FROM TOBRUK TO KHARKOV
By STRATEGICUS
THE design in the Middle East grows in dearness as the fighting becomes more intense. The objective has long been evident, and if the plan by which it is hoped to defeat the Allies still appears to lack some of its essential parts, it is because operations already in progress have not yet developed the appropriate preparation. It is obvious that this turns upon the time-space factor, since it involves the vital element of striking-power. About Kharkov, Sevastopol and in Eastern Libya swift success would have provided the impetus for exploitation, while it at once deprived the defenders of positions which were an increment of their strength and a clear handicap to the attack.
It is in this way that positions have their value in warfare of any character, but it can easily be recognised that their role and importance are less in tank battles in the desert. Bir Hacheim, for instance, was mainly the southern pivot of the positions that canalised Rommel's advance towards the east, and it was for this reason that he devoted so much of his time and strength to the attempt to capture it. When he compelled the Eighth Army to withdraw from it, he gained his first serious success and made immediate efforts to exploit it. Gazala and the area to the south of it were at once in jeopardy, since it was almost impossible to prevent Rommel moving up to the east. The original attempt at encirclement had failed because it depended too much on chance—the possibility of effecting a landing from the sea in some strength. But if a considerable armoured force could be thrown across its communications the garrison might be surrounded ; and it was the capture of the South African and the 5oth Divisions that attracted Rommel. It was the safety Of these two divisions rather than the maintenance of the position that was Ritchie's main preoccupation, and they have now been withdrawn.
The battle is now much more fluid than ever before, and what disconcerts us is not so much the abandonment of the positions as the apparent freedom which Rommel possesses to roam at will over so large an area. It would be insincere to suggest that the loss of a skilfully sited and strongly defended group of positions is not a disappointment ; but it is no special pleading to insist that the subsequent development of the battle alone can provide the true meaning of the incident. No one in his senses, for instance, can maintain that this was Rommel's objective, or that the enemy would count themselves recompensed for a great expenditure of force if this were to prove the sole gain. It is not the capture of these positions, but the thing signified that concerns him and us. It is clear that at one phase of the battle since the evacuation of Bir Hacheim the British armoured forces lost heavily and probably dis- proportionately ; but it is impossible to feel any certainty about the relative losses from the beginning. It is upon this point that everything turns, since if the armour of the Eighth Army has suffered less, an undoubtedly delicate situation still holds promise of an eventual British victory.
One thing seems to be clearly established at this juncture. In the hands of a bold and experienced tactician the attack has many advantages over the defence. In the fourth Libyan campaign General Ritchie had only about half the infantry strength of his opponent, and his small numerical superiority in tanks can be offset by the greater range and hitting power of the German models. Yet he won a decisive victory because he called the tune and insisted on changing it repeatedly. The situation is now reversed. Rommel is Continually setting new tactical problems for Ritchie, and a solution must be found almost instantaneously. He can speed off towards the east, and unless there is a sufficient armoured strength at the spot threatened, El Adem, Tobruk or Bardia, he can move off at high speed to another spot, Acroma, the Gazala-Tobruk coast road, or the western perimeter of Tobruk. In effect, he can compel a disper- sion of Ritchie's force while using his main concentration for over- whelming attack upon some part of the Eighth Army's armour.
General Ritchie attempted to provide for this condition by pre- paring a number of defensive foci, skilfully sited and heavily armed. Knightsbridge, Acroma, El Adem and the great camp of Tobruk constitute; in effect, a deep defensive. But, apart from them, posi- tions appear almost to have become an irrelevance. In the fourth Libyan campaign Rommel cut his losses and abandoned much more elaborately contrived positions with their garrisons. The fate of these positions was decided in the open fighting in the field; but then, as now, the advantage went to the army which took and maintained the initiative. In both campaigns comment at the time had perforce to be restricted to the broad determinants of the situation, though great developments might turn upon a tactical evolution taking place at any moment. Any attempt to write to the hour is certain to be outdistanced by the event.
While it is inevitable we should feel some anxiety at the wide range of Rommel's liberty of movement, and the abandonment of certain positions raises the doubt about the successful defence of areas that seem vital, factors that should reassure us are not lacking. Ritchie may have felt compelled to abandon positions ; but he did not aban- don the garrisons with them as did Rommel in the fourth campaign. As the decision must be reached by the clash of the forces in the field, and particularly of the tanks which give their striking power its momentum, temporary territorial changes in either direction may be regarded with composure. It appears to be undeniable that Ritchie is fighting a critical battle with a flair which if it is not masterly suggests a tolerable counterfeit. It might have been wiser if once more he had anticipated Rommel. The Italians feared that he would and have lately said that Rommel struck to anticipate an attack in July.
The climax appears to be imminent ; but it must be admitted that on several occasions before it seemed that a decision could not be delayed. At least we can recognise that these clashes are fiercer and show less reserve. Rommel appears to be intent on securing a decision at whatever risk ; and that is an aspect of the situation we should be foolish to ignore. The tempo of the fighting is quickening. This reflection, however, might be applied to the whole of the eastern front. The battles at Kharkov and Sevastopol are certainly parts of Hitler's plan, though even now they appear to belong rather to the category of preparatory operations. It is at least more certain than ever that they have a common strategic inspiration with the Libyan campaign. At Kharkov the Germans are said to be using forces as large as those which were drawn into Timoshenko's first battle. But even Hitler cannot dispose of thirty divisions lightly. If we can credit the reports, the German units are suffering heavy casualties, and yet, so far as we can divine the territorial objectives, they are of a minor rather than a major character. They do not, for instance, suggest the attempt to establish a protective flank for a drive towards the east so much as the restoration of what would be the pivot of such a flank. Timoshenko bit deeply into the Kharkov bastion, and any operation in the direction of the Caspian and the Caucasus might find its communications threatened from the positions secured in that offensive.
The attack on Sevastopol is different, though it also is the preparation for an offensive rather than the offensive itself. If the fortress could be captured the problem of supply on the most southernly sector of the front would be eased. Supplies and rein- forcements could be brought up by sea. The Leningrad front has long been supplied through the Gulf of Riga,' and the use of the Black Sea would be as useful for the Ukraine front. A Crimea cleared of Russians would also permit of concentrated air attack upon the rear of the positions guarding the Caucasus and the more northerly of the ports upon which the Russian Black Sea fleet would then be compelled to rely.
It seems to me that this is the main reason for the prolonged and costly attack upon Sevastopol. As. Hitler's offensive this year will be decisive, it seems certain that he will neglect no means that might improve its chances of success, and a plan to by-pass Turkey from the north-east, as well as from the south, may well form part of it. If troops could be landed on the Black Sea coast of Caucasia, Hitler may well think that Turkey, then almost surrounded, would be faced with a position similar to that which developed so dis- astrously for Jugoslavia, and would probably recognise the inevitable.
Merely to recount these possibilities appears to invest them with a viability which they do not necessarily possess. They are not fore- gone conclusions. Though only means to an end, they are no more certain than the ends themselves. They are the gages of the battl which are at present witnessing a crescendo of fury. We appreciate the quickening of the tempo, but we cannot expect interpret it justly till the present phase has passed. This is not onl through the suppression of detail, but even more because the speed ing up of the war makes a report out of date before it is printed. can only possess our souls in patience, and base our hopes on permanent determinants of victory.
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