THE VISIT OF THE AMIR TO INDIA.
THE Afghan policy of the British Government has long been a settled thing. Afghanistan is a buffer-State, and. it is worth while to realise what this term implies. It is not a feudatory State, it is not in the ordinary sense a protected State, and it is not, though in alliance with Britain, under the suzerainty of the British Raj. It is a buffer between two great and potentially hostile Powers, • and the first desideratum of a buffer is that it should be strong and independent. Our interest is therefore to see that Afghanistan remains a free country, and, if possible, • a prosperous country, for nothing impairs independence so .readily as poverty. She must be a country without foreign • relations, and the protective and exclusive tendency of all Oriental despotisms makes in her case for the peace of the world. If a State is to be a buffer, it cannot be allowed to become a thoroughfare. No one can enter Afghanistan without the permission of her Government, and by Afghan law no subject can leave the territory without a permit. The trade which enters her borders on the North and leaves them on the South is jealously supervised. The country, therefore, stands on an artificial basis, being to all intents neutralised for international purposes. British policy towards it has a twofold aspect. It must prevent any political interference by Persia or Russia, and it must abstain from any appear- ance of dictation or influence on the part of India. Our relations with the Court of the Amir are governed, how- ever, not only by these obvious needs of general policy, but by certain specific Treaty terms. Abdurrahman entered into a contract with Britain under which he undertook to have no dealings with Russia or Persia, save through the medium of the Indian Government. He undertook, also, to use his army, if occasion arose, to safeguard the northern frontier of India from invasion. In return he received a certain yearly subsidy, and various con- cessions which depended on the fact that the way from Afghanistan to the sea lies through Indian terri- tory, such as the right to the unlimited importation of arms. This Treaty remains, for it was the sole achieve- ment of the Dane Mission to Kabul that the engagements entered into with Abdurrahma.n were renewed with his successor. Habib Ullah was allowed to draw the arrears of the annual subsidies which had been accumulating since his father's death, and the independence of Afghanistan received new recognition in the title by which the Amir was described in the document: "Independent King of the State of Afghanistan and its Dependencies."
But the value of such an arrangement depends upon the spirit in which it is carried out. Afghanistan is a protec- tion instead of a menace to India only so long as her ruler is well disposed to us and clearly alive to his real interests. To all those, therefore, who are attracted by frontier questions the announcement that the Amir had cordially accepted the invitation of the Indian Government to visit the country during the coming winter is full of significance. The visit will probably be fixed for December, though neither date nor place is yet finally settled. It is highly important, if the two countries are to work together harmoniously, that their rulers should get into personal touch. An untravelled Amir is not likely to realise the power of Britain when he pictures Calcutta as another Kabul and the Indian Army as something not unlike his own forces. It was the visit of Abdurrahman to Rawal Pindi in 1885 which determined the policy of Afghanistan to-day. It has been officially announced that the coining visit is not of a political but of a friendly character, and this is as it should be. Our Afghan policy does not need revision ; what is needed is that the new Amir should appreciate the meaning of the alliance into which his father entered. Hitherto there have been signs that he was not disposed in all things to follow in his father's footsteps. After his accession in 1901 he showed a tendency to fall into the hands of the Mullahs, and to send haughty and capricious replies to the communications of the Government of India,. His more politic and master- ful brother, Nasr Ullah Khan, is believed to have exerted his influence to keep him frora any conspicuous act of folly ; but the attitude of his Government at first, while formally correct, cannot be said to have been friendly. In those early years it will be remembered that Russia made certain attempts to open up political negotiations with the Amir on her own account but Habib Illlah had the qualities of his defects, and his dislike of foreign influence —as great as that of his father—rendered such efforts abortive. The Government of India, anxious to set matters straight, invited him more than once to visit the Viceroy; but the Amir showed no intention of accepting. One excuse after another was found, and his son, Inayat Ullah Khan, was despatched in his place. Finally, Mr. Brodrick tried the experiment, scarcely consistent with British dignity, of sending the mountain to Mohammed. The Dane Expedition, as we have said, effected nothing beyond a ratification of the original Treaty. Habib Ulla,h had certainly cause to congratulate himself on the success of his policy of passive resistance.
What has wrought the change in his attitude ? Partly, perhaps, the influence of his son, whose tour in India was an unqualified success ; but mainly, we think, because, with the traditional shrewdness of his house, he has analysed his position, and is beginning to see where his advantage lies. The lessons of the Russo-Japanese War have been slow in penetrating to the minds of Oriental statesmen. At first they seemed to point only to the possible superiority of East to West. In Afghanistan, we are informed, the argument ran thus :—" We have in times past beaten the British, whom the Japanese apparently fear, because they court them as allies. Therefore we must be superior to the Japanese." But reasoning based on Maiwand and on the motives of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance could not bear examina- tion, more especially as fuller accounts made clear the reason of the Japanese triumph. Habib Ullah, retaining his old desire for an exclusion of all foreign influence, may well have come to see that there were better means of attaining it than a sulky refractoriness. He may have seen, too, that the privileged position of Afghanistan as the mistress courted by two jealous suitors was for the moment gone. Russia's de'bticle in the Far East and her preoccupation with revolution at home have postponed her forward policy in Central Asia in all likelihood for a generation. When Abdurrahman met Lord Dufferin in 1885 there were dark clouds threatening in the North, and the friendliness of Afghanistan was something worth great sacrifices to obtain. Even in 1902, with Russia intact and Britain wearied by a long war, the overtures made from the North to Habib Ullah might well have caused uneasiness to the British Cabinet. But to-day such overtures are impossible, and if they were possible, they would be meaningless. The Amir is no longer the keeper of the gates through which a hostile army might descend to the plains of India. Russian influence in Afghanistan is no longer something fraught with infinite possibilities of danger, and to be averted at all costs. The materials for bargaining which Abdurrahman held are lost, for the present at all events, to his son. It is our interest to keep Afghanistan a strong, independent buffer-State ; but it is also her interest to assist us in our policy, for her traditional aims can only be realised through our assistance. Because we believe that the interests of the two peoples are one, we welcome any incident which may smooth the path for harmonious co-operation, and we trust that the coming visit of the Amir will lay the foundations of a friendliness as real as that of his father.
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