THE RUMOURS ABOUT TURKEY.
IT seems to be possible that Justice, leaden-footed though she has seemed, is at last approaching the Sultan. The Foreign Offices are naturally and wisely silent, but the rumour comes from too many quarters, and is too well defined, to be entirely without foiindation: According to an account which is getting . believed in St. Petersburg, Paris, and London, the Czar has at last been satisfied, by evidence laid before him at Balmoral and confirmed by M. Nelidoff on his visit to St. Petersburg; that to wait in passive expectancy the fall of the Turkish Empire is to risk a sudden explosion which may shatter the 'Very foundations upon which peace is built A fresh massacre, a rising in Macedonia, a military revolt in the camp at Yildiz Kiosk, may on any day raise the Eastern question in such a form that it must be settled by action; which action may—or, according to very great diplo- matists, must—involve the risk of a European war. The three Powers, therefore, Russia, Great Britain, and France, with the approval of Austria, and with assurances of the neutrality of Germany, have agreed to demand. of the Sultan certain. reforms which, as they consider, will render the continued existence of Turkey endurable to the civilised world, and to inform him that if he refuses to accept their proposals they will be compelled to resort to measures of coercion. It is calculated that the Sultan, thus deprived of his usual source of confidence—;namely, his reliance on the latent jealousies of the Powers—will submit, will' make the changes in his Administration which are essential to any reforms whatever, and will, for the time at all events, give up his exclusive control of public 'affairs. He is not brave, he is well acquainted with the maritime strength of the Powers, and he is devoted to himself, not to the counsellors around him,. who will be ruined by his submission. If he submits, all is well for the time, for the mere fact of his submission will break the evil •spell of terror which renders all decent Turks powerless before him, and the new men who will be appointed " to carry out reforms " will know how to hold their own. In the conceivable though unlikely event, however, of the Sultan continuing to resist, or unduly protracting the negotiatior.s, or in the quite possible contingency of a general massacre of Europeans by an infuriated mob; the fleets' of the three Powers will force their way to Constantinople, and under the menace of dethronement, compel order and submissive obedience to their " counsels." It is not believed that the Sultan will fly, and mobs do net rise in cities commanded by fleets which they know to be irresistible, and which they can actually see.
This is the story, and reading an account which we conceive to be " inspired," we believe it to be true, with the reserve that, unless there is danger to Europeans in the capital, some telegrams will remain to be exchanged before the fleets which are hovering near the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus would, in the event of refusal, be actually in motion. Certainly we hope it is true, for even from the Continental point of view the course to be adopted is a wise one. It is evident from the hideous massacre at Eghin in September, a massacre of nine hundred Armenians, in which the soldiers took part. that the Sultan has in no way changed. his policy of killing out the Armenian nation, and every such massacre renders it more difficult for the civilised Govern. ments to refuse to act. Moreover, it has for some time been evident to the well informed that, apart from the question of the Armenians, an explosion within Constantinople itself, whether from the bank- ruptcy of the State, or a mutiny among the guards, or an outbreak of civil war in the streets, is ultimately inevitable. Such an explosion, which in an Oriental State is always sudden and usually sanguinary, might, and probably would, be followed by a period of anarchy which would compel the Powers to occupy Constantinople,—that is, would set in motion all the ambitions which diplo- matists believe would lead to war. It is far 'wiser, if Turkey is to be maintained, to remove the causes of disorder, which, it seems to be agreed among those who have to act, are to be most conveniently sought not in the fevered brain of the Sultan, but in the evil counsellors by whom he is surrounded. The experiment of governing through better men may, of course, fail ; will fail, if. the Sultan retains his belief in his own position as chief of the Mahommedan world ; but it is an easier experiment than the dethronement of the Monarch himself or the partition of his dominions, and it is, therefore, quite legiti- mate to try it. It may even succeed beyond expectation pro- vided that two conditions can be observed. One is that the Sultan can be convinced, be it by an autograph letter from the- Czar, or by the appearance of a. fleet, or in any other way, that Europe has made up its mind, and- that the alternatives before him are armed resistance to its decrees, submission, or. abdication. The other is that the. repre- sentatives of the Powers should act with peremptory decision, that submission or refusal should be required at once, that no facilities should be given dor the flight of the Sultan, who might carry with him- the heir to the throne, that no time should be. allowed for rumours to circulate in Constantinople, or to be forwarded to the provinces.; .that, in• fact, before the_ Ambassadors leave the Sultan's Cabinet, power within Constantinople should be transferred to strong and trustworthy hands, say those of the released Commander-in-Chief, Osman Ghazi. If there is any of thensual procrastination, if the Sultan is allowed to offer compromises, above all, if the Mussulman mob is granted time -to artnitself and descend into the streets, there will be a catastrophe yet which may bring all the skill of all the diplomatists at once to naught. The Am- bassadors must speak like officers in command of an irresistible army, not like men .intent on respectfully insinuating wise counsels to a Sovereign misled by his information. It is not true that Asiatimund.erstand only visible force. They are not such fools. But it is true that they understand with singular shrewdness when the end has come, when they must use force themselves, or submit, as they all know how, to the inexplicable will of Allah.
We need not say that we have no atom of confidence in the " reforms " themselves, whatever they may be, which are to be submitted to the Sultan.' The Czar could not, for very fear of ridicule, require him to call a Parliament, or revive Midhat's constitution, and petty rules about the police, or the right of the Armenians to fair trial, or even the dismissal of civil officers in wliose districts massacres occur, will do 'no good whatever. Reams of 'paper." re- • forms' will 'leave thd-three fotces which rule Turkey-,-viz., the Sultan, the soldiers, and the Mussulman mob—equally unaffected, and eqUally on the watch for an opportunity of venting their fanaticism or their spite. If the Indian Criminal Code were in force in Turkey tomorrow it would not prevent such a scene as that at Eghin, or such a "riot" as that which recently occurred in Constantinople. The sole hope is in a change in the depositaries of power, who can if they please protect the unarmed, raise revenue without pillage, and bring all who murder in the name of a creed before summary Courts-martial. A strong Grand Vizier to whom the good soldiers of the Empire and the more decent among the Ottomans can rally, may keep the edifice standing for a few more years, and as its fall will involve such calamities, it is well the experiment should be tried. It is not, however, a hopeful one. A riding Sultan who visited every corner of his dominions, reinvigorated the Army, and executed half the civil Pashas for peculation might keep things going for another generation ; but the house of Othman is worn out, no other has any hold upon the people, and those people themselves are about as capable of self-govern- ment as the animals in the Zoological Gardens are of elect- ing their own keepers. There are plenty of educated Turks, and good Turks, and Turks who are Western in sympathy ; but the Turkish Empire rests on the Ottomans, and the Ottomans are a tribe of the Far East, encamped in Europe for purposes of destruction, out of sympathy with their time, their surroundings, and their own leaders. They are utterly pessimist, they are boiling with rage at their position, they will find some day a soldier to lead them, and then they will fight their last fight, die like the brave men they are round their standards, and pass from the scene, leaving this repute, that they were Mongols who left their deserts to plunder, that they conquered half the Roman world, and that in four hundred years of sovereignty they never founded a city, or built an edifice, or made a discovery, or composed a book. They were, in fact, to the Arabs what the Vandals were to the Lombards or the Teutons, not merely barbarians for all the conquering tribes were that, but barbarians having in them no vivifying quality or rule of action. The Arab brought his subtle brain, the Teuton brought the seed of all progress, but the Ottoman brought nothing except a. readiness to die. That readiness gave him every- thing that he could take, but he made nothing for himself, and when his hour arrives at last every man he ever governed will draw a deep breath of thankfulness to the God who has waited, as all good men think, so inexplicably long.
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