Eclipse of Battleships
The decision of the United States Government to stop work on five new monster battleships and concentrate on aircraft carriers instead corresponds to the clear lessons of the naval war. Beginning with Taranto, there has been a long series of events illustrating the supersession of the heavy gun at sea by the air-borne torpedo or bomb. Perhaps the most striking of all was the battle of Midway Island, where big ships were present on both sides. Not a single heavy gun was fired from them, because, when the fleets were still loo miles or so apart, each launched its aircraft at the other with so much effect that the battle was decided without closer contact. The new policy, however, carries several postulates, if it is to be a success. The first is that the Power relying on aircraft must employ the types shown to be most effective against ships. These are torpedo-bombers and dive-bombers—especially the former—and not the ordinary " precision " bombers, which make up nearly the whole of the attacking strength of the R A.F. and the R.N.A.S. The second, since land-based aircraft are regularly proving their superiority over ship- based, is that it should build up chains of aerodromes wherever a main sea-route passes within range of land. Thus to reopen the Mediterranean route we should need a chain of air-bases all along the North African coast or, let us say, in Sardinia, Malta, Crete and Cyprus. Lastly, the aircraft-carriers, which are to take convoys across landless seas, should not be too large—on the handy principle of limiting the eggs in a basket. It is surprising that those upon which America is concentrating are to be of 25,000 tons apiece.
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