TOPICS OF THE DAY.
OUR PROGRESS IN ABYSSINIA.
RF1 ALTA' it is possible to carry our national habit of self- depreciation just a little too far. It is a very useful and moral habit, doubtless, tending to extinguish vainglory and develop a kind of energetic sullenness which is, perhaps, the most dangerous mood into which Englishmen or Ameri- cans can be thrown ; but it is not needful to carry it so far as to take the heart out of our own agents ; and this is what we are just now doing, both at home and in Abyssinia. It is not inspiriting either for the India House, which, in its some- what cumbrous way, is doing its best ; or for Sir Robert Napier, who has worked for three months like a slave, or a sugar-baker, or a great conveyancer, to make his arrangements perfect ; or for the soldiers, just going into action, to hear in all letters from home that the opinion which is to them as fate has already condemned the Expedition as slow, cumbrous, and over-cautious. That is the opinion more or less loudly uttered in every place of public resort, and it may be a per- fectly true one; but we wish moderate men, before they accept it, would consider a few facts. It is said on every hand that the Army despatched is, for the object we seek, or profess to seek, very much too large ; and that is true, provided the nation was prepared to run the risk of failure, to pardon a possible misfortune in consideration of the chance of an equally possible speedy and cheap success. If it was pre- pared to risk, say, three thousand men and a million without caring too much if it lost them both, then, no doubt, the ex- periment of conquering Abyssinia with a rush might reason- ably have been made. We do not believe it was so prepared. It is one of the evils or the blessings of the sovereignty of opinion in this country that officials are not permitted to fail, not allowed to run great risks, not empowered to play with British soldiers as if they were dice in a mighty game. The Government was bound by the conditions of the Parliamentary regime to make failure as impossible as it can be made in any human enterprise, and was compelled to make every arrange- ment subordinate to that primary condition. It had, therefore, to consider what number of men would place the Expedition beyond risk, and into this consideration entered some elements which seem to be almost forgotten by its critics. It would be necessary to hold and garrison a port upon the coast with a force sufficient to protect the first depots from any sadden attack from the interior. If this were not done, the Army in its march into the interior might be cut off from its true base —the sea—a blunder against which Sir H. Durand earnestly protested in advance. The distance to be traversed being nearly 400 miles, it would also be necessary to form at least two, and probably three stations, posts, or camps, call them what you like, so as to keep the ,communications between the advancing force and the coast tolerably free. Unless this were done any hostile chief might, by throwing four or five thousand mountaineers on to the line behind us, compel the brigade in front, on the slightest failure of water, food, or ammunition, to fall back, fighting the whole way. That fighting might not be serious, but it also might be, and Indian experience of mountain warfare among tribes as savage as the fighting clans of Abyssinia is not such as to lead Indians to despise the risk. There are men in the Army who can tell very ugly stories indeed of the scene which occurs on such occasions, more especially when the sepoys, awed by the mountains even more than by the enemy, begin to lose discipline and heart. Then it was needful, as we pointed out months since, to provide a reserve, and this reserve must either have been kept rather too far off in Bombay, or in the torrid dreariness of Aden, where the canton- ments, large as they are, can easily be filled, and where food and water are only procurable in detail, or on the healthy plateau of Abyssinia itself. The latter course was adopted, we think, wisely, even had there been no latent political reason for a concentration of force such as recent telegrams reveal. The policy of the Egyptian Pasha is by no means quite so clear as it might be ; he has certain rights in Massowah, and is suspected of certain hankerings, and as his intervention may alter the whole character of the war, may reunite all Abyssinia into a hostile and patriotic force, it was, to say the least of it, advisable to be strong. Pashas under French guidance are not given to overmuch respect for " moral force," and Mohammedan fatalists have still a linger- ing belief that right is on the side of the big battalions. Finally, it was needful to provide a flying brigade able to move
swiftly, to dispense in great measure with communications,— that is, to carry everything with it, from cannon-balls to spirit casks,—aud yet strong enough not to invite attack among the hills. There were, therefore, four separate tasks to be per- formed, the occupation of a port, the formation of a post on the first plateau capable of holding a strong reserve, the hold- ing of a post on the second plateau with some sort of free communication with the reserve, and the detachment of a flying brigade. Each of these tasks required soldiers of all three arms and of both races, each corps must be provided with hospitals, sappers, and transport, and each must have its stores. We talk of a flying brigade as if it consisted, like a. Volunteer regiment, of soldiers alone ; but the swiftest force engaged in a hostile, or unknown, or thinly peopled country must carry ammunition and bread, medicines and spirits, and forage for the beasts which are to carry those necessaries, or it will never be able to advance. Sick soldiers, wounded soldiers, diseased .camp followers, or footsore grooms cannot be left behind like wounded dogs if the tone of an army is to be preserved. Now, for all these objects, indispensable if failure was to be put out of the question, what is Sir Robert Napier's effective force ?
To occupy the Coast DepOl 1,000 To occupy First Post 2,000 To occupy Second Post and 100 miles of road 3,004 Flying Column 3,000 Reserve 3,000 Total 12,000
It may be necessary to form a third post, and if we remem- ber that every force on paper must be reduced one-third for casualties, we shall perceive that even with the strength at his disposal Sir Robert Napier will have to march a small force, barely 3,000 men, 200 miles at least from its supports, that is, from London to Leeds, through an unknown highland region, to attack a fortress which may be defended with the terrible tenacity of Asiatic despair. To talk of cumbrous- ness under such circumstances, and with the antecedent con- dition that failure is to be impossible, is unjust and dispirit- ing to our servants. We quite admit, and have admitted all through, that it might have been wiser to accept a chance of failure, to give Colonel Merewether half a strong Queen's regiment, 1,000 of his own Beloochees, and a mountain train, and tell him to win a Governorship or a grave, and individually we wish this had been done ; but that policy involved these two risks. The force might have been destroyed to a man, and the United Kingdom would have rung with execrations on the rash folly of the Ministry, which would, moreover, have been compelled to send an " army of vengeance," like that force which once entered Afghanistan, and which left histories there Englishmen would as lief forget. Or Colonel Merewether, who has the Indian instinct for making other men do English work, would have extricated himself by means of auxiliary corps and native alliances, which would have involved our public faith till retirement became impossible. How would the critics have approved of that ? and how would France have approved ? To run these risks or waste money and time by putting failure out of the question were the only alternatives before the Government, and they naturally selected the one which involved the least public outcry.
We do not say, be it understood, that Sir Robert Napier has not allowed his Army to be too much encumbered with camp followers. He may have done so, though there is as yet no proof whatever of the fact. All we can affirm is that 12,000 men were required under the special conditions of the campaign, conditions enforced by English not Indian opinion ; that Sir Robert Napier understands mobilization, that no camp follower can have been received on board ship without his order, and that the heaviest impediment of all, the train of baggage animals, is not one whit too large. People calculate beasts and loads as if the Army were going to march from London to York, forgetting that every General with a head would calculate on losing half his beasts, that there must be reserves of animals as well as men, and that the " local supplies," of which we hear so much, were de- pendent on the temper of the inhabitants. Impressment is possible in some places, but impressment in a mountain re- gion, with a population of about ten to the square mile, would destroy the discipline of any force in the world. It is hard enough in all cases to keep the followers from becoming a horde of brigands, but to give them leave to " bring in" supplies by force is deliberately to make them one. We must accept the drawbacks of our civilization when we are
displaying its strength, and rest content with the knowledge that an unavoidable tardiness and an enforced cumbrousness will not be paid for in national failures, but in national taxes and loans. We may come out of Abyssinia considerably poorer than we went in, but we shall not come out discredited or ridiculous.
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