THE POSITION OF FRANCE. T HE long, debate on French policy
in Morocco, which was remarkable for the intervention of M. Delcasse after a silence of two and a half years, enables one to take the bearings of the French ship of State. She has been navigated through a gale, and has by no means left the stormy weather behind, but the records of the voyage are full enough to make it worth while to ask ourselves what point she has reached and how she lies in relation to other nations.
In 1904 the Anglo-French Agreement made it possible for France to go forward with a serene mind in her policy of the pacific penetration of Morocco. Her trade interests in Morocco were far greater than those of any other country ; she was already a great Moslem Power in North Africa, and for that reason had there a traditional and growing influence. She had no thought—unless we are to disbelieve the solemn word of responsible French statesmen—of annexing Morocco ; she knew very well that she could not do that without the consent of other countries whose trade might not have amounted to very much in Morocco, but whose right to every opportunity of enlarging it was morally inalienable. France, then, took the initiative because commercially it was worth her while to do so, and other nations would have gained by the development of a country whose doors would remain open to their trade. Morocco herself at that time was not at all averse from French patronage, for it was to France that the Sultan spontaneously turned in each of his recurrent crises of penury. When France announced her Moroccan policy to Europe, she did not do so in the most formal conceivable way, and, as later events proved, it might have been better if she had done so. But at all events it is not possible honestly to say that her policy was kept secret. She made it known to Germany in the very same terms in which she made it known to her own ally, Russia. Neither international courtesy nor friendship seemed to M. Delcasse, the French Foreign Minister, to require more. For a year there was no whisper or suspicion that he was mistaken. When a cry of alarm was raised in Germany, Prince Billow instantly stilled it, and assured his countrymen that their interests were not threatened. But a year later—in the memorable and anxious year 1905—Germany began to act as though her interests, after all, were threatened in Morocco. She demanded explanations of everything from France ; she displayed her power before the eyes of the Sultan and his Viziers; and thus, as was inevitable, injured the Moorish conception of the pre-eminent influence of France. So far, as he could, the Sultan entered upon the immemorial game of Eastern potentates of playing off one European Power against another. That Power whose purse seemed more accessible was his chosen friend at the moment. The moral position of France in Morocco was damaged to an extent which even vet we are unable to estimate. And what was the reason for Germany's change of front ? M. Delcassd's explanation is simple, and of course not new. He believes that French movements in Morocco were only taken as a pretext, and that the real object of Germany was to detach France from her friendship with Great Britain, and cause her virtually to acknowledge a German hegemony in Europe. The shattering of Russian strength in the Russo-Japanese War had made possible a heavy-handed manipulation of the disposition of European power which Germany could scarcely have attempted when Russia, the ally of France, was not yet weakened or distracted. This, says M. Delcasse, is the reason why Germany discovered that interests which were not threatened in 1904 were somehow threatened by the same policy in 1905; and why, though she seemed by her silence in 1904 to admit that the diplomatic treatment which Russia had received was also good enough for herself, she discovered in 1905 that an affront had been put upon her.
It is unnecessary for our purpose to examine very closely the nintives of Germany. The facts, which are in the memory oi all, are enough ; and the facts are that Germany areated France with a roughness which, if it were the common manner of diplomacy, would change the colloquial meaning of the word "diplomatic," and eventually appeared to threaten her with war unless she agreed to attend the European Conference which the Sultan of Morocco had suggested at German instigation. M. Delca.sse now says that war was never for a moment possible, and we dare say he is right. It is quite possible that when the French Cabinet dismissed M. Deleass6 because he held out for resistance to the German demand they were yielding unnecessarily to intimida- tion. But the essential point to notice, in examining the policy of France, is that Frenchmen were unwilling to accept whatever risk there was of war. Peace was their policy, and the danger, great or small, of disturbing that was not to be faced. The result of the dispute between France and Germany has thus been twofold: the result in Morocco, and the result in Europe. The result in Morocco —all the more ironical if M. Delcass6 is right in saying that Germany was never much concerned with what happened there—is almost disastrous ; the country is in confusion, trade with the interior is paralysed, and the loss of respect which Frenchmen suffered owing to the unseemly wrangles of Europe has ended in the lives of all Europeans being in danger, and the lives of Frenchmen being in more danger than all the rest. The result in Europe has been very different, and (ironically, too) much happier. We cannot hesitate to say that France commands the regard and respect of the world more now than ever. She has been proved to be very careful of the peace of Europe. It has been demonstrated that she prefers making sacrifices to hazarding war on a point of dignity. In risking one kind of prestige she has found another,—the prestige which comes from patience and moderation in international dealings. Europe says of her : "Here is a country which is obviously not bent on causing trouble. Her ambitions are not an unknown quantity. She is sober and collected, and we can count upon her not to act on frivolous and selfish impulses." Countries which can feel like that about a neighbour have a most comfort- able sense of security. They know that that neighbour will move along its regular orbit, and not make sudden, if brilliant, dashes across the sky. As we said, we are not looking closely into German motives, but, judged by the same simple standard as that which we have judged France by, Germany has un- doubtedly shown herself a less public-spirited and con- siderate neighbour. If France would not risk war, it is not less true that Germany was willing to risk it. Like M. Delcasse, we do not think that she meant to declare war on France in the last resort ; but for a long time she unquestionably played with explosive materials, and the catastrophe might have come without her wish. Within the European community French policy has been what we might call social, and German policy anti-social.
France may be assured that her neighbours recognise her desire for peace, and will not accuse her of being headstrong if she always insists firmly on her right to make what friend- ships and alliances she pleases. If German motives were what M. Delcasse believes them to have been, then France in struggling against them was fighting for nothing less than the "liberty of the subject" in Europe. After the Franco- Prussian War, Bismarck, strong though Germany was then, consolidated her position by alliances ; and there is no reason, on her own showing, why Germany should regard the friendships which M. Delcass6 inaugurated with Great Britain, Italy, and Spain as minatory. They are hostile to no one, but are the natural gravitating together of Powers which desire the amenities of mutual support. M. Pichon was perfectly justified in saying this week that France would not tolerate the further internationalisation of Morocco. He is justified out of the mouth of the Algeciras Conference itself, which acknowledged the "special position" of France there both by commercial interest and physical contiguity. Englishmen will offer France their sincere good wishes in fulfilling in Morocco a policy which is the minimum expression of that special position (we use M. Pichon's own words) : "Defence of the rights of France, respect for International Conventions, protection of French subjects, neutrality as to Moroccan internal affair'', no protectorate."
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