THE EXPERIMENT OF PANTELLARIA
By STRATEGICUS land. is theoretically a tougher proposition than we may expect to find elsewhere." Another, Mr. E. A. Montague, writes: "Never again shall we encounter anything so easy." This is not the only divergence about the facts of the case, and it was the same with the last phase of the campaign in Tunisia. Before we draw any infer- ences, then, we have to ascertain the facts ; but for my present purposes this is not so difficult as it might seem.
The points which mainly deserve our attention are the strength of the Pantellaria defences and what caused their destruction. It is obvious that behind them is a confused background which must have conditioned the result of the Allied attack, and yet, in spite of its importance, is beyond any analysis that would carry conviction. One element of the background is the morale, and the contempt of the small number of German technicians for the Italian garrison was spparently justified. Mr. Clifford suggests that the island might have been held by really first-rate troops, and he gives- sufficient reason for his opinion. The morale of the garrison collapsed ; and perhaps it might have held out longer, though hardly indefinitely, against the same weight of attack. But the question here turns upon the defences, which, as the same correspondent says, are scarcely likely to be as strong in many places as they were on Pantellaria. Another factor which, similarly, must have conditioned the garrison's defence is that of supplies. The water was not lacking. The pretence that it failed is merely the sort of excuse which Axis commanders invent when they are beaten. They did the same about Tunisia. The question of supplies generally is not so clear. There is a suggestion that supplies, though not short, were precarious ; and, as the island was isolated, that, at least, may be assumed.
In the attack upon these islands, and particularly Pantellaria, the Allies carried out an experiment ; and it is of immense importance to know the result. Air Marshal Tedder said some time ago that the enemy "do not know how to use air-power " ; and here in the Sicilian Channel the Allies had the chance of trying out their theories under ideal conditions. The object of attack was iso:ated by means of naval and air action. It was a tremendously strong position. It was defended by a force reasonable in size. It was presumably adequately supplied. The defence was able to shelter in bomb-proof galleries. This complex offered the conditions for a sort of "class:. room " test. This is the term used by Brigadier-General Norstad, the head of the Operations Section of the Strategical Air Force.
"We knocked out all the gun positions," he says ; and that is the relevant point. There were over 120 coastal guns, ranging in bore from 4-inch to 9-inch, and their emplacements seem to have been as strong as one can easily conceive. Clifford speaks of 25 feet of concrete, and that conjures up a picture of an elaboration which even the Todt organisaticn could hardly have excelled. The opera- tion of dealing with these formidable guns in their amazingly strong emplacements was—to quote Norstad again—"a scientific job done with a slide-rule." The description seems a little exuberant ; but, in the main, it seems that we must accept it at a true version of the facts. But it should be noted at once that if the statement is taken as substantially true, something of definite importance, as having a very wide application, happened at Pantellaria.
In the problem of invasion which we have been considering recently the main obstacle is coastal guns. Nelson said "Three guns in a properly placed, well-constructed battery would beat off or destroy any ship in the world " ; and it is assumed that naval co-operation is essential to successful invasion from the sea. At Pantellaria, in fine, the Allies appear to have discovered a means of dealing with the batteries which forbid naval ships to remain inshore. No one can say how long a time the destruction of the guns occupied ; but the official suggestion is that it was no haphazard, incidental or arm-bombing result, and all that remains to be con- sidered is the factors present at Pantellaria that cannot be expected elsewhere.
The first of these was, of course, the lack of interference from enemy aircraft ; and this was mainly due to the destruction of the airfield on the island. In analysing the Battle of Crete I pointed out that mere space has a role to play in warfare ; and in the present instance it went far to condition the result. It was one of the amazing features of the Battle of Sevastopol that the Russian airfield within the defensive zone was kept in action so long. At Pantellaria the aerodrome had no chance, and with its disappearance as a factor of the defence the problem was considerably simplified.
• In an attempt to apply the lessons of Pantellaria to the mainland or to Sicily this factor of space has to be taken into account. The Allies are at present attempting to put out of action the Sicilia .1 airfields, and unless these can be destroyed the bombers cannot carry out their attack on the coastal defences. Of course, it will be remarked that Pantellaria could have been given fighter cover from Sicily if now we are planning to provide fighter cover over Sicily from Pantellaria. That is undoubtedly true ; but in this matter it seems that the Regia Aeronautica and the Luftwaffe have not yet been persuaded to intervene in strength in defence of any object attacked, from Tunisia to the islands of the Sicilian Channel. But it is very doubtful if they will maintain this Olympian aloofness with regard to the Sicilian aerodromes. If they do, the fate of these airfields will be that of the Pantellaria airfield ; but it may be dragged out much longer, since the Italian mainland could provide other fighter cover against the Allied attack. Sicily, at all events, is a very different problem. It is a large island with good com- munications with the mainland of Italy, well-provisioned, well- organised and well-defended. It is most unlikely that there will be any wavering in the defence, even more unlikely that the Allies imagine it can be brought to surrender by air bombardment alone.
It is a much narrower question that concerns us here. If the Allies are-to invade Sicily, they will presumably try to effect a landing where they can have fighter protection as well as the assist- ance of the various types of bombers ; and although this maps out a rather limited area, there is still the opportunity of tactical surprise. Moreover, the main doubt is whether the air bombardment, with this apparently new and confident precision-attack, can destroy the coastal guns. If that can be achieved, the naval ships will be able to lie inshore and co-operate with the landing troops. That would be no small service, as we know from experience at Dieppe. Even the massive concrete emplacements which have been photographed on the western front, in the endeavour to make invasion seem impossible, should not be able to resist an intensive course of treat- ment such as was meted out to Pantellaria ; and Sicily can hardly be expected to reproduce such an elaboration of guns and emplace- ments as Pantellaria, which was, after all, one of Mussolini's boasted achievements.
If the results of the bombardment of Pantellaria were what they have been claimed to be, even the Channel coast defences would stand little chance, failing mass-intervention by the Luftwaffe. Sooner or later the carefully conserved strength of the Luftwaffe will be engaged ; but Germany's rulers seem strangely reluctant to throw it into battle, and they may remain quiescent too long. The technique of invasion, however, now appears to be taking shape. The creation of a Tactical Air Force for Britain suggests that the last touch of organisation has been given, so that the model achieved in the desert campaign may be followed. The task will be first to destroy the shore defences without hazarding the lives of the ground troops, if possible, and to risk the Air Force as little as may be. Then a breach must be blown through. the defensive positions with guns
and bombs, and then the exploitation must be carried out by similar means.
How easy all this seems. It is indeed fatally easy to write, but it may be terribly difficult and costly to carry out. The one hopeful point is the growing expertiv of the Air Forces. It is, of course, possible that in the particular application I have made of the Pantellaria offensive I have taken published statements over-seriously. Soldiers are not the most precise of writers, and results reported immediately after a battle require a special technique to interpret. Napoleon warns us about that. But it seems to me that an experi- ment was tried out at PanteHada under what one might almost call laboratory conditions—" a classroom classic" the Brigadier called it. If we reduce the claim he made considerably, there is still left a residuum of truth which may represent a leverage against the most intractable obstacle to invasion from the sea. There is enough difficulty left even when that is removed ; but if it could be so easily removed, how much easier would those who have to shape our plans consider the problem. At the very least, it seems we should conclude That we are reaching steadily to higher levels of technical achieve- ment; that, in a word, means the saving of human lives.
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