MEN FOR THE NAVY.
IT is more than prudent, it is absolutely necessary, that we should build more ships for the Navy, and so make our command of the sea unchallengeable. But while we do this, we must never forget that ships without the men to man them are useless. What is the good of ordering twelve new cruisers, as we see has just been done, without also ordering a proper supply of men to put on board them ? This sounds so elementary that one feels almost ashamed to insist upon it. Nevertheless, it is most needful to do so, and for this reason. Our Naval authorities, and that able band of civilians interested in the Navy, which has grown up during the last few years, are at heart always pessimistic about the willingness of the Government and the country to do their duty by the Navy. They are there- fore always trying to make their demands as little formid- able as may be. Hence, they argue, we cannot ask both for more ships and more men. But, they go on, you cannot possibly improvise battleships. They must take two years at least to build. Therefore, if you dare only ask for one half of what you ought to have, the best way is to ask for ships. When you have got them, you may feel that in an emergency you could by great efforts somehow get sailors to man them. They might have to be sent to sea with only half their proper complement of men, and many of these not really efficient, but still they would be English battleships, and of a great deal more use than nothing. In other words, the naval experts, though they are fully aware of the danger of the course, as it were, I throw out the men to the wolves of the Treasury, and in order not to lose the new ships, suppress the need for more sailors. Under these circumstances, it is necessary for I public opinion to be vigilant, and not to assume that because the naval experts are not making any very great clamour about men, therefore it is safe to do nothing. The attitude of " You may be sure that if it was really necessary to take vigorous steps for getting more men, we should hear plenty of howling," is not a safe one for the country to take. It must, in this case, not wait for the howl, which will be suppressed in order not to prejudice the case for the ships, but must invite the advocates of a strong Navy to say frankly what they really want in the way of men.
We are not experts, and do not profess to be able to give a definite answer to the question as to exactly how many more men we want, though we are convinced that we do need a great many more, even if we add nothing more to the Fleet. while if we add more ships without adding more men we shall be simply putting ourselves in the position of a man who buys a whole set of carriages and neglects to provide any horses and coachmen,—that is, in the position of one who wastes his money without excuse. Look at the plain facts of the case. Parliament provides for about 52,000 seamen and petty officers, excluding officers, boys, and marines. Now it is calculated that it we commissioned all our existing battleships we should absorb the whole of these 52,000 men except 12,000. That is, we should only have 12,000 men to man over three hundred cruisers, gunboats, torpedo-destroyers, and all the other craft on which we have spent so much money in building. But the cruisers take quite as many men as the battleships and are quite as important. The idea of 12,000 men to man them alone is utterly ridiculous. We might, with the aid of the Reserve, just manage to man some thirty of them and about seventy gunboats and torpedo-destroyers. That done, we should have the pleasure of seeing some two hundred vessels lying idle and useless in our ports, monuments of our futility and want of common-sense. This is what would happen as things are now. If we add half-a-dozen more battle- ships and ten more cruisers, and thirty or forty more smaller craft, without adding more men, we shall simply be increasing the block of useless ships in our dockyards should war be declared. That this is no wild or sensa- tional talk may be shown by reference to a single fact. When our Fleet was mobilised last year our harbours were full of ships that might have gone to sea but could not because there were no men to put on them. Practically, we had used up all our men, and still had dozens of good ships left over,—of ships, that is, good for service in every way, and not mere survivals from early days. But even this does not disclose the whole weakness of our Navy in the matter of men. Even if we had enough men to man all our ships, and to put them on the sea in case of war, we should not be in a proper position, because we should have no reserve. Considering the loss of men, not only in action but by disease and ordinary causes, you must, unless your war is going to be merely a six weeks' picnic, look forward to your crews gradually shrinking and wasting away. But that shrinking means the need for renewal, and the need for renewal means a force from which renewal can take place. In other words, a reserve for filling up the gaps is absolutely necessary, and that reserve must be of large dimensions. It is no good as at present to have a few thousand men called the Reserve which are not a reserve for the very good reason that they would have, directly war was declared, to be called up and used in the first fighting line. A reserve is a reservoir on which you can draw when your first can gets empty, not merely a little extra bucket which has to be used to fill up the can directly you need it. What is wanted is to give the Admiralty a call upon at least 60,000 or 70,000 sailors.
How this reserve is to be obtained we shall not pretend to decide. No doubt a short-service system would give it us very easily, and no doubt also a short-service system is one very applicable to the Navy because there is little or no difficulty in finding employment for your reserve men. Your reserve soldier knows no trade which will get him a livelihood. Your reserve sailor has learnt one for which there is a brisk demand. At the same time, the long service no doubt gives us a splendid body of men, and we should be loath to see it given up, unless, which we do not believe, there were no other way of getting a sufficient reserve. For ourselves we cannot see why the nation should not get its reserve by undertaking to provide for the technical education of our merchant seamen. There is a general agreement that the manning of our merchant service is a very serious question. The proportion of Englishmen employed in our mercantile marine is con- stantly falling, and altogether we are in by no means a satisfactory position as far as our commercial sailors are concerned. The old system of apprenticeship has broken down, and there is far less encouragement than there ought to be to young Englishmen to take to the sea, and to learn their business. In other words, our supply of English sailors is in danger. This being so, why should not the Government, acting with the municipal County Councils in maritime places, set up training-ships in all our large ports, where boys of fourteen would be received and trained for the mercantile marine ? For the first three years they might be regularly trained in seamanship, and for the next three—i.e., from seventeen till twenty—they might be attached to a man-of-war, there to learn the duties of a bluejacket. At twenty their training would be over, and they would be free to take engagements in the mercantile marine. In consideration, however, of the fact that they had been trained and kept by the Government, they would all be obliged to become members of the Navy Reserve for twenty years, unless, of course, they had bought their discharge therefrom. If we yearly took in and sent out 5,000 boys under this scheme, we should ultimately get a Navy Reserve of, say, 70,000 or 80,000 men. That is, the Admiralty would have the right of call upon a large number of men, all of whom had been trained to the sea from boyhood, and who knew what naval discipline was. No doubt they would not be perfect sailors, but at any rate they would be men who knew what the inside of a battleship was like, and who could be far more easily turned into efficient bluejackets than the ordinary sailor of the mercantile marine. At the same time that we were making provision for war, we should be making provision for peace. The youths thus trained by Government would be an enormous boon to the ship-owners. The training-ships would be every year feeding the mercantile marine with excellent material,- i.e., with well-taught and well-disciplined lads of twenty. Depend upon it, after the machinery had had time to get to work, we should have the great companies attracting passengers by advertising that the crews of their vessels were all Reserve-men. We do not, of course, wish to pledge ourselves to the details of this scheme. We do, however, believe that there is a good deal in it. It does not interfere with the present long-service system, and yet gives us an inscription maritime. At the same time, it makes the State provide for technical education in what is, after all, the most vital trade in the nation, the shipping trade. We ought to teach our lads to be efficient sailors. If we do not, foreign competition will abolish the British sailor. But here is an opportunity to help our mercantile marine with one hand, and with the other to provide for a Naval Reserve.
Previous page
