TOPICS OF THE DAY.
CHATTER ABOUT PEACE.
THE student of foreign telegrams will not have failed to notice that during the past week there have been a good many hints as to the possibilities of peace, and the willingness of the Germans to end the war on what they consider would be reasonable terms. Especially are we told that in America German emissaries are talking about peace, and of Germany's readiness to go back to the statue quo ante belbun, if only she can in addition obtain, not for herself, of course, but for the world at large, what she terms "the freedom of the seas." When this apparently innocent proposition, which it is suggested that the American people should join with Germany in forcing upon the British nation, is examined in detail, it will be seen to mean, not the liberty of all parsons to use the seas in peace for their lawful occasions, but nothing more nor less than a scheme for depriving Britain of the command of the sea, which we have so long held and which is absolutely vital to us as an island Power. " The freedom of the seas " in the context means that we should resign that maritime power which the present war has once again proved essential to our national existence. Without it we can neither defend ourselves nor strike an effective blow at our enemies. If therefore the Germans, or any of those who may be called Pig-headed Pacificists, think that Britain will entertain for a moment this naive endeavour on the part of Germany to gain by sly- ness what she cannot gain by war on the high seas, they are very greatly mistaken. The British people will not even discuss, far lees agree to, any scheme for our undoing labelled " The freedom of the seas."
We note that a certain number of people who would thoroughly agree with us in this are yet perturbed by the peace chatter on this point which they believe, probably rightly, the Germans intend to raise in America. There seems to be a notion that it would be very embarrassing for us if a. large section of public opinion in America could be induced to ask us in the name of Peace, Humanity, and so forth to fall into the German trap. Such a view is very much exaggerated. In the first place, we do not believe that the Germane will succeed in getting any really important body of opinion in America to join them in this demand; but even if they do, it will not matter. The perfectly blunt refusal which will be given, not only by the British Government, but by the nation as a whole, will soon make American Pacificists understand that it is useless to knock at a door so strongly barred. During the war of the North and South there were a certain number of foolish but well-intentioned persons here who tried to persuade the North to make peace with the South by allowing the dissolution of the Union on "equitable terms," and timid people in the North and optimistic people in the South thought that the movement might be the beginning of armed British inter- vention. When, however, Mr. Lincoln showed that be was not going to throw away all the sacrifices of the North, and own himself beaten just when he was really winning, in order to please sentimentalists, the talk soon died away. That is what will happen supposing the new German pro- paganda for "the freedom of the seas" makes a little headway during the next few weeks. We have kept the command of the sea, and we have done our very best to use it to secure freedom of movement for neutrals—except of course as regards the introduction into Germany of supplies which will enable her to continue her barbarous system of warfare. It is not we who have sown the seas with mines, or who have instructed submarines to sink every floating thing at sight within the war zone. The sentimentalists of neutral States, if they want to do something for the freedom of the seas, should knock not at our doors but those of Germany, and try to teach her a system of maritime war- fare which has more respect for the rights of neutrals and of humanity. While we are dealing with the subject of peace it may be worth while to restate one or two plaht propositions in regard to it which are apt to be forgotten. In the first place, peace will be made, not at the whim or on the initiative of any one of the Allied Powers, but only when France, Russia, Italy, and Britain are agreed. This may conceivably limit our action, but, whether it does or does not, the fact remains that we are abso- lutely bound in honour not to make, or even to think of or consider, the possibility of a separate peace. The next point to remember is that the Allies are not going to make a peace which will merely restore the status quo, a peace of what we may call the eighteenth-century type. At that epoch nations often fought till they were tired, and then agreed that the players at the great and bloody game should go back to their places and all be as before. Neither we nor our allies wanted a war of that kind, or war of any sort. When the war was forced upon us, and the greatest crime in history was committed by the overrunning of Belgium and the giving up of her towns and 'villages to military execution, it became obvious that, quite apart from moral grounds and the need of self-protection, the Allied Powers could never be satisfied with a status quo Peace. To make such a Peace, and leave the Germans and Austrians with the power to reconstruct their armies and navies at their leisure and come at us again, as the Romans came at the Carthaginians in the second Punic War, would be a mere act of national suicide. When Pitt was asked to state his object in carrying on the war with Napoleon and the Consulate in spite of all the sufferings entailed, he answered " Security." It is because we must have security, and because we will not expose the next generation to the agony which we now endure, that we will not make a status quo Peace.
It must not be supposed from what we have written that we deem the destruction of the German people to be necessary to the security for which we are contending. We have no desire to treat Germany as she is now treating Belgium, and as she has in the past treated Alsace- Lorraine, Poland, and Schleswig, and is still treating them. Our security does not demand that. We realize that any attempt to enslave provinces or countries as Germany has enslaved them, or has desired to enslave them, would be inimical to that security which we desire. It would lay the foundations of fresh wars. What we must have, and mean to have, is the destruction, not of the German people, but of German militarism. We are, of course, well aware that at the present moment the vast majority of Germane would scout such a notion. The last thing, they would tell you, that they want is to shake off the domination of the Prussian military caste. Prac- tically the whole of the German people embrace with devotion the knees of their War Lords, and hope for no better fate than to be ruled and regimented by them for ever. Nevertheless, we believe that the day will come, though it may be distant, and to most observers may seem now absolutely impossible, when the scales will fall from the eyes of a large part of the German people. In any case, we and our allies have a clear duty. We are not going to make peace, when the time for peace comes, merely with the Prussian taskmasters of Germany and Austria. We want a lasting peace and a secure peace, and that being so we must make it with the German people and not with the Prussian overlords. Curiously enough, the Germans have themselves given us a precedent for this course. In 1871 the Germans would not make peace with Gambetta and the Provisional Government with whom they had been fighting during the past six months of the war, but only with the French people. They granted an armistice to Gambetta, but they insisted that a National Assembly must be freely elected by France. With it, but only with it, would they conclude the terms of peace. We must do the same. Before we make our terms of peace we must see to it that those terms are ratified and accepted by the Gorman people, or, rather, by their elected representatives. When that is accomplished it will not be for us to dictate what the German people shall do. If they like to go back to their old tyrants, and voluntarily place themselves once more in the bands of the Hohenzollerns and the Prussian military caste, well and good. There is nothing more foolish or more futile than for outsiders to attempt to impose a particular form of government, even if it is the best and freest form possible, upou an unwilling people. Napoleon again and again tried the experiment of dictating to nations what form of government they should have, and he always failed. He actually achieved the' miracle of making the Bourbons popular in Spain and Naples by his attempts to demonstrate that they were no longer fit to reign. That is a warning which will not be neglected by us and our allies. But though we shall not sow the seeds of future wars by attempting to enslave countries against their will, or to prevent them from choosing the form of government, bad or good, which they prefer, we shall of course take care to free those provinces which Germany has so misused. It will not be enough to free Belgium. We must free Alsace-Lorraine, Prussian Poland, and Schleswig. Further, the governments which their inhabi- tants desire, and not those which their former oppressors desire, must be given not merely to the people of Italia Irredenta, but to the Southern Slave, to the Bohemians. and to that large body of Roumanians who have suffered so long under Magyar tyranny. Cynics will tell us, perhaps, that these terms are all very fine, but that great peoples are fickle and national resolves weak, and that very soon we shall see some one or other of the Allies getting weary and the Alliance going to pieces. " The Germane may be suffering and may suffer more than you will, but they have more grit than you, and will wear you down." We do not believe its It is quite possible that if Germany and her rulers had not fought the war with the barbarism with which they have fought it there might have been some danger of the kind we have just described. The German Government, however, have cemented the Alliance with the blood of the martyrs of Belgium, of Eastern France, and of Russian Poland. They have made the Allies realize that there can be no security for them, there cannot even be international independence, in fact there can be nothing but ruin and tyranny, unless they destroy German militarism.
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