THE NATION'S AWAKENING.* Mn. SPENSER WILKINSON'S new book, The Nation's
Awakening, deserves, in our judgment, to be widely read and deeply pondered by British statesmen and politicians of all ranks and parties. And every intelligent reader of it will be constrained to recognise that it is not a book which, when read, can be lightly put aside as if it had no practical bearing on civic life and duty. Some of its views may be capable of refutation, but they rest upon such good informa- tion and such close reasoning, and are so clearly set forth, that no patriotic citizen can regard them as undeserving of careful examination. The great question dealt with by Mr. Wilkinson is,—By what means can this country be made secure against the tremendous perils involved in a hostile combination, including not only Russia and France, but Germany as well? To the idea of a war possibly waged against us by the two first-named Powers in alliance, the public mind has for a good many years past been accustomed. But it was only last winter that, with a startling and most unpleasant shock, the nation awoke to the fact that Germany also, notwithstanding our kinship and long tradition of co-operation with her, had to be counted among our potential foes. It is true that the German Emperor's deplorable telegram to President Kruger, and the astonishing outburst of unfriendly feeling towards this country, for which it gave the signal in the German Press, were speedily followed by an improvement in the tone of the French Press towards us. That fact could not but serve as at least a suggestion that the causes of division between France and Germany are so deep-seated and so powerful as permanently to neutralise the uniting influence, however strong, that could be exercised by the prospect of going shares in the wreck of the British Empire. Our own belief, which was indicated a week ago, is that armed co-operation between France and Germany is not conceivable as likely to happen within a long period from the present time. Mr. Spenser Wilkinson, however, points out that circumstances have occurred tending to "accustom foreign statesmen, the newspaper writers whom they control, and the public which reads the newspapers, to think less of the dissensions which separate the Powers of Europe from one another, and more of the causes of the friction which exists between them all and Great Britain." Thus there is suggested to them "the idea. that the truce which has pre- vailed on the Continent for a quarter of a century might with advantage be converted into a peace, and that an agreement might be reached in virtue of which, while each Power should renounce some European object "—for example, the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine, in the case of France—" once deemed to be important, compensation for the sacrifice thus made might in every case be obtained at the expense of the British Empire. This train of thought must lead to the grouping together of the several demands made by Continental Powers for concessions from England, and a British Government would then be compelled either to fresh surrenders, greater and more humiliating than have yet been made, or to so decided a negative reply as would be a rebuff to the combined Powers. Such a rebuff would, in the present state of the world, excite profound animosity, and might very easily lead to a war, in which none of the Continental Powers would appear to risk very much, while England would risk everything."
There are, broadly, two ways in which the tremendous problem thus presented might be dealt with. First, the defences of the British Empire, and, above all, its Navy, might be so greatly increased in strength as to enable it to meet victoriously even so mighty a combination as that of Germany with France and Russia. That is quite conceivable. But such an increase in armaments, besides being exceedingly burdensome, would require much time to carry out, and in the meantime it is perfectly possible that the three Powers
The Nation's Awakening : Essays Towards a British Policy. By Spenser Wilkinson. London : Archibald Constable and 0o,
which, by the hypothesis, are tending towards an offensive alliance, would see that their policy was to strike their blow before preparation had been made against it. The second method of meeting the problem lies in the adoption by Great Britain of a policy which would divide the parties to the supposed hostile combination, and enlist one at least of them and other Powers in alliances with this country by an appeal to interests which would be recognised from their point of view as more cogent than those prompting them to an anti-British alliance. This is the policy set forth with great skill and clearness in The Nation's Awakening. Mr. Spenser Wilkinson's view is that our grounds of difference with Germany are recognised by Germany herself as not being of sufficient importance to counterbalance the benefits which she would reap in Europe from an under- standing with us embracing a recognition of the permanence of the existing distribution of Colonial possessions and authority in Africa. In support of this opinion he quotes some very significant words from a speech by Baron von Mancha% the German Foreign Secretary, on March 14th, 1896. "The policy of the Empire throughout the world," said the Minister, "must not be in contradiction with the policy in Europe. We cannot be a bulwark of peace in Europe and seek quarrels beyond the sea." That certainly would appear to imply that the German Government did not desire to cherish, if it ever had seriously cherished, the idea of intruding its influence within the sphere of British paramount authority in South Africa. Mr. Wilkinson further points out that it was an old conviction of Prince Bismarck's that the best security of Germany against the danger of a Franco-Russian alliance lay in an understanding with England as well as Austria. On the other hand, our author argues, with great ingenuity and very considerable plausibility, that Germany is so far from feeling her position, with her present alliances, satisfactory or secure, that she is beginning to shape her policy with a view to keeping Russia and France in good humour. Thus he points out that of late she has felt constrained to acquiesce in a development of Russian influence on the side of Bulgaria which is un- doubtedly very disagreeable and prejudicial to Austria, whose position as a Great Power it is part of the raison d'etre of the Triple Alliance to maintain. A like sense of duresse has led Germany to support Russia's policy in the Far East, which it is certainly no interest of Germany's to advance, as it is most decidedly contrary to the interests of Great Britain. This kind of thing, Mr. Wilkinson apprehends, will tend to grow, greatly to our disadvantage, so long as England main- tains her policy of uncertainty and isolation. But in his view it is in England's power to offer Germany such a measure of real security as would make it plainly worth her while to change entirely her attitude towards us, and to give us a most valuable quid pro quo. He believes that the accession of England to the Triple Alliance "would be welcomed by Germany as a great deliverance, provided, of course, that it was effected under conditions which would give the German Government full confidence in the deter- mination of England to abide in the policy, and to fulfil her pledges." He argues with great earnestness that the drift of Russian policy, whether in regard to the Far East, to the Indian Frontier, or to the Black Sea, is politically and com- mercially hostile in root and essence to the interests of the British Empire, and should, therefore, if possible, be resisted. As regards France, Mr. Wilkinson does not see any permanent necessary ground of dangerous difference with this country, if only France will recognise and accept the Egyptian situa- tion; but that recognition on her part can only be brought about by the creation of a set of circumstances in which France cannot look to the Russian Alliance as a means of disturbing the British occupation of Egypt.
It results from all this that a treaty with Germany is, in Mr. Wilkinson's opinion, to be the pivot of a system of alliances by which British interests are to be pro- tected. That treaty would "set out clearly the Colonial interests of each party, which the other party will engage to respect. It should then define the interests which Eng- land aril Germany respectively hold vital," and the two Powers would agree to regard an infringement of these interests by either France or Russia as an attack on the Power which has declared them vital, and would "exchange pledges, in case of such attack by France or by IWO& on either of them, to remain neutral, and in case a Russian attack should be supported by France, or a French attack by Russia, then to declare war against both these Powers." This treaty would be supplemented by (1) one between Great Britain, China and Japan, "each of the three Powers engaging to assist the other two in resisting any Russian encroachment upon the Chinese Empire, including Corea ; " (2) between Great Britain and Austria for the defence of the Black Sea and the Straits against Russian aggression ; and (3) between Great Britain and Italy for the maintenance of the status quo in the Mediterranean.
We have thought it only due to the great amount of know- ledge of foreign affairs and the steady thought which Mr. Wilkinson has brought to bear on this great subject, to in- dicate at some length the general scope and grounds of the policy expounded by him as demanded by the needs of Imperial security. There can be no doubt that, as we have lately pointed out, apart from the question of an actual offensive alliance of Germany with France and Russia against this country, some decided new development of British policy might soon become necessary if German in- fluence were at all steadily thrown into the scale against us. We have maintained, and we distinctly hold, that an effective move on the part of England for neutralising German diplo- matic hostility could be made by an offer on our part to Italy of terms which would be good enough to detach her from the Triple Alliance. Such a measure as that would place Germany in an exceedingly awkward position, and a simple alliance with Italy would probably be more readily and immediately accepted by public opinion than any other defensive combina- tion which a British Government could make. At the same time, it cannot be denied that Mr. Wilkinson's project has merits as designed to cover the whole field of our possible differences with European Powers.
Even if Mr. Spenser Wilkinson's positive conclusions should not be adopted, a perusal of his book would be very useful as stating questions of Imperial policy in a compazt, clear, and interesting form. As we have suggested before in these columns, we see no reason for believing that Russia is our natural and necessary enemy. Rather we incline to the belief that she is less our essential rival than any other Power. She is the great land Power we the great sea Power; and even where our interests clash, there is no reason to believe an under- standing impossible. This is of course a conclusion directly opposed to the view of Mr. Wilkinson, but for all that we welcome his book. It makes for clear thinking and for facing squarely, courageously, and with open eyes the great problems which confront us in foreign policy.
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