THE WAR SURVEYED: " THE PROBABLE ACTION OF THE ENEMY"
By STRATEGICL S
HE new rumours about Germany's intentions with re- I gard to Holland and Belgium cannot be dismissed merely as an interesting but unimportant phenomenon. They originated in Germany, and they must have some meaning. Their main basis is the increase in the number of German divisions concentrated against that part of the Dutch frontier which lies south of the Rhine, and the new roads which would facilitate the movement of great forces in that area. These are facts ; and to read them as only another essay in the war of nerves fails to induce conviction. It is, perhaps, easier to dismiss the news which Belgium has received, even if it comes from neutral sources ; since, if Germany really wished to produce a scare, she would inevit- ably contrive to launch the warning from sources which would assure it serious consideration. We are bound to realise, at this stage of our dealings with Germany, that she can keep her own counsel, and that leakages of important information are probably designed leakages.
It is otherwise with troop concentrations and road-build- ing. The latter lends itself to concealment even less than the former ; and, of course, when troops reach a certain density they are as obvious as a steeple. It may be, there- fore, that Germany really means to invade Holland. The density of concentration is greatest on the southern part of the Dutch frontier, which, as I pointed out in a previous article, is less adapted to natural defence by inundation and, at the same time, is the easiest gateway to that part of Hol- land which would provide the best sea and air bases for use against England. It is possible that, even before these lines appear, one of the reported time-tables may be in process of application ; or, again, in view of the evident readiness of both Holland and Belgium, the attack may be deferred to a more opportune moment when both countries have relaxed the sharpness of their attention.
Time alone can make the position clear ; and yet, in the official training-book of the British Army there are several mentions of "the probable action of the enemy" which the soldier must somehow learn to divine. How can we dis- cover the "probable action" of Germany? One would have said that it is by reading aright the proved facts about her dispositions and movements, in the context of the pressure of events. Here, however, we are at a disadvantage, since we do not know the precise tension under which she is labouring. Indeed, on the contrary, we are looking to her action to disclose it. We know that, up to a fortnight ago, about a million tons of German merchandise had been inter- cepted by the blockade ; and, even after some years devoted to making Germany self-sufficient, such a loss is no mere bagatelle. It is an impressive figure in itself: it might have a crushing effect. We also know that the blockade of Ger- man exports, although only just begun, is producing results ; and this being a new blow might seem to suggest the probability of a new reaction. In this inference we touch firmer ground ; and we shall have some reason to conclude that the blockade is having a significant effect if Germany, on this occasion, actually marches west.
For how, otherwise, can we explain the readiness to challenge new armies which must total over a million men? The postponement of the earlier attack has given Holland and Belgium the opportunity to realise how intimately their interests are intertwined, and to come to the appropriate conclusion. The Belgian army is of first-rate quality. The Dutch army is a less known factor ; but there is a certain dour obstinacy about the Dutch which, added to their recog- rned courage, should make this adventure anything but a Polish parade. Furthermore, both armies have now had time to bring their defences up to the standard required by the favoured German tactics. At present the German army shines with the prestige which too easy a victory in Poland gave it. Can there be any purpose in risking a depreciation of so obvious an advantage? The result of the repeated defeats inflicted on Russia by the heroic Finns has already had its effect on the still unsolved problems of Eastern Europe. Even if the Balkan bloc is not yet an accomplished fact, it is distinctly nearer than when Stalin advanced from Moscow. Even the obstacles that then seemed insurmount- able, now appear, paradoxically, much less intractable. Crisis might have assisted in their removal: unexpectedly it is the relaxation of tension which has produced the desired effect.
If, then, Germany is to invade Holland and Belgium, the deciding cause must bear some proportion to the risk. If the High Command's objection is now withdrawn, it is probably for one of two reasons. It may be, of course, that for her own sake Germany wishes to see an end of the Finnish campaign. While it continues the hope of any real help from Russia can only have the substance of a dream. For active warfare Germany must extract from Russia and Rumania oil and petrol up to about twelve million tons per year. In the best circumstances it is very doubtful whether these countries could supply that amount. While the Finnish campaign continues there is not even the benefit of the doubt.
At present, the polite fiction is maintained that Finland could never have succeeded so long without external aid ; and, since Germany took the precaution of holding up the bulk of the Italian planes, the material help is attributed to her immediate neighbours and the Allies. For some strange reason Russia is threatening the other Scandinavian nations, as if what she has been unable to accomplish against Finland she coulci do so much more easily if Norway and Sweden were to throw in their lot with their neighbour. Russia's desire for an outlet to the Atlantic is also being revived. It seems, then, possible that Germany wishes to isolate the Finnish area by occupying the Allies nearer home. An in- vasion of Holland and Belgium would do that very effec- tively. The Allied staff would be concerned at once with dangerous possibilities. If bases could quickly be secured against Britain, we should have our hands full. Or, it may be the intention to attack the weaker sector of the western front ; and the German staff may think they could entice the Allies away from their defensive positions and so restore the open warfare in which they are at their best. One or both reasons may move Germany if she is now convinced she cannot wait.
Or it may be that by repeated attacks on their shipping, and a prolonged treatment of threats alternating with relaxa- tion, Germany hopes to force Holland and Belgium into actual if unwilling assistance in her blockade of Britain, and acquiescence in her flying breaches of neutrality. It does not seem a very likely prospect ; but Germany has already made a number of serious mistakes in this war and will no doubt make more. But we must now realise that the suc- cesses of our airmen, achieved very easily at first, are becoming much more difficult ; that the German air-raids up to the present have been mere experiments, and that when the much advertised campaign against us is launched it will probably be by simultaneous attacks at a great number of points on our long and vulnerable coastline, and with much improved machines.
There are numerous great aerodromes close to the fron- tiers of the Low Countries, as well as immense forces of infantry and mechanised troops. One thing is certain in a complex of events so many of which can be variously inter- preted. The hour for a real air offensive against this country is fast drawing nearer. As it will inevitably invite reprisals, the fact that such risks are being faced must measure the necessity Germany feels to weaken us, must argue that she has decided the pressure must be eased. Even if we now discover that she has learned the lesson of the comparative defencelessness of her bombers and will not repeat the mistake, we can await the issue with confidence. Our airmen have merely to live up to their record: Ger- many's to live theirs down. And, while we are still in ignorance of the "probable action of the enemy," our plans must be sufficiently elastic to cope with the various alterna- tives. Not that we must take the White Knight for our model ; but, at least, we must be prepared for the more probable developments. Such dispositions have no doubt already been made by General Gamelin and our Air Com- mand; and we can leave the situation in their hands in the reasoned assurance that the German moves which appear to be threatened argue weakness rather than strength.
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