THE RESULTS OF A REVERSE IN CHINA.
WE all think, or rather assume without much think- ing, that this march of Europe and Japan upon Pekin 'will be a successful operation. As soon as fifty thousand men are collected, it is said, with their transport and supplies, Tientsin will be "relieved," that is, the force besieging it will be driven away, and with that city as base the distance the international army has to traverse is only .seventy miles. It is true there is no railway, and there will be .many. trenches, and possibly many daring efforts to intercept supplies, but still a European army with its impedimenta,can do ten miles a day, Pekin was not fortified to defy a modern siege train, and within a fortnight of leaving Tientsin the European Generalissimo ought to be in possession of the Chinese capital. That is a reason- able forecast. in accord with the result of the Japanese invasion and the history of all collisions between Europe and China, and it w:11 in all human probability be justified by events. 3ut suppose for a moment, as there is a pause while the troops are collecting, that Europe is mis- taken, that the army fails to reach Pekin, or, arriving there, finds nothing but the smouldering ruins of the Imperial city, what will happen then ? It is at least possible that the Chinese, full of suspicion, believing heir Empire the greatest prize on earth, and aware from the talk of Europeans that they have offended beyond forgiveness, may see in the invasion a deliberate attempt to conquer China, and having good arms, may defend themselves inch by inch with a fury and a self- sacrifice of which we have as yet had in Asia no modern experience. They may fight everywhere, as they do at Tientsin. They may be aided by disease, by divided counsels among the cosmopolitan invaders, by a murrain among the beasts of transport, or, in short, by any one of the accidents to which armies have occasionally been liable, and after a month of incessant losses and disappointments the allies may reappear at Tientsin a beaten army. The first result of such an occurrence, most improbable, but still within the range of human prevision—it occurred often enough to Roman armies in Asia—would be that all China, gratified to the very bone in its pride, and once more confident in its civilisation, would prepare for resistance under a general who, having defeated the detested foreigner, would be master of the Empire, and would organise as soldiers the million and a half of ruffians who in China under various names are subjected to military law. The next consequence would be that Europe would lose heart for the general enter- prise, each people either abandoning it as too difficult and costly, or insisting that it would act for itself and keep such prizes as it might win. The Armies of Europe being conscript Armies, and their Treasuries just now fully taxed, that separate action might be exceedingly difficult, jealousies might produce wars, or other events not now foreseen—such as an explosion in Turkey, a mutiny in India—or a demonstration against the novel cost and new horrors of the military system might arrest the prodigious effort which in such circumstances the conquest of China would require. Europe might draw back and leave China once more to work out its own destiny. What then would the Chinese try to do ?
If still an Empire, which is the most probable forecast, the men who had defeated Europe possessing force suffi- cient to put down any local movement, it can hardly be doubted that the rulers of China would try to make two ideas the bases of their future policy,—the ideas of militarism and exclusivism. They could not forget the lesson they had learned that a defenceless nation is a nation which may become a prey. They would dread Japan, dread. Russia, dread Great Britain, and, moreover, would want to assert themselves against the disintegrating tendencies to which war would have given birth. They would undoubtedly strive to organise as powerful an Army as they could ; and as conscription is a recognised idea, as their people, seeing them victorious, would obey, as they could import all weapons they require, and as Asiatics can make armies—who else made the Japanese or the Turkish ?—they might make a very powerful one indeed. Great is science, and German soldiers are devoted, but even a German army would hesitate to rush on two millions of riflemen indifferent to life, and com- pletely masters of the use of the spade. The mere exist- ence of such an army, the mere possibility of its overflow- ing bounds, would deprive Europe of all power of dictation, and compel three Powers at least, Russia, France, and Great Britain, to take very large and very expensive precautions. Russia is well aware of her danger ; France, mindful of Jules Ferry. never forgets hers ; and Great Britain, if ever she ceases to regard China as a negligible quantity, will wake with a start to the perception that India is more vulnerable on the East than on the North, that three great armies could pour at once through Nepal, Sikkim, and Bootan, and that with a Chinese foot once upon the ricefields of Bengal her Indian Treasury would be bankrupt. A Chinese Government of any real strength would be a most formidable menace to civilisation, and would use its powers unhesitatingly to secure its own objects. The first of those objects would be isolation. They could hardly forbid intercourse with Europe altogether as the Japanese did, for they would want military supplies, but they would limit it to the utmost, reduce Treaty Ports to two, tax imports exactly as they pleased, and compel Europe to surrender the Capitulations, which have already been surrendered in Japan. China, in short, would be a closed market except for the Japanese, who can supply everything, even munitions, just as well as Europe. The officials would always be tyrannical and corrupt, the few Europeans remaining always plaintive, and the European Governments always hesitating between rage at the affronts put upon them and dread of beginning a war in which, as experience would have warned them, they could not hope to win. In the end it is probable that each affronted country would wage war on its own account, and aided by a superiority at sea which the Chinese can never overcome, would succeed in seizing small points d'appui where their traders would be safe ; that is, in precisely repeating the conditions which at this moment exist.
That is not a prospect, it will be conceded, to excite enthusiasm, yet it is a prospect which may be realised if the international force suffers a great defeat, or if, arriving victorious at Pekin, it finds that Pekin has sunk to be the capital of Pechili. Europe, in fact, is bound under heavy penalties to win in this new Crusade, and to win she must cease to be im- patient. The work is not to be done in one mad rush. The invading force must be adequate, with a large allow- ance for deaths from disease, must not be cut from its base even for a day, must be fully supplied with muni- tions, commissariat, and even water, and must above all have adequate means of transport in a country where all kinds of forage will be burnt as it advances. What does it matter to a Chinese general if, in order to delay an enemy twelve hours, he has to desolate a county ? Above all, the army must have a resourceful general, who can use the different military qualities of six nations, who will not be perplexed if nothing in his force is interchangeable except the men, and who, above all, will understand that he has Chinese vanity to fear even more than Chinese valour. With courage, patience, and caution the work may be done, but it will not be done if the newspapers of Europe are incessantly lashing the generals to more speed, and if it fails to be done the consequences will affect more than one generation.
Previous page
