THE USE OF CAVALRY.*

THE efficiency of cavalry in warfare is for many reasons more dependent on the efficiency of the officers who lead it than that of any other arm in the service, and Sir Evelyn Wood professes himself by no means satisfied with the cavalry training that can be obtained by our present system of manmuvres. Umpires, as a rule, are too apt to assume that the rifle fire of infantry on service is as deadly as its aim on the range, and to over-estimate also the value of artillery practice when guns are laid on moving targets; the result being that their decisions, while they are far from repre- senting the probable results of war, are generally extremely discouraging to the cavalry officer engaged. With a view to proving the erroneous character of these judgments, and of helping officers towards a more correct appreciation of the value and capabilities of cavalry, when properly handled, Sir Evelyn has made a selection of twelve of the most famous and characteristic cavalry engagements during the last century, which he now offers as studies for the benefit of young officers who, in default of actual experience in the field, are anxious to learn what can and has been done by men in their own line. Of these twelve achievements, as Sir Evelyn terms them, North Germany is credited with no leas than five, Austria and France with two each, while England, Poland, and Russia can only claim one. "This is to be accounted for," says the author, "so far as our cavalry is concerned, by the fact that though it had many opportunities of achieving success in the Peninsular War, yet the leading of its officers, being more indicative of courageous hearts than of well-stored minds, was often barren of results." There are, in fact, more instances in our military history of heroic blunders, like the Charge of the Six Hundred, than of well-planned cavalry successes.

The great cavalry leader, like the great General or the great Admiral, is, we suspect, born and not made. Take Kellerman, for example, the true hero of Marengo, who by charging opportunely, at the head of five squadrons only of cavalry, changed the whole face of the battle at the most critical moment, and converted an impending defeat into a glorious victory, even capturing two thousand prisoners and the General in command. Kellerman, according to our author, possessed in a remarkable degree the three essential qualities of a perfect cavalry leader. To wik—" his courage was indomitable ; he had that quickness of perception which enabled him to seize the exact moment for throwing his com- mand on the enemy ; he was able to inspire his troops, not only with his own determination, but with confidence in his leading." The last quality, adds the author, is often wanting in even the most daring men. Murat certainly possessed the first of these qualities in the highest degree, and it is difficult to believe that he did not possess the last, in spite of the fact that he was lamentably deficient in the second. As a contrast

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to Kellerman's exploit at Marengo, Prince Murat's operations near Leipsic are very instructive. Sir Evelyn tells a rather characteristic story of Napoleon with reference to Kellerman. That he fully appreciated the value of the latter's exploit was shown by his words on the battle-field. "That little Keller- man did very well! He charged home, and in the nick of time; we owe him a good turn"

Nevertheless, two hours later, when Kellerman entered the

room in which the Generals were sitting at supper, Napoleon said coldly, 'You made rather a good charge to-day,' and then, turning to Benieres, whose command bad only charged a beaten foe at dusk, observed, 'The Guard covered itself with glory.' Keller- man, irritated by this injustice, answered, I am glad you are pleased, Consul, for this will put the crown on your head.'"

It is one thing to be a good cavalry officer, and quite

another to be a good courtier. The most brilliant, perhaps, of the achievements related by the author is that of General von Bredow, at Reyonville, in the Franco-Prussian War. The position of the left flank of

• Achi.roements of Cavalry. By General Sir Evelyn Wood, V.C., &c.. London: George Bell an4 Son.

the German army had become highly critical, and the orders given to Von Bredow were to relieve the temporarily overpowered infantry by silencing the French batteries in front, cost what it might, and making an effort to break through the French infantry beyond them. The enterprise, on the face of it, seemed to partake largely of the character of a forlorn hope. Readers must be referred to Sir Evelyn Wood's pages for his spirited account of an action which cannot be described in a short space. Suffice it to say that at the head of six squadrons—some 750 men—Von Bredow utterly wrecked six of the enemies' batteries and dispersed four battalions of infantry, besides rendering a good account of the French cavalry, which tried to intercept his return. The loss on Von Bredow's side was heavy,—among his Cuirassiers the casualties amounted to 7 officers, 198 men, and 261 horses; among his Lancers the losses were 9 officers, 222 other ranks, and 224 horses. On the French side, however, the loss was still heavier, and while the immediate pressure was taken off the German infantry, which had run out of ammunition, the effect on the French was such as to completely check the advance of a whole army corps. General von Bredow has the honour of being represented by the only portrait in Sir Evelyn's book. The face is a striking one, and interesting insomuch as no one could fail to recognise it as that of a soldier, and, most people, we fancy, would add, of a cavalry soldier too. What special features characterise a cavalry face it would be hard to say ; nevertheless, there is something that seems to us unmistakable in the hawk-like outline. Another most interesting and instructive exploit is that per- formed by the British cavalry, represented by five squadrons of the King's German Legion, at Garcia Hernandez. Here again was a feat which should have been absolutely impossible according to the rules and probabilities of warfare. These five squadrons, sent to attack some squadrons of the enemy's cavalry that were out in the open, came unexpectedly upon a large body of infantry and artillery that was concealed by an intervening hill. Their gallant leader, Colonel Bock, never hesitated to attack what was, in fact, the infantry rear-guard of a French division, with the result that he broke two squares and captured a General and one thousand prisoners. Chance favoured them in the breaking of the first square :—

"The two front ranks of the French infantry, kneeling with the rear ranks standing behind, in all six deep, presented an apparently impenetrable barrier, but a shot from one of the kneel- ing ranks, by killing a horse, threw both it and its rider on the bayonet, and into the gap thus made rode the dragoons. Though Bock's men and horses at first fell fast, the formation of the infantry once broken, the whole battalion was either sabred or taken prisoners."

The story of Bock's charge, as most of the exploits narrated by Sir Evelyn Wood, seems to point to one thing as

the chief essential of a cavalry charge, namely, a determination on the part of officers and men alike to ride home at all costs. Of course the fire of modern rifles is a good deal more deadly

and effective at longer ranges than was that of infantry in the Peninsular War. Nevertheless, as the author points out in more than one instance, the really destructive effect of the rifle, now as then, is not felt until the attacking cavalry are almost upon an infantry square. It follows that the crucial moment is of short duration if by sheer weight the mounted combatant can succeed in breaking through the barrier of steel opposed to him. A famous French cavalry soldier, Edouard de Colbert, in describing how he should wish the last stage of a cavalry charge to be delivered, said : "What I should like to see would be that at ten paces from the enemy the bits should all drop out of the horses' mouths. If that happened, however strong the enemy might be, he would be overthrown to a certainty." The weight and impetus of cavalry in a well-delivered charge would be absolutely irre-

sistible, were it not for the irresolution of the rider, and in nearly every one of the achievements related by Sir Evelyn Wood, when chance unpreparedness on the part ti the foe has not facilitated the first onslaught of the carflry, its success has been won by the most reckless and determined courage. The same unreasoning and self-sacrificing bravery—

that displayed by a naked and badly armed savage—has before now succeeded in breaking a British square. Sir Evelyn Wood adds a chapter upon the subject of mounted infantry, a branch of the service which owes much to the attention that he has devoted to it. While admitting all the advantages which he claims for the men, who can be moved like cavalry, and fight like foot-soldiers, we still hold that the old objection holds good in the matter of their employment as true cavalry, in delivering a charge for instance. "How absurd," wrote a German officer, "is our manner of training our dragoons ! When mounted they are tang14 that no infantry can resist the impetuosity of their charges; when drilling on foot they are taught to consider themselves invulnerable against cavalry." However, their real sphere of usefulness is outside this objection, and the author adduces excellent reasons for their further development.