeply among their peoples, to admit of common action. They could not even create, as Allies have repeatedly created, a Commander-in-Chief. Nobody thought Count von Waldersee unworthy of that position, nobody objected to his appointment, and nobody would obey him except as a momentary act of grace. The British suspected the Germans, the Germans suspected the British, the French would trust neither, and the Russians pursued a policy of their own. There was not only no real coherence, there was genuine though concealed antagonism, which, spring- ing, as it obviously has done, not so much from immediate interests as from abiding convictions, must sooner or later influence action in Europe, and immediately renders true cordiality impossible. You cannot feel truly cordial towards trade rivals whom you suspect of perpetually trying to take dirty little advantages. It may be said that there was no cordiality before, but events in China revealed the width of the fissure between the Powers which had been partially concealed by the diplomatic bridge. No Power could act alone, not even to strengthen Shanghai or threaten Sian, because on the first hint of such a design the remaining Powers pronounced the solitary one a thief in intention, and took armed precautions to prevent his thieving. A common expedition with common objects and common results has decreased, instead of increasing, the harmony of Europe. We ourserves in particular are less near a thorough understanding with Russia, or Germany, or France than we were before.
The third result is perhaps most important of all, though its importance is confined to ourselves. It has become most difficult in any future combined operation to use our Indian troops. The generals, of course, never objected to their co-operation, but the soldiers of the Continental Powers did. The intense German contempt and dislike for men with dark skins, which events are revealing in other quarters of the world, extended itself even to Indians who were fighting by their side, and curiously enough was shared by the French, who had Annarnits soldiers in the field. Insults were shouted at the Sikhs, and collisions were only averted by their perfect discipline. This will never do, for Indians, whether Sikhs or Rajpoots or Mussuhnans, are as sensitive as any soldiers in the world, and if provoked beyond bearing, would avenge them- selves with greater thoroughness even than Europeans. It will be necessary in any future combined movement to leave them behind, and what with this unmannerliness of their comrades, and the invincible dislike to their employment in South Africa, we run the risk of being deprived of one half our effective strength, and. of creating the impression among the fighting tribes of India that they are regarded as savages, and that we do not resent the imputation. The Indian troops are no more savages than our own men, are quite as well disciplined, and just as little likely to massacre the unarmed. It was not Sikhs but Germans who shot down the peasantry on the Pekin Canal. People talk of the impropriety of using coloured men against white, and if they are to live side by side we agree with them; but if the Russians ever invade India, are we to send the Sikhs to the rear? It is one of the many evil results of this expedition, which has had no good ones except the rescue of the Legations, that it has increased the difficulty of employing native troops, whom we have always regarded in China and in 'Africa as a most trustworthy left-arm. The retreat of Europe is under all the circumstances a relief, but with the relief have come some grave and by no means consolatory reflections. Our national work grows more complicated than ever, and it is not in complicated affairs that we shine most.
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