THE Rl7SSO-CHINESE TREATY.
WE can see no sound reason why this country, which needs Russian assistance in Turkey, should spend her strength in resisting the Treaty just concluded between St. Petersburg and Pekin. That Treaty, which for reasons stated elsewhere we believe to be genuine, and which now lacks only final ratification by the two Emperors, does no doubt secure to Russia a position in Manchouria which for certain political purposes, and especially for warlike preparations, is equivalent to sovereignty ; but we do not see that it threatens our interests in a way which would justify war. Under its provisions China allows the Russian Government to prolong its Trans-Siberian Rail- way at once to Kirin, the capital of Manchouria, and to garrison all stations along the line with an unlimited number of soldiers, whether infantry or cavalry. As these soldiers must be cantoned, and as when cantoned they and a certain district round each cantonment must remain under Russian military law—for otherwise disci- pline would dissolve—this arrangement amounts in all but form to a cession to Russia of the territory occupied by the railway, and as Northern Manchouria thereby becomes indefensible, is, in fact, cut off from China by an impassable wall, the concession may be held equiva- lent to the surrender of an enormous though half- deserted province. Northern Manchouria under it is lost to China. Further, although to save the " face " of the Government of Pekin, China promises to build the railway from Newchang to Kirin, and from Port Arthur to Newchang, it is arranged that if China cannot fulfil her promise, which she certainly cannot do, Russia shall do her work, and thus stretch her rail- way, and necessarily with it her authority and influence, right into the Gulf of Pecheli.- As if to make this still more clear, it is settled that while in time of peace China shall continue to govern Port Arthur and some other places, in time of war Russia, already permitted by the Treaty to erect fortifications there, shall take full possession of them and defend them with her whole resources. In plain English, under cover of ceremonious words intended to save the incurable pride of Pekin, Russia is allowed to extend her great North Asiatic railway to Port Arthur, and to exercise all the powers necessary for its defence and utilisation in time both of peace and war. Port Arthur will be as much hers as Batoum. The moment the railway is completed she is seated at Port Arthur in her full strength, with her fortifications complete, with her railway through Manchouria guarded, and with the power of drawing supplies from all Siberia, and, if China. is friendly, from the interior of China itself. Moreover, she is so near Pekin that, unless the Chinese move their capital, her influence on the policy of China must be immense, must rather resemble that which Austria once exercised in the petty Italian Courts than any which usually falls to the lot of the Ambassador even of a first- class Power. Indeed, if a provision cunningly inserted in the Treaty for lending Russian officers to the Chinese Army were ever carried out, she would be as dominant in Pekin as ever General Kaulbars tried to become, and thought he was, in Sofia. It is a superb position, and indicates by far the greatest advance made by Russia in Northern Asia during the last two generations.
And yet what is it all when compared with our own position in Southern Asia, where England, seated on three capitals, of which one, Calcutta, is beyond attack, rules calmly over nearly two hundred and fifty millions of peaceful taxpayers? massed in a vast and fertile peninsula inaccessible to the south by any one not mistress of the seas, and defeuaed on the north by a mighty chain of mountains, the tow gates in which are protected by fortresses and a great system of strategic railways ? From India, where she raises dark armies at her own discretion, England can strike at Persia, Egypt, East Africa, Indo-China, or China almost at will, and using in the first instance resources not derived from the British Treasury. She could, in fact, if driven to put forth her full strength, sweep every flag but her own out of Asia, as Lord Minto swept evcry flag, and then garrison without fatigue every importnit point from Perini to the Gulf of Pecheli. If a " dangeruns preponderance" is to be a, ground of attack without actual evidence of hostility, our position would justify it far better than that of Russia, which has in Northern Asia few taxpaying subjects, and must keep up all the armies and fortresses she may possess there out of the shallow Treasury of St. Petersburg. Why in such a position should we be so bitterly jealous because the rival Power has at last a fair chance of getting to the water, and filling Southern Siberia with a population which in a cen- tury may be perhaps one-twentieth as thick upon the ground as that of Bengal? Because our prestige will be threatened? Where, except in Pekin ? Do we want prestige in Tokio or the archipelago of the North Pacific, where already we are seated in security upon 'the immense island of Borneo, while we hold its gate, the Straits of Malacca, in a grip all the stronger because it seems to depend so completely upon our mastery of the seas? But "our interests are threatened," it is said. In what way, any more than the interests of the rest of Europe ? All we need in China is opportunity of trade, and as the revenue of China now depends upon that trade, Russia, however influential at Pekin, cannot arrest it without danger of making her great " vassal " her enemy, and compelling the Court to fly either west- ward out of Russian reach or southward to the protection of British shells. We can trade with a protected China just as well as with an independent China, and probably with much more profit. What have we lost in our com- merce through the French occupation of Indo-China ? The French say nothing, or rather that we have gained, and the French are right. Trade, it is said, follows the flag, but we are not going to wage a great war, we suppose, for the trade of Manchouria, and as to that of China it must belong to the nations which can send goods by water, not to those which must pass every ton they sell over four thousand miles of half-deserted land. As for territory, we can hardly be accused of being Little Englanders, but there are limits to all things, and we utterly refuse, with India, Egypt, and East Africa on our hands, to advocate burdening ourselves with Chinese provinces. We have not the Army to garrison them, and could not hold them to obedience or keep them in decent order without periodical massacres. It is hard enough to keep order in Singapore, where the Chinese are only a colony, and sleep within range of British guns. Some of our countrymen are positively beside themselves with their dreams of empire, as if England could hold down the world with a corporal's guard in each country subjugated. Some of them are so inconsistent also. Here is the Daily Chronicle, for example, which desires us to evacuate Egypt, and is greatly tried by an expedition to Dongola, but which actually wants Great Britain to assume in Southern China the position which it imagines Russia will occupy in Northern,—that is, in practice, to rule another hundred millions of people, who of all black or yellow mankind know best how to make their Governors uncomfortable. We would not, without a conscription, accept such a position if it were to be obtained by mere volition, and we do not suppose that the Daily Chronicle, of all journals in the world, is pre- pared to pay that price. Let us be contented with the million of square miles we have recently acquired, continue with a. certain doggedness to do our beneficial work in East Africa, liberating blacks, putting down Dervishes, and subsidising Abyssinians, until at length there is order, contentment, and prosperity among the dark millions, from Alexandria to the Cape. That is a big enough task for us, for the present at all events, and we may well while we are doing it let Russia expand herself, and, if possible, spread her people over the illimitable deserts of Siberia and Manchouria. We have no moral right to prevent her whatever, even if she, like ourselves, should plunder the Summer Palace or dictate terms at the gate of Pekin. We are willing to face the danger of irritating half man- kind, as we are doing by our incessant acquisitions ; but at least we can abstain from playing always the part of the dog in the manger. Russia is only fulfilling her destiny in rolling to the water. Let her roll in peace. She will be at least as vivifying a power at Port Arthur as Japan would have been, and we did not object to her, though her temporary possession was accompanied by a massacre such as the world has not seen since Tilly sacked Magdeburg.
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