LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.
THE NEED FOR STERNNESS IN PUBLIC LIFE.
[TO THE EDITOR OP THE EPECTATOR.$1
Si,—The note which you append to my letter in the Spectator of October 25th swells, as was to be expected, the indictment against the late War Minister. Of course, as you say, he is not to be held responsible for the actual failure of the general at Colenso, Spion Kop, and Vaal Krantz, any more than for the abortive attack on Paardeberg. But on the other hand, if the Boers had not been allowed to take the initiative, and to do more or less what they pleased while our army was crossing the sea, there would have been no occasion for a relief either of Ladysmith or of Kimberley, and the main advance into the Orange Free State could have been pushed from the first along the central instead of the western railway. You yourself say that you hold a War Minister responsible for failure in the field when due to his lack of foresight; and if it does not prove lack of foresight that our army was still six thousand miles from the frontier when the enemy was crossing it, I do not know what will prove it. So far, then, I think we are in agreement. One count in the charge of lack of foresight is proved against the late Minister of War by the fact that the troops were not on the spot when war broke out. A second count is proved, on your own showing, by the Report of the Remount Committee. Finally, you add a third charge, of failing to choose competent commanders and of not recalling weak generals when their incompetence had become patent. As to this I have no sufficient knowledge or information; but if this accusation also can be brought home to the Minister, most assuredly it ought to be. In any case, the first two charges stand ; and yet the Minister goes scot-free. I am well aware, Sir, that even if the substitution of military for civil control over the War Depart- ment could cure the evils of our military system, it would be hopeless to look for it. I only claimed for it the advantage that it makes it possible to try the War Minister by Court. Martial, and I confess that it seems to me lamentable that because he is a civilian he can be tried by no Court at all. Public opinion, in fact, is so well trained by our past history to accept incompetent War Ministers as inevitable that it is unduly lenient to them. Suppose that this war in South Africa bad been a naval war, against a Power possessing, say, twenty-five powerful ships. Suppose that at the outbreak of war our only force on the spot had been six ships, and that the Admiral in command, after a little sparring, had been blockaded in a bay with the lose of one ship, and subjected to bombardment. Suppose that a relieving squadron had been sent out piecemeal, and that the new Admiral after three failures had at last succeeded in extricating the blockaded squadron, what would have happened at home ? I believe that the First Lord of the Admiralty, and very likely the whole Board with him, would have been driven from office forthwith in disgrace; and that one, if not both, of the Admirals would have been tried by Court-Martial, with perhaps one or more of the Sea Lords also. In plain words, the country would not endure such things at the Admiralty. It ought not to endure them at the War Office.—I am, Sir,
J. W. FORTESCUE.
[We would bring home responsibility to our War Ministers by the most drastic methods, but we cannot admit that there is any ground for believing that a soldier would prove a better Secretary of State for War than a civilian, and hold that
there is much ground for believing the reverse. Our worst War Ministers have been those who leaned most on purely professional advice.—En. Spectator.]
Previous page
