THE ANSWER TO THE GERMAN CASE.
WE shall be told, of course, that all we have said in the preceding article is pure conjecture, if not, indeed, a gross libel upon the statesmen who rule Germany. In defence of our view let us point to one or two plain facts. The present Government have been in office for over five years. They came in not only determined to put an end to our rivalry with Germany, but fully convinced that Germany had not been properly handled in the past., and that they could come to an understanding with her. What has been the result? Relations with Germany, instead of becoming better, have, as the .Daily Chronicle says, steadily got worse. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman(s policy simply led to a tremendous increase of German activity in ship- building. Germany seized the opportunity offered by his policy of stopping our shipbuilding to prove that we were in earnest to " rush " her own programme. Meantime the better kind of public opinion in Germany was exasperated, and, as we have always held, not unnaturally, by the (in effect) dictatorial and interfering tone of those who conducted the campaign for the limitation of armaments. In brief, the present Government have sincerely tried to get on better terms with Germany, have had plenty of opportunities for doing so, have used those opportunities to the full, and yet have failed completely. That is a fact, and a fact of immense siknificance. The explanation is that there was no making terms with Germany except at the price of our entering the sphere of German influence, moving in her orbit, and desertine. France and Russia. Another illustration of these general considerations is the case of Sir Edward Grey. If ever there was a man who loved peace, if ever there was a man who was not bound by rigid diplomatic conventions and traditions, if ever there was a man who went to the Foreign Office with his mind unclouded by prejudice, if ever there was a man who was not awed by rumour or excited by talk of war, or, lastly, if ever there was a man who was not liable to be led by his subordinates, that man was Sir Edward Grey. Yet Sir Edward Grey, it is clear from his public utterances and actions, and still more from the things which he has not said and not done, though we know he would have liked to say and to do them if he could, has shown that it is impossible to come to an understanding with Germany except on the impossible lines which we have indicated. To think that the amateur journalistic diplomat is going to succeed where Sir Edward Grey has 'failed would be laughable were it not so tragically naïve. We know very well that it is now the fashion to say that Sir Edward Grey has proved a disappointment, and for members of his party to assert that be is unfortunately not the earnest Radical they once took him for ; but this is a pure delusion. Sir Edward Grey remains quite as strong a Radical as he ever was. But the force of circumstances has obliged him to take—though, we feel quite sure, very reluctantly—the line he has taken in foreign affairs. What is even more important is that circumstances have obliged the Prime Minister and his colleagues to back him up, for there has never been any suggestion that the Cabinet have been dissatisfied with Sir Edward Grey's conduct of foreign affairs, or believed that he could have done better if he had been more Germanophil. They know that if Sir Edward Grey cannot be reckoned as a Gerrnanophil, it is only because the men who control German policy have not allowed him the possibility of being so.
Let us look further at the facts. The able Germans to whom is entrusted the task of talking to our Radicals tell them in plain terms that Germany is a. long-suffering and much-enduring Power whose patience is well-nigh exhausted owing to the arrogant, suspicious, and unfriendly action of the British Foreign Office and British diplomats. We would ask our Radical readers when they hear such talk to think of the facts. IT this were true, and if our Foreign Office really acted as a kind of agent-provocateur, is it likely that we should have adopted the attitude which we adopted at the Algeciras Conference ? There we told France, no doubt, that we should stand by her if necessary, but at the same time we did everything we could to urge upon her not to stand on a punctilio or to show wounded amour propre, but to come to reasonable terms with Germany. In the same way, when Russia was threatened by Germany and Austria, when, in the Emperor's own words, Germany in "shining armour" stood by the side of Austria and in effect told the Russians that if they did not agree with Austria German troops would enter Poland within twenty-four hours, was the part we played that of an enemy of peace ? It is common knowledge that, though we were ready to stand by our allies, we did our best to make it easy, not hard, for Russia to yield. If these facts are disputed, there is one more test of the peaceful and sound character of our diplomacy which, in our opinion, is conclusive. Italy is bound to England by the strongest ties of traditional friendship, and for naval reasons, which we need not go into now, is peculiarly susceptible to British influence. We can hardly doubt, indeed, that if we liked to play an aggressive and Machiavellian part in diplomacy, we could do a good deal to force Italy out of the Triple Alliance or to undermine her position there. It is notorious, however, that we have never attempted to play any part of this kind, and have never thought of saying to Italy that she must make up her mind whether she will be friendly with us or with Germany, as she cannot be friendly with both. On the contrary, we have helped to make it easier for Italy to remain in the Triple Alliance, bolding that our object was not in any sense to hem Germany in, but merely to take precautions against the establishment of German domination. When the Emperor of Russia paid his sensational visit to the King of Italy, our influence was thrown, not in favour of break- ing up the Triple Alliance, but of maintaining the status quo. Again, we have never shown the slightest jealousy or dislike of an improvement in the relations between Russia and. Germany, but have welcomed such diplomatic changes as tending towards peace. For example, the Potsdam visit has not caused annoyance in our Foreign Office, but rather satisfaction. The better Russia and Germany can agree, the better satisfied we shall be, because such agreement will make for peace. In truth, our consciences are absolutely clear. Our Foreign Office and our diplomats, though vigilant to protect our interests and to prevent anything which might be called bad faith towards Russia and France, have invariably worked for peace and against war, and have never attempted to do anything which could be regarded as hemming Germany in,—unless of course keeping faith with France and Russia and protecting ourselves may be so described. Our action can only be described as hemming in if the action of the lamb in drinking below where the wolf drank could. be called fouling the water and. making it undrinkable for the wolf.
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