A PERIOD OF HESITANCY.
' There would seem, thereto*, to be at least two reasons for ,anticipatiUg that some time. must elapse before the • monetary situation can- become normal. If, on the one band, the monetary authorities in New York should either he Unwilling or unable to bring sufficient pressure to effect a reduction in speculative demands for capital, then there is the prospect of a further rise in Stock Market values with a continuance of high money rates in New York, a disinclination on the part of that centre to lend abroad, and a time of strain at this and other mone- tary centres. If, on the other hand, the Federal Reserve - Board should succeed in effecting a really material reduc- tion in the speculative position in Wall Street, there might quite well be a reaction a few months later to very Much easier monetary conditions; but in that case there might also be considerable temporary disturbances re- sulting from a further decline in Stock Exchange values. it is not surprising, therefore, that the general disposition on this side of the Atlantic should be to restrict commit- ments on the Stock Exchange to the minimum awaiting further developments.
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