MR. ROOSEVELT'S PEACE HOPES
THE Roosevelt peace offensive has now begun in earnest. By sending a special Ambassador to the Vatican—a very venturesome step from the viewpoint of American internal politics—the President has established a liaison be- tween the greatest neutral nation and the greatest non- national power interested in peace. Thus the most available mediators have combined their forces, rather dramatically, and are mobilised for action in the two or three months now remaining before the all-out war may be expected to begin.
The project for co-operation between Washington and the Vatican has been in preparation for the better part of a year, first in a war-preventive and now in a peace-making sense. President Roosevelt has seen that the Holy See is the only remaining substantial force whose influence extends across the Siegfried lines and has some possible effect on opinion in Germany. He once entertained the present Pope at his New York home, and has a high respect for his diplo- matic abilities. From every point of view, American col- laboration with the Vatican suits the President's policies. It has these ramified possibilities: It establishes a powerful potential mediatory force or alliance; It tends to keep Italy neutral, or even sympathetic to the anti-aggression front; It assists in maintaining Spanish neutrality; It creates a wider anti-Soviet front, for any religious uni- fication is bound to be directed against the anti-religious power of Communism; It thoroughly pleases Latin-America—a fact which is highly significant for the United States' hopes for inter- American solidarity; It keeps American Roman Catholics in line, whereas they had been showing a tendency towards the extreme right of late under the stimulus of pro-Nazi Father Coughlin and others.
It is a mistake, of course, to over-interpret and emphasise such an outwardly simple step as the President's liaison with the Vatican. But this is a policy in sequence. For long months Mr. Roosevelt has been warming his contacts with the Holy See, and of late he has been thinking more and more of a peace programme. Now both operations have been joined.
There is no sign that the President, in co-operation with the Vatican, is likely to press for a peace inimical to the Allies. He is, by every indication, still as firm in his moral support of Britain and France as ever, and the latest move cannot but be helpful to Finland. He is in all probability not contemplating an immediate and sensational peace move but preparing a long-range basis for a peace-offensive.
Perhaps some explanation should be given of an odd phrase at the beginning of this article: the reference to the venturesomeness in American politics of closer official relations with the Vatican. The point is that large sections of Protestant opinion, in a nation where party political lines on religion were sharply drawn as recently as 1928, are dis- tinctly opposed to official recognition of the Vatican as a political entity. Clergymen of various faiths have already come forward to object to the appointment of an Ambassa- dor as the President's personal representative at the Vatican. In desultory fashion prior to 1867, the United States main- tained some sort of representation to the Holy See. But in that year Congress refused to appropriate funds for an envoy, and none has been maintained since. The issues of Anglo-Irish religious politics have been transplanted to the United States. A prime factor in defeating Alfred E. Smith for the Presidency in 1928 was the fact that he was a prominent Roman Catholic layman, and no member of that faith has yet occupied the White House. The anti-Catholic Ku Klux Klan, with its hooded knights and its fiery crosses, rode by night as recently as the mid-twenties.
Thus, in joining hands with the Vatican, President Roose- velt ran the risk of offending the intensely Protestant South, although by the same token he may have pleased much of the industrial North. Since the South is almost unshakeably loyal in allegiance to the President's Democratic party, and the North has been wavering of late, Mr. Roosevelt's net result may be gain.
However, all the signs continue to point against a third term for the President, and that means among other things that he must hasten with his peace plans. The first dead,- line, of course, is the possible outbreak of intense fighting in the spring. The second, as far as the chance of Ameri- can mediation is concerned, is the campaign and election of the autumn. And the third is President Roosevelt's prob- able retirement to private life in January, 1941. Between now and every one of these deadlines, he may be counted on to do everything in his power to assist peace negotiations.
Meanwhile, the successes of the British arms at sea and the Finnish arms on land have taken some of the dis- illusionment and cynicism out of American public opinion. The emotional unneutrality of the people of the United States is constantly revealed, never more than when they followed the thrilling sea battle of Punta del Este. The dogged qualities of British seamanship were thoroughly appreciated here, and the suicide of the 'Graf Spee's ' captain was taken as a symbol of the victory-or-death philosophy of Herr Hitler. The incident, it is felt, may be a bit prophetic of the whole desperate Nazi gamble.
American aid for Finland is being intensively organised. There is, first of all, the $50,000,000 R.F.C. loan. Next comes the refund of Finnish debt payments. These two sources of funds, while not officially expendable for war supplies, free other Finnish deposits here. Then comes relief money, which is also an indirect aid to the prosecution of the war, and is being poured out generously both by the American Red Cross and under a separate organisation headed by Herbert Hoover. Mr. Hoover's emergence is the best proof of the fundamental change toward the European conflict brought about by the Finnish war. The former President kept in critical seclusion throughout the summer and autumn, occasionally describing the war as just another chapter in the endless battles of European power politics. He refused an appeal from Mr. Roosevelt to become "general manager" of relief work, because he accurately estimated that such activities would inevitably line him up with the New Deal brand of "neutrality."
But the Finnish war brought Mr. Hoover out of retire- ment. Not only were his humanitarian instincts aroused; his political intuition told him he could no longer maintain isolation. He chose the most popular possible ground, drew up his own staff, and is running an effective relief organisa- tion which besides helping Finns also keeps Republicans from being convicted as hard-hearted quasi-Fascists.
Congress is back with us, and the President has submitted a conservative budget. The New Deal is in cold storage, because this is election year and venturesome governmental experiments are in disfavour. The Presidential sweepstakes are as confused as ever, though with the third term receding, and Vice-President Garner's entry into a Democratic field already invaded by Paul V. McNutt, it appears that the Democrats will need a " compromise " nominee. In that case the prospects of Cordell Hull are improved, for he would be an excellent compromise.
Previous page
