BOOKS.
SIR JAMES SITLIVAN.* THE Snlivans were a race of sailors, and the forces of heredity and the immediate ancestry of Sir James could scarcely turn out aught but a sailor. His father, his uncles, his brothers, and some of his cousins were in the Navy, and the Jameses, his mother's family, were sailors too. The father did for the Baltic fleet of Parker and Nelson much the same work that the son did for the Baltic fleets of Napier and Dundas, fifty years later, and in no other war has the handling of a fleet been so absolutely dependent on the work of the surveyor as in the difficult approaches to Sveaborg and Cronstadt.
Sulivan underwent an admirable apprenticeship in the arts of navigation and seamanship as Second Lieutenant to Fitzroy in the Beagle' in the year 1831. It was not his first voyage with Fitzroy, for he had already cruised in South American, and in Spanish waters, and in the Mediterranean, when the Captain of the Beagle' was only a Lieutenant. Of these voyages Sir James Snlivan's reminiscences have many a striking incident to relate, and it is to be regretted that after the interruption caused by the writing of some recollections of his friend Cooper Key, he was unable to continue the story of his own career. As Darwin and Fitzroy have described the voyage of the Beagle,' the editor has withheld all but a • WO ar.d Letters of A dmiral Sir Bartholomew James &elven, K.C.B. Edited by his Son, Henry No ton :•,n.tvan. W.to rort-i a t. P.aie. Map, and Ens' ra- tions. Loudon John Mul ray.
few of his father's letters, but these give us a clear and lively account of some of the surveying expeditions. In 1838 he was selected to undertake the survey of the Falkland Islands, Fitzroy having warmly commended him to the hydrographer; and again in 1842 he was sent to make additional surveys of the Falklands and of the Rio Plata, and this voyage led to his taking part in the Parana Campaign,—one of those interesting wars that bring into action all the finest qualities of the English sailor. The Parana War was due to the head‘ strong behaviour of Roses, whose seizure of both banks of the Rio de la Plata broke the guarantee of independence given by France and England to the Banda Oriental. (Afterwards it was decided that we had no right to prevent Roses closing the river !) Twice the ' Philomel ' went to the Falklands from the Rio Plata, and arrived after her second trip in time to take part in the blockade of Monte Video, the Obligado affair, and to assist in convoying merchantmen to Corrientes. There are many interesting anecdotes and vivid details of the warfare between Roses and his rivals at the head of the Corrientes and Paraguay troops, which was conducted with a ferocity worthy of these South American States, and with a relentlessness that earned a name, even in the Argentine, for Rosas and his Gauchos.
Rosas intended to dispute the opening of the Parana at Obligado, and to force the defences the usual inadequate force was sent. Sulivan in a letter expresses his astonish- ment that the authorities could dream of exposing tk expedition to the chances of a reverse. Not only were the steamers for the ascent of a shallow river two of the largest in the service, but not a single munition of war was sent out by the Admiralty. That the steamers were too large and the men too few may have been unavoidable—it is England's weakness and glory that she has too few men—but at least they might have ammunition enough and to spare. For all our wealth, however, it is often brought home to us that we lack powder, if not shot. The affair was a success, though an expensive one, as the light wind prevented the vessels anchoring in their appointed stations, and they were thus exposed to a heavy lire, without being able to return it effectively. The San Martin,' a brig of 200 tons, had every gun disabled, and was simply wrecked ; yet she kept her station. Fur this magnificent action the French made her Captain an Admiral. "No vessel of her size," Sulivan said, "ever stood such a fire before." The chain of boats being cut, it was decided to land and spike the guns, a risky proceeding had not the loss of the enemy been so severe. This, however, was unknown to the allies. Sulivan, by him- self, spiked the six guns of one fort, under a musketry fire.
Sulivan made later an adventurous voyage in a dinghy down the Parana from Corrientes, to a point where a vessel was aground ; a large convoy then started for Corrientes, Rosati again disputing the passage at the cliffs of San Lorenzo. He used field-guns, galloping them up to the cliff-edge, firing, and then retreating before the guns of the squadron could be trained on them,—a very pretty exhibition of the uses of field artillery ; but though he hulled some of the vessels repeatedly, he caused no loss. Sulivan got to know the Parana so well that it was declared that no one in Buenos Ayres knew the river as he did. It astonished everybody to see Sulivan pilot- ing a. steamer down the stream among shallows, snags, and rocks, at a breakneck speed. His handling of the Philomel' had, months before, led a French officer to declare "that the devil must be in her," and his own countrymen were always on the look-out for some new exhibition from Sulivan of the art of seamanship. He was certainly a consummate seaman ; but we have not space to record the stories that show his mastery of the noble art which is so dear to Englishmen. On the occasion of his last descent of the river, the 'Philomel' ran the gauntlet, but so close to the cliffs that the artillery- men could not depress the guns enough to hit her. No medal was granted for Obligado, whereas the French were justly proud of the affair,—Paris has still the captured cannon and France has two men-of-war, the 'Obligado' and the Trehouart: "I have two medals I am ashamed to wear;' said an officer, "as I was not within one hundred miles of the enemy, but if I get a medal for the Parana I shall have some pride in wearing it."
After taking the despatches home, Sulivan had to content himself with half-pay till the Russian War saw him appointed as one of the surveyors to the Baltic fleet. It was with con- siderable difficulty, and only at the last moment, that the Admiralty made up their minds to send surveyors, so that the fleet had passed the great Belt before Sulivan and others overtook them. What the fleet would have done without a surveyor it is impossible to say, as Napier appears to have been ignorant of their value, and could conceive no better use for a surveying-vessel than to convert it into a fire-ship. This opinion he expressed before some of his officers in Sulivan's presence, but he had reason to withdraw this ignorant remark before he left the Baltic. Sulivan spent months of incessant labour day and night sounding the channels, buoying rocks, and reconnoitring various forts, and generally acting as the eye of the Admiral. These were real reconnaissances, not the trips made by masters who, satisfied with an inspection at a distance of twelve miles, could report a "reconnaissance." Sulivan had a great deal of difficulty with these men, pro- foundly ignorant of the nature of the shores of the Baltic, opinionated and jealous ; they would flatly contradict the evidence even of his mathematical instruments, till Admiral Napier would turn from one to the other in despair. Sulivan's accounts of the trips he made with the officers of the fleet are lively and amusing, but suggest some serious reflections on the actual capacity of the men in command of the fltets. The astonishment of these worthies at the speed with which the ' Lightning ' threaded the channels and took them for a near glimpse of Cronstadt or Sveaborg vented itself in a variety of ways. The French Admiral compared Sulivan to a "truffle-dog," and Sulivan's juniors and friends years before always said that his knowledge of the contour of the channels and rocks and the nature of the bottom appeared to be in- stinctive and almost miraculous. In 1S55 the bombardment of Sveaborg took place, Sulivan's plans having been agreed to by the Admiralty, but it was only by dint of the strongest persuasion that Dundas, who had succeeded Napier, was kept up to the plan, and at the very last the obstacles raised, and the bungling of superior officers, must have tried a man of Sulivan's impetuous and keen temperament to the utmost. For days before the affair Sulivan and those under him were busy finding safe anchorages, planning the ranges and positions for the mortar-boats, but the com- mand was given to some one else who was against the scheme. In the early morning of the intended bombardment things were so obviously muddled that on his own responsi- bility he postponed the engagement. The next morning he was roused by the officer in command, who wished to know what they were to do about hauling the boats up to their respective stations. Sulivan was equal to the occasion, and eventually the bombardment was a complete success—a terribly perfect one indeed—but Sulivan's relief might well take the form of "undignified capers on the paddle-box" when the first shells, by their accurate range and deadly effect, removed all anxiety from his mind. It was sheer ignorance on the part of the Captain in command of the plan .of the principles of gunnery which caused the delay, and which, previous to the first day, led him to declare the mortar- boats and the frigates were anchored too near, the clearness of the air deceiving him as to the distance; nor did &Alvan's protest as to the accuracy of his scale avail. The Admiral told him to moor the frigates further out, and Sulivan imitated, in some degree, a famous incident of a previous Baltic fight, sending his nwn officers to the frigate with in- junctions to weigh anchor, turn the ship's head a little, and drop anchor before she had moved her own length.
Peace was declared before Sulivan's plan for destroying Cronstadt could be tested, and with peace his active service was over. Not till fourteen years after the war did Sulivan receive his K.C.B., and be was justly indignant at the peculiar notions of seniority which prevented adequate recognition of his invaluable work. It is not suggested that other than strained notions of seniority influenced this neglect. But Sulivan, who to the last remained a boy and always possessed a sanguine, warm-hearted, and sensitive temperament, felt these things for others' sakes as well as his own. He worked at high pressure, as Fitzroy said; things never seemed to go fast enough for him, for he acted not only as the eye of the fleet, but, in some instances, as the brain also—yet he lived to be eighty. That he possessed quite an unusual amount of tact, united to a fine sense of duty and independence of judgment, is proved by his popularity among his colleagues, and the absolute reliance that was placed on him by the Fleet Admirals, to whom he always spoke frankly. At one time his name was as well known in France as in England—perhaps better—as a brilliant seaman and a man of extraordinary quickness of perception, and with a knowledge of practical gunnery and practical gunnery tactics that made him an invaluable adviser and officer. He drew up many valuable plans,—witness his seaman brigades, which won Napier's heart. These letters throw an interesting side-light on a much-debated campaign and the working of a fleet on actual service in the pre-ironclad days, and many more human aspects of warfare. They are private letters, for the most part to his wife, yet there is nothing injudicious in their contents—and the biography generally is most moderately written—and if its object was to show us a noble specimen of an English sailor, a Christian gentleman, and a charming personality, it has succeeded, and we must thank Mr. H. N. &divan heartily for the book.
Previous page
