GENERAL BAKER'S WAR IN BULGARIA.*

THE title of this book has the undeniable .merit of strictly indicating the nature of its contents, but a large number of the personal experiences which the book itself records are un- fortunately of the kind which, by a remorseless law, speedy oblivion marks for her own. Unfortunately, too, General Baker wields a pen which is far less graphic than his brother's, and his personal experiences are not set off with any of those literary graces which lend such a charm to the narrative of insignificant events in Bothen. But General Baker is a thorough master of the principal topic on which he treats, and what he sees clearly himself he has the power of making his readers also see clearly. This faculty is rarer than might be expected, and quite exempts this book from the common roll of travellers' note-books. We must, however, from a literary point of view, notice the fact that it is very hastily and inartisti- cally put together; and we must admit that in spite of the clearness of General Baker's expositions, it is not easy to follow his narrative, unless the reader be more than usually strenuous and painstaking. Unless, too, the said reader be fond of consulting and studying maps, he will derive very little instruction, or, we may add, even amusement, from this book. If, on the contrary, he is strenuous, and is fond of military geography, we can promise him a rare treat in the capital description which General Baker has written of the important combat of Tashkessen. The combat itself was a little masterpiece of tactical and strategical skill, and may rank with the very best things of a similar kind in the Anaba81.9. The description—as modest and simple as those of Xeno I

Non,— is almost as good as the combat, but unless the reader will take the trouble to use attentively the excellent map which accom- panies this description, he will lose nearly all that gives it in- terest. If, however, he has taken that trouble, he will probably agree with us that the manoeuvres which promised the result anticipated in the passage that we are about to quote, were as clever, to compare small things with great, as the manoeuvres which secured success to the world-famous conquerors of Gamine and Lenthen

* War in Bulgaria : a Narrative of Personal Experiences. By Lieutenant-General Valentine Baker PaMa. London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle, and Rivington.

"The Russians bad already made two fatal mistakes, which, great as were the odds against us, gave me much hope. Firstly, instead of marching against Acha Kamarli, they were simply outflanking us, both right and left. Secondly, those outflanking movements were being made against my false, and not against my real position. It seemed likely, therefore, that instead of benefiting by their immensely superior numbers to penetrate the mountain range on either flank, both dial- Tons would close in upon our first position, after we had abandoned it, and would then find themselves massed and disordered in front of the main crest."

The result was not actually obtained, owing to the mis- behaviour of some of Baker's troops ; but the way in which he held his own with 3,000 men, of whom only a third were really trustworthy, against nearly 40,000 of the best troops of Russia, marks the combat of Tashkesson as one of the most brilliant feats of minor warfare that have ever been performed, and fills us with an abiding sense of disgust that the very able officer who gained it should have been lost, through his own bad con- duct, to the British Army. One criticism, or question rather, we must not omit, and that is, whether General Baker was quite in a position to judge accurately of the motives which led the force which so enormously outnumbered him at Tashkessen to act as it did? It does not, of course, detract one whit from the brilliance of his own exploit that the Russian commanders may have been not acting without excuse for the movements which he so sharply, and of course so correctly, stigmatises as

blunders ; but we cannot help feeling a wish to read their account of the affair.

It is not, however, to General Baker's judgments on his enemy's mistakes that the reader who is anxious to profit by this work will turn most readily. In the nature of things, it lies that all

such judgments must be more or less one-sided. But as a thoroughly competent soldier, and a stout philo-Turk, General Baker appears as a most unexceptionable authority on the Causes of the collapse of the Ottoman Army. We do not, how-

ever, mean to hint even that the General is mistaken in his estimate of the Russians, and as far as their cavalry, at all events, is concerned, his bitter and contemptuous criticisms are not at variance with the reputation which sticks to that portion of the soldiery of Europe. Roughly speaking, the regular Russian cavalry have hitherto not won their spurs on any large theatre of war, although, as all the world admits, their infantry is magnificent. As to their irre- gular cavalry, the Cossacks, they had already, before the publication of this book, lost all the pseudo-glory which they acquired so cheaply in the days of the First Napoleon's down- fall ; and we may notice the fact that General Baker has no good opinion of Turkey's irregular cavalry, the Circassiaus. But of the Turkish infantryhe speaks as highly as their warmest admirers could desire, and as the quotation that we are about to make is corroborated repeatedly by facts narrated in this book, and as it in fact contains the gist of the book as regards the crying evil which vitiated, as it has always, during the last two centuries vitiated, the military system of Turkey, we need make no apology for its length. It is as follows :—

" Why is it that, in modern military history, Turkish campaigns have over presented so many instances of jealousy, incapacity, con. ruption, or treachery ? Look at the Turkish private. Where will you find a grander specimen of a man P He unites in his person every military virtue. Brave, patient, and enduring ; sober and tem- perate; ready to fight and die upon a crust of bread and a draught of water ; a first-rate marcher, and innately possessing that grand instinct of military intelligence and battle-power which, well organised and employed, so surely leads to victory. He is the very typo of an ideal soldier. Why do we so often find the reverse of the picture in has commander ? There can be little doubt that it results from the deteriorating influences of the usual routine of Turkish official life amongst the better classes. A most intelligent Turkish officer, holding a high official position, accounted to me for the evil as follows In Turkey there exists ne aristocracy, pro- perly so called, which may show an example of honour and honesty to those immediately below them. For this, to a con- siderable extent, the social system is to be blamed. But we must seek further than this want of an aristocracy amongst the better classes for that general system of corruption which is the bane of official life and of all prosperity. This kills the patriotic feeling 'Which alone can long sustain the existence of a nation in times of trial, and utterly debases the whole fabric of social organisation. For the origin of the evil, we must look to the constant system of change in official positions which seems to have become almost inherent in Turkish government, and to the system of protection which will so constantly raise people of low and often menial position to the highest offices of the State. The result is that men who have no fortunes of their own, and whose tenure of office is likely to be limited, seek to wake the most of their opportunities by rapid and wholesale robbery. from this springs a system of bribery, extortion, and general comp- .ion. Every man is trying to jostle his neighbour out of some post, in order that he may secure it, either for himself or for a friend who may be useful. The State is a bad paymaster, yet rapid fortunes must be made. This once- accomplished, and the power to bribe being available, the official may rest pretty well assured that, even if reverses come upon him, he will not long be loft out in the cold. The result is intense jealousy, distrust, and intrigue ! No one unacquainted with Turkish life can believe the extent to which this jealousy is prevalent, nor how the desire to oust seine rival from his position seems to be the all-absorbing idea of nine out of ten Turkish officials. The canker extends to the Army, more especially in the higher ranks, and it is to this that we must trace the conduct of Suleiman in the late campaign, as well as most of the disasters that have befallen the Turkish arms in previous ones."

Suleiman, we may add, is General Baker's InIto noire, and there certainly seems to be good grounds for believing that in the case of this impracticable blunderer, the devil is quite as black as he is painted.

Another burning error which appears to have had a specially evil influence on the arms of Turkey was the mania of the superior officers and Government for dispersion, a mania still blinder and sillier than that which rendered the old Austrian Marshals and the Aulic Council at Vienna so unequal a match for the concentrating energy of Napoleon :—

"Soon after my arrival at Constantinople (after the fall of Mehemet Ali Pasha), ' I found,' says General Baker, that the same fault of dispersion of force, which so strongly characterised the dispositions of all the Turkish Generals, was just as apparent amongst the Turkish officials. When I urged that good battalions should be with- drawn from in front of Montenegro, I was met by the reply, But the Montenegrins might burn the frontier villages.' 'If you lose Plevna,' I replied, 'you may lose the whole Empire. Which is the more important, it, or a frontier village P ' But all my arguments were thrown away. They had but one idea—to be strong everywhere, and to guard everything. As a natural consequence, the Turkish Army was scattered and weak at every objective point."

The concluding chapters of the second volume are full of

interesting and suggestive remarks, and, with one exception, the political "Conclusion," deserve and will repay the attentive study which is hardly likely to be given to the merely personal

experiences of the author. Some of the questions which General Baker discusses in these chapters cannot fail to arrest the attention eveu of the civilian reader. In view of the area for its exploits which appears to be opening in every quarter for the British Army, it can remain a question of indifference to no thoughtful Englishmen how that army may be best and most quickly put upon an effective footing. General Baker thinks that the rough-and- ready way in which Turkey, crippled as she was in her finances, was able suddenly to place 800,000 men on foot at only sht notice, armed to the best of modern guns and small- arms, and capable of moving at any instant to almost any point that might be required, is the outcome of what he calls "the practical and common-sense system which is adopted by the Ottoman armies." He thinks that England might copy

much of this system with advantage. We doubt it gravely, and we express our doubts with more confidence, because it is precisely on statements made in General Baker's book that those doubts are founded. From first to last, we find it teeming with evidence of the radical unfitness of untrained troops to take the field against regulars. But this is one of the common-places of military history, and we need not insist. We are more impressed by the utter failure of the Staff College in Constantinople to produce anything in the shape of even respectable officers. Nearer home than Constan- tinople, men are beginning to doubt whether technical and scientific knowledge acquired from books is worth RO much as it has been thought to be. But this consideration is one which has been long debated. Readers of Sanest will remember the fierce contempt which Marius poured on the prceposteri bowlines who hoped to supply their luck of what we should call regi- mental experience, by studying Greek (or as we might say, (ier- man) books on tactics and strategy. And no doubt the Turkish staff officers, as described by General Baker, were little better than the frivolous" swells" whom Sallust scoffed at. But to tell the truth, there is no royal road by which a nation can find out its heaven-born Generals before-hand. The real man will come to the front in time, and sooner or later, though far more often later,

the Napoleon or Wellington of the hour finds his proper place. The unfortunate peculiarity of Turkey seems to be that she pos- sesses the secret of keeping her best men always back. Carthage had the same unenviable privilege, till the House of Barca broke the spell ; and till some warlike genius arises in Turkey who shall topple the whole miserable system to the ground, we doubt, for our own parts, whether any scheme of reformation will succeed. There are diseases where certain remedies are most useful, if they follow others of a searching, drastic nature. But apply remedy number two before remedy number one has been vigorously used, and you do but film over the ulcerous sore. We have no space left to notice the suggestions which General Baker makes with regard to the use of pack-horses for the supply of ammu- nition, of massing artillery, of mounted riflemen, and many other kindred topics. It will be enough to say that on all these points General Baker has knowledge to communicate which is well worth acquiring, and that he communicates his knowledge in a plain, straightforward, and soldier-like way, which deserves to be praised very highly. We have much pleasure, therefore, in recommending his work to all military students ; and a great many students who are not military, will find their account in reading and pondering the lessons which it teaches.