SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCH.
SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S despatch describing the terrible days when the British armies were being pushed -back by the great German advance which began on March 21st has been published three months after it was written. The military events of this year so far as they concern the British Army provide an astonishing contrast. In the first place, we see the Fifth and Third Armies being forced back in some- thing like a precipitate retreat, and the blame, being put by inference on Sir Hubert Gough, who commanded the Fifth Army. At all events the renall of that officer, who has never had the satisfaction of .any inquiry into his conduct, implied that the Government were sufficiently dissatisfied with the leadership, the Staff work, or the organization of the Fifth Army. On the other hand, we see the wonderful and brilliant advance of the same—or much, the same—British armine„in these later months. If Sir Douglas Haig and his armies have not received anything like the praise they deserve from the British Government for this advance, they have been loaded with praise by that master-judge of warfare, Marshal Foch. The present British advance is indeed the supreme achieve- ment in the history of British arms, just as the retreat in March was the worst disaster in the history of British arms. Naturally one looks in Sir Douglas Haig's despatch for some light upon these extraordinary contrasts. Much light certainly is cast by this very able document. But the despatch raises so many questions of a puzzling, and indeed bewildering, nature that it would be very wrong to demand that public attention should be distracted now by a discussion of them.
The general impression we receive from the despatch is that the Fifth Army under Sir Hubert Gough was simply the victim of circumstances. It- was overwhelmed by an enormous preponderance of German troops, and in its retreat it gained the utmost credit for doggedness and resource. It is made quite plain that the Fifth Army- was holding too much ground with too few troops, not through any fault of Sir Hubert Gough or of Sir Douglas Haig himself. Sir Douglas Haig, very rightly feeling that it was essential to make the Channel ports secure, kept that_ reserves in the North, and had to trust to General Gough being able to hold the line 'of the Fifth Army with what troops he could be given. Bach division of the Fifth Army was holdingon an average CM yards, whereas each division of the Third Army immediately to the north of the Fifth Army was.holding on an average 4,700 yards. Nevertheless much the heavier blow 'fell upon the Fifth Army. Sir Douglas Haig sums up the situation by Saying that " the forces at the disposal of the Fifth Army were inadequate to meet and hold the attack in such strength as that actually delivered." No criticism is made of General Gough, except possibly in reference to the abandonment of the Percenre bridgehead. " At no time, either on the Somme or on the Lys, was there anything approachinga breakdown of command or a failure of moral.' It will probably be news to the public—who have regarded the Third Army as holding fast everywhere while the Fifth Army gave way—that it was the withdrawal of the right of the Third Army on March 26th, owing to some misunder- standing, •which compromised the Fifth Army.
Now let us turn to the bewildering questions which Sir Douglas Haig's statements on various matters compel us to face. We want merely to put these perplexities on record. Though now is not the time to discuss them, some day they must be answered. We cannot do better than follow the very coherent examination of the despatch by Sir Frederick Maurice which was published in the Daily News of Tuesday. The first difficulty is with regard to the extension of the British front, whereby new ground was hurriedly taken over by the Fifth Army not long before the German blow fell. Sir Douglas Haig states that " the prime cause of the disaster was a lengthened front," which made it " impossible to have adequate reserves at all points threatened." As we know from previous despatches, Sir Douglas Haig again and again pleaded for drafts to be sent out to him in greater numbers and more proniptly in order that he might have time to train them. We may take it for granted, therefore, that last winter and last spring he was not quite dumb on this matter. But on April 9th Lord Curzon, speaking in the House of Lords, said :- " There seems to have been a • tendency in some quarters to suppose, either from a reluctance to tamper with available sources of rasa:power in this country, or from a failure to appreciate military -advice the British Army in France had been allowed- to decline numerically to a point that was fraught with peril. There is no foundation for such a suspicion, nor were any apprehensions of such a character either entertained or received."
Again, later in the same speech The Western Front was well equipped to look after itself. If it has in any respect failed to do So, the-explanation must be sought elsewhere."
That, is one difficulty. Verbally it is impossible to reconcile the two istateMents.
Now we Coble to another difficulty—the question whether the strength of the British-armies had or had not been reduced. We must dote Sir Frederick Maurice in full 'Sir Douglas Haig hays : Since the month of September, 1917, pursuant-to a decisiontak6n by the British Goterrernent towards the end of that month; negotiations had been pro-deeding 'With the Frenoh authori- ties regarding the extension of the f rent held by the-British armies.' Mr. Boner Law, on April 17th, said ; The arrangements in the matter ' (t.e., the extension bf the British front) were made entirely by the British -and French military authorities.' Sir Douglas Haig Bays : Under instiv.otiew3 from the Army Council, the reorganisation of divisions from a thirteen -battalion to a ten-battalion basis was completed during the month of February ' ; that is about one "Month' be-fore the • Ceti:Min attack. Apart from the reduction in fighting strength involved by this reorganisation, the fightiri,g :effieigney - of units was to some extent affected. An unfamiliar grouping of units was introduced thereby, necessitating new 'Methods Of tactical handling of the troops, and the diseardirig of old 'Methods to which subordinate commanders had become accustomed.' In other' words, at -a time when it was knoWn that a -great attack was impending, and the British front had to be extended, Sir Douglas Haig's establishment was reduced by some hundrbd and thirty battalions, because he was not given sufficient Men td. keep these battalions up to Strength, and on the eve of the battle the fighting organisation of his armies was radically changed."
Yet on April 9th the Prime Minister, speaking in the House of Comtninis, said : " Notwithstanding the heavy casualties in 1917, the .Army in France was considerably stronger on January 1st, 1918, than on January 1st, 1917." Once again there is no possibility of verbally reconciling these two statements. As to the disposition of what reserves there were, there is a very curious question to be answered. On April 9th the Prime Minister said that he had been informed by Sir Henry Wilson " in the month of January or the beginning of February " that the Germans would attack the British front in the very region in which they actually did attack. If the Government had acted on this warning of their military adviser, they would of course have made preparations on the spot against the im- pending blow. On August 7th, however, the Prime Minister stated that within a month after the German attack had begun, three hundred and fifty-five thousand reserves were sent across the Channel. Why were those reserves at home ? Why had they not been sent to France after the very accurate prediction of Sir Henry Wilson had been uttered ? Why, above all, had it been necessary to reduce the strength of the British armies in France, as Sir Douglas Haig tells us it was reduced, by a hundred and thirty battalions ? We repeat that this is not the time—and the British public is very properly not in the mood—to discuss such issues as these. As, however, Sir Douglas Haig's Report has been published, it was impossible not to put the conflicts of evidence on record. It is obvious that when the suitable opportunity comes there must be answers, and we hope that they may come for the most part in the form of an inquiry into the conduct of Sir Hubert Gough. Nothing less than a full inquiry is owed to him.
In conclusion, we must refer to a remark made by Sir Frederick Maurice on the unity of command. Sir Douglas Haig's despatch, he says, " brings out very clearly the fact that if effective unity of command had been established before the battle instead of in the midst of the greatest military orisis which we experienced in this war, the dangers to which we were exposed would have been very sensibly diminished. The polyglot Versailles Executive Committee was not, and could not be, an effective organ of command." We remember that Sir Frederick Maurice the elder—the father of the officer whose article we are discussing—used to say that a Commander-in- Chief who talked about " calling a Council of War " ought to be shot. That saying represents the feelings of almost every experienced officer in the British Army. All know that the decisions of a Council mean colourless compromises and delay, not the boldness and the lightning speed which proceed from a single confident brain. The writer of the article in the- Daily News implies that what soldiers like Sir William Robertson and those associated with him opposed was not the creation of a single command, but the idea of placing the supreme military command in the hands of a Committee. The public, rightly or wrongly—the history of the whole matter is obscure—imagines that the Prime Minister was for a long time advocating the appointment of a Generalissimo, and that this was resisted by obscurantist soldiers in high.places. We do not know exactly when the Prime Minister was convinced or persuaded that the appointment of Marshal Foch as Generalissimo was the best solution of all our difficulties—it has been brilliantly and abundantly justified—but it will be remembered that in November, 1917, he described the notion of having- a General- issimo as most dangerous. This, too, is a subject on which more light might eventually be thrown with advantage, though we admit that it is not anything like so important as to explain the extraordinary contradictions which appear between Sir Douglas Haig's Report and the statements of Ministers.
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