18 JUNE 1942, Page 16

BOOKS 014 THE DAY

Revolution by Order

The Government of Vichy. By Lieutenant-Colonel Pierre Tissier. (Harrap. 15s.) The Government of Vichy. By Lieutenant-Colonel Pierre Tissier. (Harrap. 15s.) ALTHOUGH the world has little noted it, there is a " revolution" going on in France. Or, rather, there are two revolutions going on. There is a real revolution of opinion; a national stocktaking, a kind of unorganised preparation for a future States General—for France is more prepared for profound changes than she has been since '89. Then there is an official " national revolution," defined in proclama- tions by the Marshal, in speeches and articles by Vichy propa- gandists, carried out, on paper, by a mass of rules and orders, by a few actual changes, above all by a great game of musical chairs in the administration, where it is now as much a handicap to have been a Mason as it used to be a help, where all the follies of the " ordre moral " are parodied and where even the profiteers of the new regime—if, like M. Fay, they have any knowledge of the shift in power brought about by the Russian war and the entry of the United States—are hedging. Even M. Laval prepares a line of retreat through U.S.A., and the official Press goes on with the solemn comedy of flattery in a vocabulary that recalls 1847 or 1869.

It is a depressing period in French history, where nearly every- thing official is either silly or sinister, that Colonel Tissier describes in a very remarkable book. As befits so distinguished a jurist, his exposition is a model of lucidity as far as the difficulties of French official language make it easily understandable by the English reader. All the promises of the Vichy regime are examined in the light of performance. Colonel Tissier is ready to give credit where credit is due; it is not very often due, but that is not his fault. For the first time, we have available the record of the basic principles and practices of the new regime. What kind of impression is made?

The first is one of indecision. Schemes are adopted and after a few months dropped; one step forward (by M. Chevalier) is followed by one step back (by M. Carcopino). The official and officious patronage of the Church by the Marshal was feared by the more prudent of the clergy, if it was welcomed by the Baudrillarts and the other heirs of the foolish political prelates of the nineteenth century. The attempts to build up a " national " party and a " national " youth movement foundered on the rock of German domi- nation. A real " national " party, a real " national " youth movement would 13.t organising resistance to the Germans, not providing cover for collaboration in the new order of which the life, death and posthumous career of Heydrich provide such a fine working model. And all that Colonel Tissier has to say on this point is made doubly telling since Laval has replaced Dalian, since Abel Bonnard has become Minister of Education, and such tainted agents of Germany as the ex-art dealer agent of Mr. Hearst, M. Benoist-Mechin, have risen higher in the official hierarchy. The Marshal is less and less effective, even as a figure-head; the " French state " is increasingly a police state, run for and to a large extent by the Germans.

Yet the absurd parody of the Nazi and Fascist revolutions g on. The old Ecole Polytechnique, alma mater of Foch and of He Poincare, is made safe for the Germans, but a school for the Fren Gestapo is raised to the rank of the grandes ecoles. But even her the pre-1789 bias of Vichy makes the future agreges es mouchardag study the administrative history of the seventeenth and eighteen centuries. Fouche isn't good enough as a model; so the ghost o M. de Sartines has to walk.

Behind all these follies and treasons, as Colonel Tissier m plain, lies a fundamental miscalculation. There was combined the men of Bordeaux a naive belief in their ability to handle th Germans and a conviction that Britain would speedily follow th example of surrender set by the hero of Verdun. That profoun a priori ignorance of the outer world that marked French conserva tive thought, at any rate from the moment that that profound ignorant man, Charles Maurras, got control of it, was dearly pal for. But, as Colonel Tissier points out, even in the darkest days o June, only Petain could have covered the surrender. Why did he There was his fundamental pessimism revealed in the last war (There are other and better authorities for this view than Poincare memoirs, which Colonel Tissier alone cites.) Of course, Pe was not the only pessimist. As Colonel Tissier points out, man of the Frenchmen who joined General de Gaulle were far fro sharing his hopes; they believed that the war would end in German victory and went on fighting on a point of honour. Bu Petain was needed to secure the obedience of the Empire, of th fleet, of the armies in Africa and the Levant. Towards the end o Louis Philippe's reign, the Parisians made fun of the nominal Prim Minister, Soult. He was officially known as " l'illustre epee"; the called him " Pillustre fourreau." Into the sheath of the Petain a legend increasingly dirty weapons have been thrust. And it is th stain from the dirty hands of the Brinons, Bonnards, Lavals that turned even the more respectable plans and activities of Vichy to tattle-tale brown. This austere record of the truth of this politi Gresham's law can be warmly commended to all serious readers D. W. BROGAN.