TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE CHANCES OF RUSSIAN SUCCESS.
THERE is one point in this Eastern campaign which those who are so certain of Russian defeat do not appear to us fully to realise, and that is, that the war now raging on the fron- t' er is the war, and not merely the beginning of a war. Plevna is no more to Turkey geographically considered than Sebas- topol was to Russia, but its fall may mean as much to the Sultan as the fall of that fortress did to the Czar. It was absolutely necessary to the invading Russian Army that it should, before advancing in force, make the line of the Danube safe ; and it was absolutely necessary to the defending Power, unless it would consent to lose its territories down to the Balkans, that it should keep it unsafe. A great war, therefore, has raged round that pivot, and upon an apparently narrow field of operations, the strip of country along the Danube from Servia, to the sea, and about sixty miles in depth. The Russian army cannot advance without taking Plevna, for if it did, the army in that fortified position would destroy its communications, and before long leave it without materiel. It cannot move without defeat- ing Mehemet Ali and his army, for the same reason ; and it cannot move without taking or shutting up Rustchuk, from precisely the same cause. The object of the war, for the time, is safety on the Danube ; and as the Turks perceive that as clearly as their foes, this becomes, in a sense, the whole object of operations. The battle for the existence of Turkey is being fought out not in Turkey, but on the southern bank of the Danube only. The force of both Empires is being concentrated there, and the destiny of both will, in all probability, be there decided. It is more than probable, if the Russians win on the frontier—that is, if they take Osman Pasha's army, if they defeat Mehemet Ali, and if they cap- ture Rustchuk—that all will have been accomplished, that the resisting force will have used itself up, and that all subse- quent movements will resemble Sherman's march through Georgia under much the same circumstances, a "march through space."
The importance of this special part of the campaign—its relation, that is, to the whole campaign, of which it takes the place—being thus fully recognised, let us see how matters stand. The Russians have gained with Nikopol a foothold on the soil to be secured, and one which, while the Dobrudscha is occupied, prevents their rear being assailed. They have planted a very large army, in daily receipt of rein- forcements and supplies, in the very best position, ex- actly between the two armies which, if they them- selves moved forward, would join and completely cut them off from their base and source of all supplies. They are steadily endeavouring to destroy these two armies, but have not as yet succeeded. Partly from over-eonfidence, partly from miscalculation, but chiefly through an unsuspected want of brain-power and " go " in the ruling Staff, they have made attacks which have failed, and have lost a certain number of men, probably as many as 40,000, though this is above their own figure,—that is to say, five per cont. of their effective Army—excluding local forces—or one-tenth of the number of the Russians proper who present themselves every year for the conscription. The number in every country thus organised is always one per cent, of the popu- lation, and there are 40,000,000 of Russians in the Empire. This is a serious loss, and seems to men accustomed to consider 25,000 men an army a very dreadful one, and con- stitutes, no doubt, a decided and most disagreeable check. But this is not victory for the Turks. They are not one whit nearer to their end, which is the expulsion of the Russians, or if they advance, the seizure of their means of retreating across the Danube. By incredible efforts, by calling out all male Mahommedans capable of bearing arms, by expending all revenue on materiel, And by concentrating effort till little , Montenegro, but for Austrian menaces, could march to Croatia almost unopposed, the Pashas in Constantinople have succeeded in enabling their two Generals on the frontier to remain successfully on the defensive. That is all. The bullet is not cut out, or crushed out, or forced out, but stays there, as big and as deadly to health as ever. Osman cannot advance, even though he be entitled " Ghazi." Mehemet Ali nnot advance, even though, as a born Christian, he is not entitled " Ghazi." It is supposed that the bullet is growing smaller, but there is not the slightest evidence of that, The passage of the Danube by the II cumanian Army of itself filled up the whole gap caused, till that time, by losses in the field, the daily reinforcements replace at least the losses by disease, and there will, as we calculate, soon be the Imperial Guard to the good. The Turks have to kill 30,000 men a month merely to keep down the new supplies of men poured into the army by the conscription—for in Russia no one's time expires. in war—and they are wholly unable to do anything of the kind, The Russian Army remains unbroken, while very slowly, no doubt, but still visibly, the higher officers, spoiled by the system of Czar Nicholas, and by the favouritism which is the curse of a government like that of Russia, where each member of one family has a prescriptive right to exercise high patronage, are weeded out, or killed out, or superseded by more successful rivals, and the Army becomes gradually the centre of an opinion—necessarily weak till the Army is concentrated in the field—which even an absolute master cannot disregard. The Czar may be weak, and his family may be unequal tk duties, which require abilities very rarely to be found,—jusi think for a moment of the Great Northern Railway, not with hereditary chairmen, but hereditary Traffic-managers I—but neither of them can be free from an intense desire both to win and to ensure the devotion of the Russian Army. They have not been crushed in seven days, as the Austrian incompetenta were, or in seven weeks, as the French incompetents were, but have had time given them to redeem mistakes, in part at least inseparable from their system. By Christmas the Russian army may, on the most reasonable calculation, be as strong as ever, as fully supplied, and commanded by abler men.
So may the Turkish Army ? That is, of course, conceivable, but is it reasonably probable I The Sultan will hardly remove Osman Pasha, and if he removes Mehemet Ali or Suleiman, with whom is he to replace them ? If he chooses a Turk, the chances are he will be no better, and if he buys or borrows a Christian' that Christian will be hampered with " jealousies " such as have prevented Suleiman from helping the Prus-
sian Mehemet Ali to victory. As to men, there are signs on all hands that the dominant caste is doing its utmost, and can do no more, the very Osmanlis of Constantinople, for ages exempted, being sent, in the dearth of men, to the front. We do not know what Turkish losses are, for the Turk does not complain, and his Government publishes nothing, but we do know that there are are not soldiers to restrain the Irregulars that the villages in Asia Minor are "empty," that the Khedive is importuned for more men—his men, the Daily Telegraph reports, are beginning to malinger, by blowing off their own thumbs—and that there is no spare force to watch or intercept the Montenegrins. As for supplies, they may be reduced, but as far as regards fire-arms and unlimited cartridges, they can hardly be more perfect than at present. The Turkish Army may be kept up, but additional force is unprocurable.
But then the Russian Court, disheartened by unexpected difficulties, may abandon the undertaking ? It may, as it may turn Protestant or Catholic, but we see no probability that it will. Courts do not give up long-planned enterprises willingly, or willingly accept humiliating defeat, and there is nothing visible that should compel the Russian Czar to move in that direction. His only important neighbour is strengthening his hands. His army is eager to retrieve its fame. his people show every disposition to go on, and will most assuredly punish retreat, by demanding that the autocracy which he desires to continue should be limited, till they are able to prevent, or at all events, to foresee, catastrophes of the kind. The difficulties about money and so on, which so appal City Editors with a strong hope that Turkish Bonds may rise, probably hardly strike the Czar, and will, in fact, not be felt at their worst until the war is over, and the Treasury is again compelled to resort to normal methods. It will be far easier for the Czar, considered as a merely selfish dynast, to go on than to retreat ; and he is probably, even if a selfish dynast, also very much more, a man, like most of his prede- cessors, in whom long-continued and supremo loneliness has developed an almost morbid sense of responsibility for the races entrusted to his charge. We believe that he will go en, and if he goes on, he will find himself within a few weeks able, if he has but a Commander at his disposal, to place a much stronger weapon in his hand. Wars like this, ware which are episodes in struggles stretching over centuries, are not ended because either side has lost a few men, or finds a difficulty in raising a few pounds. The very Bourses which ask vhere Russia is to obtain the money, record with exultation the victories of a Power which is unable to raise any.
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