MR. STEAD'S MYSTERY. F OR the last three months the air
has been filled with rumours of wonderful forthcoming revelations as to the Jameson Raid. The advocates of Mr. Rhodes and the Chartered Company have again and again shaken their heads and hinted how " they could an' they would" a tale unfold which would make our flesh creep. Sometimes it was hinted that the awful revelations were concerned with Germany. They would show, it was whispered, that Mr. Rhodes and Dr. Jameson were not only amply justified in what they did, but that they could have done nothing else as long as they remained Englishmen. So terrible was the crisis, so dark and daring the foreign intrigues, that they had no choice but to ride pell-mell for Johannesburg and Pretoria and repel somebody or something not exactly specified, but, we presume, mounted marines who were to have ridden in from Delagoa Bay. Again, it was hinted that there were terrible things to come out about Mr. Chamberlain. He would be shown to be deeply implicated, and the Raid and the Revolution would be found to be all his work. But these rumours were not merely nebulous. They had a practical conclusion founded upon them, which was to the effect that in view of the impending disclosures it would be far better to atop the inquiry into South African affairs. Why, it was asked, make a serious international question by telling the truth about the German intrigues and ruin poor Mr. Chamberlain by showing that he was the true raider ? Surely it would be far better to stop the inquiry than to run these awful risks.
At last these threatened revelations have been brought to the test. They have been given to the world by Mr. Stead—Mr. Rhodes's ablest and most independent advo- cate in the Press—in his " History of the Mystery," and we are able to judge of their value. Mr. Stead tells us that till the Committee begins its sittings his work will be derided as "a mere story," but that afterwards, and when the revelations have come out in the course of the inquiry, men will say, "After all, there is nothing new in these so-called revelations, they were all published months ago in Stead's New Year's annual." That may be, though we hardly see how; and for this simple reason. As far as we are able to judge, there are absolutely no revelations, good, bad, or indifferent, in Mr. Stead's book. Perhaps some of Mr. Rhodes's Irish friends will declare that this is false, and that the " blacked-out " passages are fairly alive with revelations. But alas I we are too English to find revelations in blanks. The nearest thing we can find to a revelation in Mr. Stead's book is the statement, not that Mr. Chamberlain was privy to the Raid—Mr. Stead expressly disowns that notion both for Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Rhodes—but that he was aware that an insurrectionary movement was going on at Johannesburg, and that he gave the movement his assist. ance. Mr. Stead suggests, in fact, that Mr. Chamberlain knew what was going on in Johannesburg this time last year. We sincerely hope that at least this " revelation " will be proved true. We cannot imagine anything more damaging to Mr. Chamberlain than that it should be shown that he was blind to the condition of the Outlanders and to their discontent. Of course he knew it, just as his predecessors before him had known it, and of course he was aware that if certain things happened it might be necessary for the British Government to restore order. If Mr. Chamberlain could be proved not to have known about the revolutionary ferment in the Transvaal, and not to have considered a line of action in case an explosion took place there, the country would feel that it had been greatly mistaken in its man. But between this knowledge and this watchfulness over British interests and the direct fostering of a revolution in Johannesburg there is a. world of difference. Mr. Stead has, however, another plea in stock. Even supposing that Mr. Chamberlain did not know that Mr. Rhodes was fostering a revolution, Mr. Rhodes cannot be blamed because he at least thought that Mr. Chamber- lain knew all about his connection with the intended Raid. " Whatever Mr. Chamberlain intended, Mr. Rhodes be- lieved that Mr. Chamberlain had been informed of the project, and had handed over the strip on the frontier and the police as the sign and seal of his approval." These are Mr. Stead's own words quoted from a sort of digest of his novel issued with it. This second plea is of course absurd, and we only quote it as a political curiosity. The man who has come a cropper in business or politics always says, "Of course, I thought you approved of all I was doing, or I should never have dreamt of doing what I did." We prefer, therefore, to deal with the general allegation that Mr. Rhodes had nothing to do with the Raid itself. Dr. Jameson, says Mr. Stead, was repeatedly forbidden, both by special messenger and by telegrams, to cross the frontier. "Mr. Rhodes ordered Dr. Jameson to abandon the scheme." This may have been so, but we confess that we find it very difficult to reconcile this statement with the telegram sent by Dr. Jameson to Dr. Harris on December 28th. It runs as follows :—" Received your telegram Ichabod re Captain Maurice Heany. Have no further news. I require to know. Unless I hear definitely to the contrary shall leave to-morrow evening, and carry into effect my second telegram of yesterday to you, and it will be all right." But Dr. Jameson never heard to the con- trary from Mr. Rhodes either that night or the next. Is this consistent with Mr. Rhodes's alleged anxiety to stop the Raid ? He had another chance to stop the Raid the next day—i.e., on December 29th—for on the morning of that day Dr. Jameson wired to Dr. Harris at Cape Town that he was leaving that night. Mr. Rhodes did not even then wire a peremptory order to delay. Lastly, when Dr. Jameson had ridden in, Mr. Rhodes did not take any proper steps to stop him. A mild stopping telegram was drafted, and as long as there was no telegraphic communication open with Dr. Jameson this telegram was sent periodically to the post-office to be transmitted. The moment, however, that the telegraph-wires were restored the telegram in question ceased to make its visits to the post-office. Send this telegram as long as it cannot be got through,' seems to have been in effect Mr. Rhodes's order. Mr. Stead ex- plains the fact that Mr. Rhodes did not answer the 'unless I hear to the contrary' telegram by saying that Mr. Rhodes regarded his previous " Ichabod " telegram—which, how- ever, contained no peremptory order to stop—as final. But we do not desire to be drawn into a rediscussion of the Raid telegrams. We cannot, however, leave Mr. Stead's book without saying a word as to the unfairness, not to say the bad taste, of mixing up fact and fiction in the way he does. A serious issue is involved, and there- fore the treatment should be serious. The book suggests a great deal more than it says, and its vagueness and want of definiteness are most marked. Hints are not a fair way of conducting a political controversy of this kind. The truth is, Mr. Stead is overborne by his worship of Mn. Rhodes, and is as unfair as a fond grandmother when her youngest grandchild is concerned. When her darling gets into a mess and cuts a discreditable figure she is always sure that it was really the fault of that other boy. The fact that the other boy did not come to grief or get into disgrace is only a sign of his exceeding wickedness, and the old lady is determined that if her dear one is to be punished, that good-for-nothing wretch whom she has never liked' shall suffer too. But un- fortunately for fond grandmothers, schools and com- munities cannot be governed on this principle. It may be very unpleasant to Mr. Stead to see Mr. Rhodes in danger of disgrace and Mr. Chamberlain standing clear, but we fear there is no help for it. His efforts to show that Mr. Chamberlain was every bit as bad as the other boy will fail because they are based upon a foundation of paradoxes and not of facts.
Before we leave the subject of the Transvaal we must say once more what we have said on previous occasions,— namely, that our sympathies are, and were, with the Out- landers. Their grievances were, and still are, sufficient to cause the gravest discontent on the part of those who endure them. No one could have blamed the Out- landers if they had risen. But they did not rise, and, this being so, we cannot but blame those who attempted from outside to procure a revolution. Who can doubt that if there had been no Raid the Outlanders would by this time have received the vote ? Had they been allowed to organise quietly, to petition the Cape Government for aid, and to demand justice from the suzerain Power, it is practically certain that the Boer minority would have yielded. As it is, the locus standi for interfering to help the Outlanders has been taken away from the Colonial Office. Such has been the result of Mr. Rhodes's policy in the Transvaal. Add to it the rising in Matabeleland and the waste and misery it has occasioned, and then strike a balance between these blunders and Mr. Rhodes's success, his occupation of the Chartered Company's territory—remember it is only occupation, the title was secured not by Mr. Rhodes but by the action of our Foreign Office in declaring certain districts to be within our sphere of influence—and if we mistake not, the balance will be heavily against Mr. Rhodes. The great need of South Africa is federation. But Mr. Rhodes dealt the cause of federation a deadly blow when he and his millionaire friends attempted to rush a revolution in Johannesburg.
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